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ABSTRACT
This dissertation combines Gregory Ulmer’s post-criticism
with multimodal composition resulting in a work that cri-
tiques the medium of comics in comics format. Six trad-
tional text chapters forge a theoretical and practical founda-
tion; punctuated within and without by occasional visual inter-
ludes and three comic sections. I advocate teaching multimod-
al composition through comics’ interplay of image and text.
iii
DEDICATION
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1“This book is not a good book.” 
Lyotard, DF 191
uestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio indissolubili materia perfectae, 
quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis manibus ipsa texuerat; quarum 
speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet, caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis 
obduxerat. harum in extremo margine Π graecum, in supremo uero Q legebatur 
intextum atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti 
uidebantur, quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. 
Her clothing was wrought of the finest thread by subtle workmanship brought to 
an indivisible piece. This had she woven with her own hands, as I afterwards did 
learn by her own shewing. Their beauty was somewhat dimmed by the dulness 
of long neglect, as is seen in the smoke-grimed masks of our ancestors. On the 
border below was inwoven the symbol Π, on that above was to be read a Q. And 
between the two letters there could be marked degrees, by which, as by the rungs 
of a ladder, ascent might be made from the lower principle to the higher. 
Boethius, Consilatio Philosophiae, 1. 3-4
As one of the first texts I read in Latin, Boethius’ Consolatio has had a great influence 
on me. I remember when I first saw Lady Philosophy, decked in her homespun robe. In 
my elementary knowledge, I imagined the two letters as the walls of a ladder, the steps 
1 References to Discours, Figure will be abbreviated DF and by followed by the page numbers of 
the original French edition.
2moving back and forth from practical to theoretical knowledge. Comparing my own 
translation to others, I realized I had made an error. Practical knowledge lay at the bottom 
of the garment, waiting to be overcome by one who would climb toward theoretical 
knowledge. Philosophy banishes those meretricious muses, calling them scenicas 
meretriculas (drama queens), knowing that only philosophy can heal the sick. They are 
far too base for her higher theoretical knowledge. 
 I still like my first reading better. 
 Boethius is much more ambivalent than the informed (and oversimplified) 
reading presents him. Certainly, he loves philosophy, his consolation, but he also loves 
poetry and muses. The Consolatio’s prosimetrical form offers (in)[decon]struct-able/d 
binaries, theory and practice, poetry and prose. The steps that join theory and practice are 
productive (poesis).What Aristotle theorized, Boethius practices: knowing, doing, and 
making. 
I took these lessons with me in choosing a graduate program. I loved theory, but I loved 
making things out of it. I loved teaching, but too many pedagogues tended to fear either 
thinking about their work or using it to produce anything of worth; far too often they 
avoid both. Clemson’s PhD program in Rhetorics, Communication and Information 
Design stresses theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge. It offered me at once 
a place to reflect and learn, while forcing me to teach and reflect, to create and again to 
reflect. It struck me quickly that the warp of the weave was reflection. Shuttling back and 
forth from production to practice to theory, reflection made it all work. 
 This dissertation was produced out of a desire to weave these three. In seeking 
to theorize multimodal composition, I realized a truly multimodal text would be made 
of knowing and doing. Comics appeared first as a way of discussing the marriage of 
3words to things, of theory and practice. Whereas much of multimodal composition theory 
has stressed one medium over another, I found in comics a medium that operated quite 
self-consciously on the hypostatic union of semantic and sensory that all media always 
engage. Rather than offering comics as the supreme medium or a meta-medium or a 
container medium, I find they perform the same basic operations all other media do, but 
more obviously, more basically. 
It is this obviousness that first presented comics to me as an object of study. 
On every page of a comic, readers are forced to move rapidly, recursively from text to 
image. Comic readers consciously and unconsciously read images and see text (and vice-
versa). The infinite gulf between plastic and print is routinely bridged in a medium rarely 
considered beautiful or sublime. 
Comics also offer a way of performing post-criticism, Greg Ulmer’s term for 
using the medium to critique the medium. Ulmer advocates working in other media 
rather than attempting to critique from the outside (text).2 Previously, I’ve employed this 
methodology to create video games, comics, and videos. For the dissertation, comics was 
an obvious choice. As the only print option, it seemed the most likely to be accepted by 
the graduate school. 
Early on in my research Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari provided me an 
opening and a caveat. The notion of Rhiz|comics transports the rhizome into multimodal 
composition. I firmly believe that comics and composition need the figure of the rhizome 
desperately. Deleuze and Guattari present the Rhizome in opposition to the classical tree 
model of the book (exemplified most notably by Peter Ramus, on whom more later). 
Rather than constantly subdividing or obeying the species-genus-differentiae model of 
definition, rhizomic writing moves up, left, east, out, down, through, over, against, et 
semper cetera. My students had spent too long internalizing the five-paragraph essay. 
2  Il n’ya pas de hors-texte.
4It gave them indigestion. Worse, I had to read their five-paragraph essays. A rhizomic 
model of writing recognizes what composition teachers have known for so long: writing 
is recursive, communal, fictional, multiple, nonlinear. 
To this list I add that composition is always already multimodal. And here we 
come to Deleuze and Guattari’s caveat:
Each plateau can be read starting anywhere and can be related to any other 
plateau. To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs 
it; no typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of 
words, no syntactical boldness can substitute for it. In fact, these are more often 
than not merely mimetic procedures used to disseminate or disperse a unity that 
is retained in a different dimension for an image-book. Technonarcissism. (A 
Thousand Plateaus 22)
A Thousand Plateaus is multimodal only in this philosophical, “always-already” sense 
I used above. Certainly their text has a sensory nature, appearing as marks on a page or 
illuminated pixels, but they took very little advantage of this property, almost ignoring it 
completely. For them, such calls are mere technonarcissism. 
 Multimodal composition seems to draw technonarcissists. I’m probably the chief 
offender. I love making my students download the latest open-source software and create 
something new and exciting. I worry that I sometimes use Photoshop just because I’ve 
got it. I fight against those who think that writing must always be (or ever was) just words 
on paper. Technology is neither an end to itself or a destructive force. 
 Flipping the quote around we get the strange claim that their book may be read 
out of order, for it is rhizomatic. Jean-François Lyotard made the same claim about his 
Discours, figure. He called such a book, “a good book.” This is not such a book. It has an 
order. It has rhizomic moments, but it is for the most part a traditional dissertation (albeit 
5a multimodally technonarcissistic one). 
The dissertation is divided into three sections: knowing, doing, and making. 
Part one, knowing, takes up the first three chapters. Part two, doing, consists of chapters 
four through six. Making twists across the entirety. Three comic excurses punctuate my 
overall argument, acting as notes toward a supreme composition (borrowing their titles 
and much of their title pages from Wallace Stevens’ “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”).
 With its focus on theory, the first half may feel a bit heavier than the second. 
Chapter one, “The Structure of Comics: Ut Poesis Pictura,” begins by querying 
Derrida’s infamous hors-texte. It offers possible outsides while attempting to avoid the 
inside|outside binary. In contrast to current definitions of comics, based either on the 
movement across the gutter or on historical/generic contexts, I decenter comics around 
the image-text binary. This focal point allows an expansion of comic theory into other 
media and fields such as hypermedia. The subtitle inverts the typical order, ut pictura 
poesis, showing that the play between image and text is bidirectional.
 Excursus one, “It Must Be Abstract,” advocates a return to dialogue in 
composition. It attempts to show rather than tell the advantages of a multimodal 
composition always in conversation with itself. 
 Chapter two, “Signs of the Times: Figure, Discourse,” repeatedly deconstructs 
the sign searching for a third way between discourse and figure. Close readings provides 
ample evidence that the categories of image and text refuse to stabilize. Texts are seen 
and images read. For the first time comics become the objects of criticism, but artifacts 
traditionally considered texts leap alongside them to complicate the medium. 
 Chapter three, “Playing It Cool: Reflexive Multimodal Composition,” interrogates 
possible syntheses for discourse, figure, finally finding the synthesis in the reader. The 
reader’s participatory synthesis of modes remediates hot media towards cold. The chapter 
6itself relies heavily on a reader’s synthesis of multiple texts: both the main text and that 
of three tangents on Greek philosophical terms. Finally, I advocate a reflexive multimodal 
composition, the focus of the second half of the dissertation.
 Splitting the two halves we have the second excursus, “It Must Change.” This 
comic triangulates a future for composition based on design. The iterative design model 
(design, test, analyze) offers old ways of new writing and vice versa. From the first 
excursus’ dualism, we move towards possible third ways.
 With the second half, the heady theories of the first half are brought to ground 
in practical application. In Chapter four, “Restructuring Writing: Hypermedia and 
Rhiz|Comics,” I begin my analysis of Rhiz|comics, a composition between and across 
media and modes. Bernard Stiegler offers a complex, nuanced historical understanding of 
technology and our relationship with it. The history of rhetorical theory can be read as a 
marginalization of the canon of delivery. Recent technological advances have drastically 
changed the importance of delivery, yet the academy seems oddly isolated from many of 
these changes. Ignoring the importance of delivery, students and scholars have become 
alienated from their labor. 
 Chapter five, “Plays Well with Others: Rhizcomics in the Classroom,” refocuses 
my argument on teaching composition, explaining how comic composition teaches 
electracy and rhizomatic thought in productive ways. Compositionists have recently 
returned to delivery in document design and multimodal composition. Reflecting on 
various teaching experiences in my Technical Writing classroom, I show the resistance 
to new thought and the breakthroughs that Rhiz|comics can offer. In a technical writing 
course, I assigned Greg Ulmer’s mystory, a project which fuses professional, popular, and 
personal narratives into a single multimodal text. A student of mine prepared this short 
comic relating the discovery of structure and equilibrium in his love for records to his 
7chosen career as a civil engineer. Another student answered the Mystory assignment with 
a single poster, integrating popular, personal, and professional.
I add to this a final tool for pedagogical self-awareness and for constructing a 
multimodal classroom: augmented pedagogy. In efforts to teach (with) electracy, I have 
used Adobe Connect and traditional lecturing to achieve an augmented pedagogy. Adobe 
Connect offers webinar modalities: chat space, video conferencing, collective notepads, 
polling devices, and shared control of screens. By using emerging software like Adobe 
Connect simultaneously with a traditional lecture we create an augmented classroom. 
Students are free to engage in chat based conversations while the teacher lectures and 
to engage the material in multiple representations. Augmented Pedagogy brings what 
I theorized of multimodal composition in the first half together with the delivery of 
composition.
The final excursus, “It Must Give Pleasure,” calls play back in from recess. The 
prescription for student narcolepsy is playful pedagogy. We as scholars and teachers have 
forgotten Sidney’s twofold use of poesy: to instruct and to delight. If we are to join poesis 
to praxis and theoria, play must provide the glue. In order to enact such play, I practice 
the comic art of the fugue, a braiding of meaning across various registers.
The critical reader may already have noticed patterns in the organization of the 
chapters and in their titles. These patterns will continue throughout the dissertation, 
especially as I multiply modes in subsequent chapters. This weaving across chapters 
follows the general arthrology first termed by Thierry Groensteen, and most notably used 
in Vladimir Nabokov’s prosimetrical Pale Fire. In Pale Fire the weaving of prose and 
poetry, text and commentary, reader and writer, constructs a single object, a multiplexed 
text. At one point a character seems to discover the text around him and the artist who has 
constructed it:
8But all at once it dawned on me that this
 Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme;
 Just this: not text, but texture; not the dream
 But topsy-turvical coincidence, 
 Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense. 
Yes!  It sufficed that I in life could find
 Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind
 Of correlated pattern in the game,
 Plexed artistry, and something of the same
Pleasure in it as they who played it found.  (ll. 806-15)
Plexed artistry, then. There can be no more beautiful term for the reflexive, multimodal 
composition I advocate. I offer it then as an homage to its greatest practitioner since 
Boethius. May this work offer you the same pleasure as I found in playing it.
For now, abide these three: theoria, praxis, poesis, but the greatest of these is 
poesis.
1ut poesis pictura
Structure
the
of comics
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I begin then with the eye, and all will spread 
from this initial insistence. There are two aspects 
of the eye’s physiology with which I will erect a 
structure for the playing out of interconnections.
First, there is peripheral vision. The dis-
tribution of rods and cones on the back of 
the eye makes peripheral vision more acute 
at seeing difference — black and white — 
and narrow vision more acute at seeing con-
tinuity — the range of color. While looking at 
stars, for example, the periphery is far more 
able to distinguish these small balls of light 
against the dark sky, and every stargazer 
must learn to look near but not directly at. 
Second, there is the parallax view. Three 
dimensional space is a mental construction 
based upon two conflicting interpretations of the 
world — those of the left and right eye. Keep-
ing these two figures in mind, I will proceed to 
discuss comics, through the 
two lenses of philosophy and 
art, but also as a center I must walk around. 
This first chapter then may seem to have little 
to do with comics per se, but recognize that 
they are evident in each assertion I make. 
If we are to discuss the eye, we must 
begin with its story’s teller, George Bataille:
The point of view I adopt is one that re-
veals the coordination of these potenti-
alities. I do not seek to identify them with 
each other but I endeavor to find the 
point where they may converge beyond 
their mutual exclusiveness. (Erotism 7)
Bataille’s figure of sex and death is at once 
parallax and peripheral, combinatory and su-
perficial. My task concerns concepts no less im-
portant to a unified description of being: image 
and text, coupled with perception and action.
Eye am become a transparent I
(Deleuze,  “The Actual and the Virtual” nt. 9)
11Change for a Pair ‘o dimes
We are told everywhere that there is a change 
underway. The digital revolution, the advent 
of visual literacy, it is called by many names. 
Sometimes it is a technological renaissance, 
other times a paradigm shift. I however am in-
terested not in defining this change, in finding its 
limits, but rather in decentering it, both laying 
down and (re)moving its center. As may seem 
obvious, the center lies in the middle, between; 
not with a finis on each side, the limits waiting to 
be defined, but between other, older centers. 
I will choose two centers and watch them 
move: visual and verbal. These are not chosen 
at random, but as a means of approaching the 
question sidelong. This division may indeed be 
hardwired into our brains, the verbal left hemi-
sphere coupled to the visual right hemisphere 
by the corpus callosum. Thought exists in the 
communication across this fissure. Neuroscience 
teaches us that ideas are not localizable within 
the brain but are created by neural connections 
(Damassio). Similarly, words are almost mean-
ingless without context. Meaning is created 
through connections. New me-
dia make this more explicit as 
context becomes removable. 
Just as context and text are no longer 
easily separable, visual and verbal modes 
have become inextricable — rather have been 
revealed to have always been the same thing. 
I am not the first to argue this. W. J. T Mitchell 
implies that the division between image and 
text has always been illusory (46). Each new 
medium uses these two modes in one way or 
another. Film and television greet us with mov-
ing images coupled to an audio track. The av-
erage magazine today contains more space 
devoted to images than text, and page layout 
itself has always been a visual mode. Digital 
media marry image and text throughout. The 
DJ spins in front of old kung fu and blaxploi-
tation flicks. If there is a new paradigm, it is 
not a stable position but a method: intercon-
nectivity of various modes. This interconnectiv-
ity must embrace its own inherent reflexivity.
For example, there is the con-
textless lolcat meme. Originally a 
look inside the dubiously grammatical 
world of cats, the meme has circled 
the internets subsuming culture and 
creating its own context along the 
way. The context of the greater meme 
of imitation lolcats becomes insepa-
rable from the original. Context itself 
becomes inseparable from the text, 
in which case it is not context. In new 
media context is (re)producible. 
Lo
l C
at
s
12From defining to decentering
If it is everywhere, why start with comics? One 
measures a circle starting anywhere (Charles 
Fort or Alan Moore, I can never remember1)  so 
we might as well start there, at the periphery, 
in that marginalized medium. However, they 
also seem to evidence this multimodality more 
explicitly than any other medium. The metatex-
tuality of multimodal texts forces self-reflection, 
and this is a good thing. Before we continue 
then, allow me a digression on the indefinabil-
ity of comics, bringing us closer to decentering.
 We must start where every scholarly 
work on comics starts, with Will Eisner and Scott 
McCloud. Eisner pioneered comic theory, be-
ginning with comic strips, creating the Graphic 
Novel, and finally offering book length 
treatises on what he called “sequen-
tial art.” This term is important for Eis-
ner and for the field because it set in 
stone a specific definition for comics: 
the interrelationship of panels to cre-
ate a narrative. Between one panel 
and the next, the reader2  creates 
closure, a sense of narrative and con-
nection. Art Spiegelman calls this “time 
mapped across space” and he too rec-
ognizes it as the quintessential comic 
moment. Marshall McLuhan saw in this moment 
comics’ participatory power — the reader is 
forced to interact with the comic more con-
sciously than with a traditional text. This then 
is Eisner’s definition of comics: sequential art.
1 Don’t listen to him, it’s Fort.
2 I realize the problems inherent in the 
term Reader, but I will complicate it in later 
chapters to the degree that it is applicable to 
comics.
If Eisner is the Plato of 
comics, McCloud is the Aris-
totle. He took Eisner’s defini-
tion and systematized it. His 
definition of comics follows Eisner’s, becoming 
more explicit as it does: pictorial and other im-
ages placed in deliberate sequence. McCloud 
also notes a productive inconsistency in this 
definition: it applies to things we would never 
think of as comics. McCloud finds sequential art 
in the Bayeux Tapestry, Trajan’s Column, a Ma-
yan Codex, even cave paintings. And herein 
lies the problem. Scholars have since tried des-
perately to pin down the finis, the limit of com-
ics, in their definitions, mostly with little success. 
Aaron Meskin’s 2007 article, “De-
fining Comics?” provides an erudite de-
scription of the issue. Meskin’s prob-
lem with most definitions is that they
offer an ahistorical account of com-
ics, which leaves their account open 
to plausible counterexamples from 
the prehistory of comics. . . . One obvi-
ous response to this problem would 
be to incorporate a historical condi-
13
tion into the proposed definition. (369)
The problem could be put more succinctly: 
we all know what we are referring to when 
we say comics, and it has nothing to do with 
cave paintings. By defining comics histori-
cally, Meskin evades this problem elegantly. 
The art of comics, which began in the 
middle of the nineteenth century and 
developed largely out of eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century caricature and 
mid-nineteenth-century British humor 
magazines such as Punch, can and 
should be understood on its own terms 
and by reference to its own history. (376)
However, this definition obliterates comics’ unique-
ness and potency. If comics are defined solely 
historically, they can only be studied through 
historical modes and have little to say to con-
temporary issues across disciplines. Meskin rec-
ognizes this flaw and seeks to evade it by ques-
tioning whether we actually need a definition.
 I follow Meskin to 
a certain degree but am 
unable to avoid defining 
comics by the same means. 
I have no definition I could 
give that would surpass the 
efforts of scholars who have come before me, 
yet I cannot leave the term hanging and build 
an entire structure on it. Rather than defining, I 
seek to decenter comics. The de of define entails 
laying down, in this case a limit. Here decenter-
ing takes on this meaning as well as the more 
traditional meaning of destabilizing. On the one 
hand, laying down the center entails focusing 
on what comics do more explicitly than other 
media; for me this is the combination of the vi-
sual and the virtual. On the other hand, moving 
this center means moving terms, from comics to 
rhiz|comics. Throughout the rest of this chapter I 
will attempt this first move, laying down a center 
and leave the decentering until the next chapter.
The Center which is no Center
Image and text, visual and verbal have 
been separated for as long as there 
has been language. Saussure’s sign itself 
speaks to this division, on one side an 
image of a tree, on the other, the word 
“tree” itself. Homer signifies a distinct mo-
ment in the history of this division. While the 
original Iliad and Odyssey were presented 
multimodally through oral presentation 
(gesture at this moment inextricably tied to 
speech), the moment it is written down it 
becomes something else. Homeric schol-
arship has since been an archaeology of 
what was lost in translation from speech to 
writing. The division has existed since the birth 
of ekphrasis and the notion of ut pictura po-
esis, echoing down through the history of art.
W. J. T. Mitchell’s Iconography provides a 
14
route in to art criticism for those of us who are 
on the outside. The second half of his book pro-
vides a historical overview of the image|text di-
vision through four major critics. First,  we have 
Edmund Burke’s distinction between sublime and 
beautiful. The sublime always signifies a depth 
of feeling greater than signification can signify. It 
could be viewed as the love and fear wrapped 
up in the supplement. For Burke it exists only 
in language, for painting cannot signify more 
than what it is. Instead, its worth lies in beau-
ty, in designating rather than signifying. Kant’s 
aesthetic theory depends heavily upon Burke.
Gotthold Lessing built upon Burke’s work, 
further elucidating the relationship between 
painting and poetry. For Lessing, the relation-
ship comes down to space and time: painting 
is atemporal representation within space; po-
etry is temporal representation divorced from 
space. Lessing abhors (a la Burke) any mixing 
between the two. His simplistic definition is 
complicated through various examples. Keats’ 
“Ode upon a Grecian Urn” is the classic refuta-
tion of Lessing, but comics work just as well. Like 
Keats’ ode, comics signify and designate simul-
taneously. On every page the visual and the 
verbal invert each other, from the onomato-
poeias delivered in textured fonts to the desig-
nation of movement and emotions in emminata. 
Ernst Gombrich known 
for his embrace of the Nature/
Convention binary. Gombrich 
wishes to erect a strict barrier 
between art and literature on 
the basis of this distinction — art 
is natural, literature is conventional — but finds 
that the binary deconstructs itself before his 
eyes. For Mitchell, Gombrich lacks the naivety 
of his predecessors to think he could ever main-
tain this distinction, but he has inherited their de-
sire to do so. Gombrich, at once enamored by 
nature and skeptical of its universality, chooses 
a Platonic dialectic between phusis and nomos.
Nelson Goodman reacts to Gombrich’s 
omphaloskepsis with an almost scientific rigor. 
He divides between picture and paragraph 
but allows that the distinction is relative to in-
terpretation. One may read a picture and see 
a paragraph. However, our readings are pre-
conditioned. Contrary to his predecessors, “Hy-
brid texts are not only possible but are entirely 
describable in his system . . . The only question is 
whether the results are interesting” (Mitchell 70). 
However, preceding all of this historical 
narrative, the first half of Mitchell’s book begins 
with definitions of image and text. Mitchell’s def-
initions suffer from the same problems that we 
have seen in definitions of comics. We all know 
the difference between image and text, but in 
attempting to clarify this distinction we realize 
it is no nearly as stable as we assume. Mitchell 
ends this first section of his book with a summary,
Perhaps the redemption of the imagina-
tion lies in accepting the fact that we cre-
ate much of our world out of the dialogue 
between verbal and pictorial representa-
tions, and that our task is not to renounce 
this dialogue in favor of a direct assault 
on nature but to see that nature already 
15
The Outside is the Inside
informs both sides of the conversation. (46)
This interplay between image and word com-
prises our experience with the world, and we 
cannot evade it in some attempt to access the 
real, but instead must look at the conversation 
going on between the real, image, and word. 
While Mitchell insinuates that Structuralism may 
provide a way around this binary (47), I will now 
elucidated my reasons for thinking that post-
structuralism can provide a form of indirect as-
sault on nature through a peripheral parallax, 
around and through, both and always another. 
Mitchell, it should be noted, 
does not come down on the 
side of the structuralists but 
rather hypothesizes that this 
binary will continue to resist our 
theories. Žižek would remind us 
that this resistance proves the center’s reality. It is 
the no which says yes, the repressed continually 
reasserting its power. Perhaps the peripheral 
and the parallax of poststructuralism can bring 
us closer to the decentering I have promised.
This network of word descends from the Latin plectō, meaning “to 
plait, braid.”   Its sister, plicō, means “to fold,” and descends from the 
same Greek verb: plekw, which means, “to plait, twine, twist, weave, 
braid…metaph[orically] to plan, devise, contrive.”   The original Greek 
verb, plekw, split into two distinct meanings in Latin, but rather than 
differentiating the metaphorical from the literal, each word retained 
both aspects.  From plectō we get “plexus” and “complex”, whereas 
plicō yields both “explicate” and “explicit.” This particular lexical node 
entails the concepts of planning and folding.  When a critic explicates 
a passage the author’s original complex plans are unraveled before the 
reader — the latently metatextual becomes patent.  All future puns may 
be inferred by the reader with the author’s willing consent. 
Et
ym
ol
og
y 
Fu
n
We move now to Jacques Derrida and to a pro-
viso: I cannot wholly embrace Derrida’s theo-
ries of language but I must utilize his method-
ologies of research and theory. My issue with 
Derrida’s theory of language may actually be 
illusory, but I think it worth stating. In Of Gram-
matology Derrida explicates the differences 
between speech and writing, arguing brilliantly 
and against common sense that the latter may 
precede the former. The entire argument de-
pends upon the play of presence and absence, 
explicated in a truncated form in “Différance.” 
Finally he brings us to his boldest and most con-
troversial move: “There is no outside-text” (158). 
Much ink has been spilled in the argument over 
exactly what this may mean. It certainly argues 
for an immanence which recognizes that there 
is no metalinguistic position while maintaining an 
interest in metatextuality. However, the battle 
depends more upon what is meant by text in 
this formulation. Derrida has already compli-
cated its definition throughout this work (and 
others). Suffice to say, I am uncomfortable with 
the word because I fear it might return us to a 
kind of logocentrism; however, I also embrace 
its evocation of textile weaving, folding compli-
16
Like the first word, the first pictogram is therefore an image, 
both in the sense of imitative representation and of meta-
phoric displacement. The interval between the thing itself and 
its reproduction, however faithful, is traversed only by trans-
ference. The first sign is determined as an image. The idea 
has an essential relationship to the sign, the representative 
substitution of sensation. (282)
cations. An easy way to answer my fears is to exclude it by following Foucault’s 
formulation instead: “There is no outside” (Discipline and Punish 35); this act of 
cowardice on my part is not wholly respectable and when we get to Lyotard 
I may become more gallant. My proviso given, I will proceed with Derrida.
The initial concept I must take from Grammatolo-
gy is of course the grammè. The grammè is the mark, writing, the 
trace. It is the moment of différance and its effects become what is called text. 
Derrida’s notion of the figural, at least within Of Grammatology, is  illu-
sory, elusive (note the puns on the latin word for play, ludo, lusus, which will con-
tinue). The image is for the most part presented as a moment of the grammè: a mo-
ment between speechlessness and alphabet, a hypothetical unreachable origin: 
We saw this in Saussure’s sign. The signifier and signified are divided by an insurmount-
able gap. As we move to accept Derrida’s play along the chain of signification we find that 
the gap itself is where his interest lies. Différance is not in the gap but rather is the gap.
One more example from Of Grammatology before continuing with différance:
17Here we see différance, the differentia-tion that is at once a schism and a defer-
ral. The difference of différance becomes 
entwined with the dual eyes of the par-
allax, while the constructed absent real-
ity present within the mind figures deferral.
We also have the notion of a center which is 
no center. This center cannot be seen directly, 
but only peripherally. The structure depends 
upon it. The sign gives it meaning (so long as 
we forget the play along the chain of significa-
tion). Play swirls us back toward this center, at 
times moving the center itself. This mode of pe-
riphery, of a center which is no center may be 
seen in the trace, the origin which is no origin: Th
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And with the trace we come to comics. I too am merely a tracer, adding depth to the work of 
one who has gone before me. I have here traced he who traced the trace. Derrida’s methodol-
ogy then comprises periphery and parallax, but it also gives me a more practical mode: 
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If the simulacrum is ever going 
to occur, its writing must be in 
the interval between several 
styles. And the insinuation of 
the woman (of) Nietzsche is 
that, if there is going to be style, 
there can only be more than one. (Spurs 139)
This simulacrum, the forgotten umbrella, calls for an 
interplay of styles and modes, of image and text, I 
would argue.
The Given Is Not a Text
Jean-François Lyotard’s figure looms large here, as does his discourse. His frustratingly untranslated 
Discours, Figure offers a much more sustained deconstruction of image and text than Derrida. Individual 
chapters have been translated, and Geoffrey Bennington’s colossal chapter on Discours, Figure in Lyo-
tard: Writing the Event provides a complex reading of the entire work, a reading upon which I depend.
In the first chapter of Discours, Figure, 
Lyotard lays out the stakes of his argument: 
This book protests: the given is not a 
text, there is a density to it, or rather 
a difference, a constitutive difference 
which is not to be read, but to be 
seen, this difference, and the immo-
bile mobility which reveals it, is what 
is continually forgotten in signifying it. 
(“Taking the Side of the Figural” 34, DF 9)
Here my reasons for not completely siding with Derrida become evident. The given is not a text. 
The (originary) act is not reading but seeing, of which reading is only an aspect. Think of reading 
as a fold of seeing, one of the folds of which earlier Derrida spoke and of which Deleuze would 
soon speak. The fold however has grown strong while the THIS out of which it folded has been 
left to atrophy. We see this particularly in the way images are now read while text is rarely seen. 
When referring to “originary” thus far, consider it to have been placed between paranthe-
Such is the imaginary: to possess 
both this side and the other. Such is 
sin and pride: possessing both the 
text and the illustration. 
(“Taking the Side of the Figural” 35,. DF 10).
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One advantage of this quote is that it at once displays the difficulty of Discourse, Figure and its 
basic organization. Lyotard walks back and forth from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis. The multivocality of the origin is the hinge upon which 
these two turn. In a later chapter, he calls this THIS by the name of matrix-figure, that from out of 
which all discourse and figure erupts, yet itself having neither form nor sense: 
To establish the matrix-figure in a textual, a fortiori systematic space would be to imag-
ine it as an arche, to entertain a double phantasy: first that of an origin, and then that 
of an utterable origin. Far from being an origin, the phantasmatic matrix demonstrates 
to the contrary, that our origin is an absence of origin and that everything that ap-
pears as the object of a primal discourse is an hallucinatory image-figure, located pre-
cisely in this initial non-locus. (“The Connivances of Desire with the Figural” 293, DF 271)
The question of origin returns elusively. The matrix-figure certainly occupies the non-locus of 
an origin, yet can be no univocal, utterable origin. The matrixfigure takes the side of the fig-
ural, while not being a figure itself. What then of my earlier implications that the ori-
gin is somehow figural? Lyotard responds in the very next chapter: “The figure cannot lie, 
since it has no pretensions toward univocality” (“The Dream-Work Does Not Think” 50).
We are finally approaching the THIS: Anaximander’s apeiron, the ur-stuff out of which ex-
istence exists. The boundless, apeiron can be made to dance with Lyotard’s figural, and out of 
this dance we may begin to see. The apeiron signifies that which is perceived in the parallax 
view, but that which is also constructed. We might look to Lacan’s triangle of Imaginary, Sym-
ses, bracketed from sense. This is presaged by Derrida and by Lyotard’s extensive 
discussion of the arche: 
(“Taking the Side of the Figural 42, DF 18-19)
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bolic, and Real. In my example the imaginary 
and the symbolic occupy the places of each 
eye, while the real is that which is perceived 
and constructed through their mediation. Im-
age and text in conversation with the apeiron. 
The interplay of figural and discourse 
leads us toward Lyotard’s later develop-
ment of the libidinal band. The libidinal 
band is a single surface, like a Moebius 
strip. We might imagine this as an origin, 
but only a hypothetical and impossible 
one. One of the interesting things about 
the Moebius strip is that when cut it does 
two different things. First, if we cut it along 
the middle, we get one very long strip with 
two sides. Second, if we instead cut it along 
an imaginary line a third of the way from 
the edge, we get two new strips, one with two 
sides and one new moebius strip, both strips 
being interlocked. This second cut signifies Lyo-
tard’s formulation of the relationship between 
the disjunctive bar and the libidinal band. It 
also signifies the relationship between discourse 
and figure. Discourse is two 
sided, binary, predicated by 
différance as Derrida has 
shown us. The figural, how-
ever could be likened more 
closely to this libidinal band.
Finally we have Lyotard’s Differend: an 
imagined conversation across languages. My 
own panmodal rhetoric signifies bearing wit-
ness to new idioms. Parallax and periphery fi-
nally come into conversation in Lyotard, resulting 
in something new which is always something old.
Visual Illiteracy
Gregory Ulmer has hovered behind and above 
this dissertation since its inception. His concept of 
post-criticism birthed my rhiz|comics. Now he can 
provide the glue (Ulmer’s Glue™) between gram-
matology and hypermedia. In some ways, the 
glue exists between books. Applied Grammatol-
ogy asks the question of how a deconstructive 
pedagogy would proceed. That question is an-
swered by the rest of Ulmer’s canon: hypermedia. 
Ulmer devises new rhetorics and new 
logics based not upon the word but upon new 
media. Parataxis becomes the new movement, 
always “and/and/and” rather than “or.” Con-
cepts from disparate levels of our logocen-
tric hierarchy become parallel. How does he 
accomplish this? Through a grammatology of 
hypermedia; said another way, through Der-
rida. But this is still not enough, “Not  to follow in 
the footsteps of the masters, but to seek what 
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they sought.” Ulmer takes Derrida’s concepts 
and applies them in new ways. Something old, 
something new, something borrowed, something 
true. Sampling the old, folding it in on the cur-
rent, revealing our now in the currents of the 
ancients. Here my earlier claims at reflexivity 
and metatextuality begin to come into focus:
The mise an abyme [sic] is a reflexive 
structuration, by means of which a text 
shows what it is telling, does what it 
says, displays its own making, reflects 
its own action. My hypothesis is that a 
discourse of immanent critique may be 
constructed for an electronic rhetoric 
(for use in video, computer, and inter-
active practice) by combining the mise 
en abyme with the two compositional 
modes that have dominated audio-visu-
al texts — montage and mise en scene. 
The result would be a deconstructive 
writing, deconstruction as an inventio 
(rather than as a style of book criti-
cism). (“Grammatology Hypermedia” 4)
The notion of metatextuality, of a text which is 
concerned with its own textuality, its own meta-
phoricity, belongs not just to hypermedia and 
postmodern metafiction, but to comics. Here we 
replace the mise en scene/abyme with the mise 
en panel. “To count as an 
abyss, resemblance must be 
literally manifested across 
the levels of the text. In short, 
one part of the text must lit-
erally (at least in part) as well 
as metaphorically reproduce the other” (Heu-
retics 147). This comes very close to McCloud’s 
description of the interrelationship of image and 
text in comics. They may reproduce each other 
or merely converse with each other. Both acts 
point towards an outside of the text (here used 
as the woven object that is comics) and towards 
the question of that outside’s validity, leading us 
readers to question the gap between, on the 
one hand, ourselves and the text and, on the 
other, ourselves and our own metanarratives.
It is also important to note that comics cannot 
become merely a new type of writing, but 
must move beyond. The goal is not to create a 
hypertextcentrism to answer logocentrism (or 
logo centrism), but rather to move backwards, 
to intervene. Writing speaks to comics and 
comics speak back to writing, each to each. 
Comics occupy this combination of grammatol-
ogy and hypermedia, but rely upon interven-
tions for their dissemination. 
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Ulmer returned us to the metatextuality I 
referred to in my opening. That comics tend to-
ward self-referentiality has been noted before 
(cf. Thierry Groensteen, “Bandes Désignées: 
De la Réflexivité dans les Bandes Dessinées”), 
but the importance of this fact has been over-
looked. Comics tend toward self-referentiality 
because of their multimodality. Hence, Mc-
Cloud’s straightforward Understanding Comics 
belies its postmodern presentation. McCloud 
appears throughout the book, often standing 
in one panel and referencing another panel. 
This is crucial. He references, not the ideas or 
contents of another panel but another actual 
panel.
The importance of such metatextual-
ity reveals itself through the theorists I have 
mentioned, Derrida, Lyotard, and Ulmer. Work-
ing backwards, Ulmer stresses reflexivity most 
explicitly, calling for a mise 
en scene that would always 
already be a mise en abyme. Remember, Ul-
mer is speaking of the composition classroom 
here. The purpose of such reflexivity would be 
to cause students to reflect on their own pro-
cess, to become aware of the available means 
of persuasion they utilize, rather than just utiliz-
ing them. Metatextuality makes rhetoric patent. 
Stepping out of order, Derrida intro-
duces metatextuality as inherent to text. All 
text is always already about metaphoric-
ity, textuality. But if there is no outside-text, 
what are we left with? What is the point? In 
the cramped abyme of Derrida’s grammatol-
ogy, we find no space for reflexivity to reflect.
Lyotard offers us this space, this density 
and difference that enables reflexivity and 
gives it purpose. Reflexivity is the ultimate ta-
boo in the text. Text presupposes a transpar-
ency without which reading would be too 
laborious: one would have to reflect on the 
shape and appearance of each individual 
letter. Derrida does not deny this by stress-
ing text’s inherent concern with metaphoricity. 
Rather, Derrida points us towards something 
like the return of the repressed. Figure provides 
a way out of this over-oedipalized cycle. Fig-
ure demands opacity. When looking at an 
image, one may indeed see through it, to the 
signified, but one’s attention is also rapt by the 
signifier itself. This is the strength of figure, and 
its weakness. Figure demands reflection and 
seems almost abused when forced into the tex-
tual preferences of clarity brevity and sincerity. 
If we take these two axes then, discursive 
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and figural, and multiply them by themselves, 
we get a table which might describe four ways 
in which these paradigms greet us.
First there is the figural figure in which the 
surface becomes focal, think of the paintings of 
Mark Rothko or any painter interested in the 
flatness of the canvas. In the discursive figural, 
we find figure in the service of discourse: the 
airplane safety manual being the classic ex-
ample. In the figural discourse, Nabokov’s Pale 
Fire presents a plot depen-
dent upon its own reflexivity. 
In the discursive discourse we 
are left with the zero-degree 
writing of Immanuel Kant or 
Lyotard’s style in The Differend. 
Lyotard’s concepts of 
discourse and figure provide us with a way of 
having our cake and eating it too. We live in 
the world of the disjunctive bar where signifier 
and signified are always already separated 
by a vast chasm. But, we are not completely 
without access to the libidinal band. Reflexivity 
allows us to move from one side to the other, 
moves us through the band and around un-
til we realize that discourse and figure have 
always been one sides of the same coin.
Figural Discursive
Figure
Discourse
Rothko
Nabokov
Safety Manual
Kant
1excursus 
It must be abstract
1 
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So this opening, it’s when 
we switch the two? When 
man becomes woman?
That’s one binary Janus can envelop. But 
there are others. Man and woman. Before 
and after. Image and text. Word and thing.
Absolutely not. Why would I want to have a 
conversation with myself? That’s dialectic. 
Thesis antithesis synthesis. What I’m looking 
for is not dialectic, but –
Hm. Difference. That’s all we 
have, our differences. So the 
goal is conversation so we can sort 
them out into some bland malaise?
That’s part of it. That’s negative 
deconstruction. But there is an 
affirmative deconstruction as well 
that maintains each, and maintains 
separation and differance while 
recognizing that each exists on the 
basis of the other.
/
Dialogue?
29
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I mean more specifically, this 
conversation. How did we move from 
chess to multimodal composition? 
No.
This isn’t us. It feels like 
we’re the mouthpiece for 
a rhet/comp scholar.
And what of these 
reflexive moments?So what? Have 
we learned?
Yes, language speaks us. 
This is at the center of 
the split subject.
Another binary. The distance between writer and 
reader is surmounted only physically, through texts.
What else would it mean to be multimodal?
Do you ever feel as 
though our words 
are not our own?
Reflexivity reveals the system. Makes 
us aware. Makes learning possible.
So. What have 
we learned?
32
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Heterotopia
The mechanism at work here could serve 
as the object of a scholarly explanation 
of which I am incapable 
The explanation would be valuable even 
irrefutable but the mystery would remain 
undiminished
Rene Magritte 
to Michel Foucault
I invited my friend Kyle to join me on my weekly 
pilgrimage to the local comic shop a few days 
ago. With his misspent youth reawakened, Kyle 
began debating the epistemological implica-
tions of the übermenschen of our youths. This 
quickly dissolved into various hypothetical bat-
tles between our superheroes: who would win 
in a fight, Superman or Mighty Mouse? Batman 
or Wolverine? Jean Grey or Dr. Strange? This 
last one stopped us for a moment. Jean Grey 
is/was (the character is currently dead, though 
seems to get revived on a biannual basis) the 
world’s most powerful psychic with powers of 
telepathy and telekinesis coupled to an inti-
mate understanding of psychology. Dr. Strange 
is a master of the arcane, with a knowledge of 
magic and the supernatural that beggars belief. 
Both exist within the so-called Marvel Universe, 
the self-contained universe wherein exist all the 
characters published by Marvel Comics. It sud-
denly struck me that these characters existed in 
incompatible worlds within the same universe. 
Jean Grey’s abilities depend upon a scientific, 
materialist world in which she walks through 
psychic landscapes created by human beings. 
Dr. Strange acts as a mediator between the 
spirit realms and our own. The battle has no 
common ground. Dr. Strange could rebuff Grey’s 
powers of metaphor and metonymy with magic 
and mysticism. Grey would meanwhile disperse 
Strange’s demons as the physical effects of 
psychic trauma. Though they occupy the same 
space, their material is cut from different threads. 
I was struck by the parallel relationship of 
image to text: heterotopias coexisting in the mind. 
The relationship between im-
35age and text is not Apollo and Dionysius, for the seeming binary gives way. The answer is not a simplistic monism, but a self reflexive triad. 
And counting to three offers possibilities of counting beyond numbers
In the previous chapter we discussed comics’ quest for a defi-
nition. From Eisner and McCloud’s canonical definition of com-
ics as sequential art to Aaron Meskin’s disavowal of formal definition in favor of his-
toricizing, comics have long sought to claim legitimacy through a clear definition. I 
followed Meskin in rejecting formal definitions, outlining instead a formal decentering. 
Whereas definition erects clear boundaries,
decentering focuses on central attributes which deconstruct 
themselves thereby undermining the very center it posits. 
Such decentering allows formal elements to be used to distinguish comics 
from other media while refusing to solidify any description of the medium. 
My own decentering places comics’ center in the juxtaposition of image and text. 
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from image | text,
to visual | verbal,
to paradigmatic | syntagmatic,
to decoupage | tressage,
to discourse | figure.
Finally, the general aporia of 
these binaries is embraced, allow-
ing for the endlessly recreated bina-
ries essential to the reading process.
In this chapter, I follow the movement of the center 
through successive deconstructions of binary centers:
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This aporia turns back on itself in the 
composing process, forcing students to create 
self-aware multimodal compositions within the 
medium of comics. When we embrace this apo-
ria, comics become not a marginal genre but a 
medium that currently finds itself at the center 
of all new media. The lessons 
learned in comics composi-
tion apply to web pages, 
graphic design, videos and 
all media in so far as all media depend upon 
multimodal reading and composition practices.
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Image|Text
The justaposition of image and text occupies 
the most obvious of these binaries, and the one 
with which I began my decentering process in 
the first chapter. Becoming frustrated with se-
quential definition’s exclusion of single panel 
comics like The Far Side or The Family Circus, I 
created a new center: image and text. Nor am 
I alone in this move. Robert C. Harvey has pre-
viously intimated such a redefinition (“Comedy 
at the Juncture of Word and Image” 75ff), but 
I feel we must move further into this division. 
The traditional comics definition relates 
comics as sequential art. McCloud perhaps 
did the field a disservice with his focus on this 
definition. His definition allows for theorizing the 
gutter, the space between two comic frames 
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in which the real substance of comics happens 
(or so McCloud argues), a site which has since 
been extensively archaeologized. But the 
same gutter occurs be-
tween the image and its 
caption in single-panel com-
ics. As we shall see, the 
gutter is very much the center of comics: it is 
everywhere and nowhere at once. We’ll begin 
by defining image as mimetic and text as se-
mantic and see what trouble that gets us into.
In the average Far Side comic the differ-
ence between image and text is fairly clear, and 
thus acts as a primary example for our analysis. 
Here the caption depicts a character’s 
speech. The speaker is clearly delineated from 
the four other characters in the image by his 
open mouth. Nor is it an accident that Gary 
Larson is obsessed with anthropologists. I like 
to imagine the disembarking anthropologist 
as Claude Levi-Strauss. He steps off the boat 
looking for a definition of culture, something 
that clearly separates physis and nomos. How-
ever, everywhere he goes he finds the incest 
prohibition, a universal interdiction, a natural 
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any productive definition of comics will 
inevitably not only apply to other media but 
through reflection will show that the moves 
that typify comics are central to all media 
law. Would that he could arrive before he got 
there and see the savages with a culture not 
unlike our own. What do they watch on their 
TV? What do they read with their lamp? Per-
haps their favorite show is Survivor: Paris, in 
which twelve Bororo are transplanted to the 
16th arrondissement and forced to eat fois 
gras, escargot, and other local delicacies 
through clenched teeth, while performing feats 
of street painting wearing aboriginal berets. 
Who knows what one looks like through the 
eyes of the Other. Larson’s humor often re-
volves around these types of deconstruction 
which I defined as negative in my first excursus.
Things become more complex with the 
introduction of word balloons, as in our next 
example.
Here the difference between image and 
text becomes a little more slippery. Now the im-
age actually contains text. The image must “trans-
late” the text into a visual form, speech balloons 
and handwriting. The task is as impossible and 
m
ed
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Traduttore 
traditore
unwanted as a canine decoder. How could a 
dog’s life be translated into English and would 
we really want to know what they say? Tradut-
tore, traditore. Translation is betrayal. Translat-
ing the image into text is equally impossible and 
unwanted; like explaining a joke, it removes the 
humor, the substance. Similarly a purely negative 
deconstruction merely reveals the possible with-
out actually entering into possibilities. Negative 
deconstruction clears the ground, an important 
act, which takes us from grund to abgrund, from 
ground to abyss. The affirmative deconstruction 
which I espouse erects possibilities, impossi-
bilities, and compossibilities upon this abgrund.
Things can of course get infinitely more 
complex with repeated acts of translation. In 
the next comic, the caption 
occupies the position of text, 
but within the image we then 
have two more levels (at 
least) of representative translation. The thought 
balloon represents in a semantic, textual manner 
the ideas contained with-
in a character’s thoughts. 
However, within thought 
balloon we find, not text, 
but another image. In the 
semantic thought balloon we find a mimetic 
reproduction of a textual object, the classified 
page from a newspaper from the future. The 
newspaper communicates semantically, but 
the typeface of the classified ads has been re-
There is always a supplement. Here 
it is BIll Keane’s The Family Circus, 
the comic that asserts itself as a 
deconstruction of sequentiality. Why 
focus on Larson instead of Keane? 
The answer is fairly simple. I hate 
The Family Circus.
I am able to both ignore and 
address the hated one through an in-
teresting meme that circled the in-
terwebs a few years ago. The Nietz-
sche Family Circus pairs a random 
quote from Nietzsche with a random 
image from The Family Circus, often 
with gratifying results. http://www.
losanjealous.com/nfc/
God is dead! God remains dead!  
And we have killed him.
Nietzsche Family Circus
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I wonder whether there 
are jobs for former video 
game playing experts
placed by Larson’s handwriting, which I might 
add looks little like his signature in the lower 
right. If this binary has not yet deconstructed 
itself clearly enough, there is still the caption, 
which we note by comparison has changed 
font from the previous two examples. Whereas 
the caption earlier consisted of simple sans-serif 
fonts, it has now evolved 
to a more decorative 
font choice, reflecting the 
type used for Larson’s 
name on the covers of 
many of the Far Side col-
lections. Would this change be mimetic or 
semantic? The difference is disappearing.
When I first read this comic, I thought 
of myself as the child. Now, that we have 
passed the newspaper’s futuristic date, I 
wonder whether there are jobs for former 
video game playing experts. Was my own 
youth squandered reading comics and play-
ing video games or did they prepare me to 
teach multimodal composition? The lineage 
is unclear, but present. Similarly the divi-
sions be-
tween im-
age and 
text in the 
comic are unclear but present. 
Far Side comics provide my read-
ers with a certain familiarity, in that they are 
read widely and conform to a common view 
of comics: they should be funny and found in 
a newspaper. They also seemed at first to fit 
nicely into the schema of Image|Text. As we’ve 
Visual|Verbal
By dividing our investigation of comics into visual 
and verbal modes, we are able to at once carry 
with us our mimetic/symbolic distinction and fo-
cus more clearly on what might be traditionally 
found at the core of multimodality. Looking at 
the last Far Side example through this lens, we 
find that it breaks down a bit more neatly. The 
verbal describes the captions, word balloons, 
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and even the newspaper text. The visual then 
describes both the depictions of the characters 
and the newspaper in the parents’ imagination. 
Just as soon as we have things neatly divided, 
though, they begin to disintegrate, or rather re-
integrate into an uninterpretable aporia. Each 
verbal element acts visually as well. The words 
in the newspaper are handwritten, the font of 
the caption distinctive. Similarly, the visual el-
ements slip unbidden into the position of ver-
bal element by making themselves utterable, 
readable, describable.1  In fact, it would be dif-
ficult to find any visual artifact that could not 
be reduced to the verbal. The opposite is only 
somewhat less true. The verbal can of course 
be spoken, not just written, and then could be 
devoid of visual elements (unless we consider 
lip-reading). Just as we were unsure whether 
to classify a particular element as image or as 
text, we are now unsure how to stop oscillating 
between elements which are always already at 
once visual and verbal, seen and read. Where-
as the image|text binary broke down because 
of undecidability of content, the visual|verbal 
binary breaks down because of undecidability 
of interpretation. Perhaps Derrida could pro-
vide us with more elaborate and convincing 
arguments about the spoken word’s written 
1 See Groensteen (The System of Com-
ics 121-127).
and therefore visual nature. 
He might also provide 
us with another way of think-
ing of the verbal and the vi-
sual. His Glas confronts readers with a text that 
is not purely linear. Glas features two parallel 
yet intersecting essays, one on G. W. F Hegel 
and one on Jean Genet. Within each column, 
there are also peepholes of inset text peering 
out at the reader and across the gutter to the 
other essay. For the most part, the visual nature 
of Derrida’s text is owing to length. His Genet 
essay is shorter, and therefore its font is en-
larged to allow it to fit, but this carries with it a 
supplement, namely that it allows the reader to 
more easily differentiate between essays. The 
essays repeatedly comment upon their own vi-
sual nature and reach across the aisle towards 
each other. Derrida mimics Genet’s format-
ting, attempting to evade a Hegelian synthesis 
through contraposition. Finally, the essays begin 
and end in mid sentence, allowing us to begin 
again. But these rebeginnings need not set up 
two closed systems. Instead we might end the 
Genet essay with a half twist by beginning 
the Hegel essay and vice versa, creating an 
infinite Moebius strip of a text. The disjunctive 
bar dissipates into its “originary” libidinal band.
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To read Glas as visual, we must first dive into Derrida’s “The Dou-
ble Session” (Dissemination 173-285). Published just two years be-
fore Glas (but presented four years prior and published in Tel Quel 
three years prior), “The Double Session” opens with two quotes in Glasian format.
The quote from Plato’s Philebus concerns the nature of thinking and the interplay of writings 
and paintings. The quote from Stéphane Mallarmé’s Mimique concerns a play, which Mallarmé 
may or may not have seen, and a quote, which Mallarmé may or may not have composed him-
La Séance Double 
Derrida finally made his confession during a subsequent confronta-
tion with visuality and representation. In his introduction to Visions 
d'Aveugle, L'Autoportrait et autre Ruines, the exhibition he selected and 
prefaced at the Louvre in 1990, he revealed that his sense of a “secret 
election” to writing as a vocation was directly related to his brother's 
prowess at drawing. His own 
efforts were pitifully clum-
sy: thus a substitution took 
place; a deliberate strategy 
of fraticide. “My hypothesis 
for work also signified a work 
of mourning. Throughout 
my life I have never drawn 
again, never even attempted 
to draw.” Painting, a “de-
generate and superfluous 
expression” as it is called in 
“La Double Séance”, is sub-
sumed in portraiture, a prac-
tice Derrida extravagantly, 
metonymically, immemorial-
ly, represented by the trope 
of blindness. (Wilson 13)
Derrida’s renunciation of the visu-
al in favor of the textual both ex-
plains and indicts his writing. For 
his family circus, we must reveal 
his juvenile longwindedness for 
what it is: shadows and simulacra.
D
er
r
id
a
 F
a
m
il
y
 C
ir
cu
s
I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the 
business of childbearing-but also with a glance toward 
those who, in a company from which I do not exclude 
myself, turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet 
unnameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do 
so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only 
under the species of the non-species, in the formless, 
mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. 
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self. However, when placed side by side, Plato 
introduces a question which Mallarmé perhaps 
answers. Derrida poses the question toward 
the end of the first session or rather toward 
the center of the double session: La question 
du texte est—pour qui le lit (224)1.  Restated, 
the question is who reads and who is read.
The text is where one lies. It 
is at once fiction and bed, text and 
hymen. The text is a textile, woven 
through différance. But it is also the 
hymen: a marriage between oppo-
sites, an impossible moment, an event 
defined by rupture, a test of purity 
and a rejection of testing. However, 
the hymen of the text is also continu-
ously resutured, oscillating between 
innocence and experience, between 
known and unknown, between. The 
pleasure of the text is found in rup-
ture and rapture. The medium is al-
ways between author and reader. 
The text is the bed wherein two be-
come one. What better way to read 
the central margin of Glas then as 
the continually perforated and re-
constituted Hymen of textuality?
Derrida’s central interpre-
tive metaphor is play, the allusions 
and illusions of the text, but to what 
purpose? “The practice of play 
in Mallarmé’s writing is in 
collusion with the casting 
aside of ‘being’” (216). Play 
avoids is. We must remem-
ber that play is always al-
ready sexual, the playsure of 
the text. Play is the proper act of the bed:
1     Barbara Johnson helpfully points out the ambiguity of the sentence:
La question du texte
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(216)
To play is to act, to screw, to lie. The central 
margin of Glas creates the excluded muddle 
that exists only in silent collusion between 
author, reader, and text. Play, as Derrida 
suggests, is allusion and illusion. But it is also 
elusive.
Derrida began his essay with an 
unstated promise of developing the relation 
between image and text, a promise that lies 
undelivered. The entire essay is an attempt to 
elude that which is always already excluded 
in text: image. Perhaps his brother could have 
drawn more compelling conclusions.
Viewing a text such as Glas as visual 
47seems perverse to say the least. There are 
no illustrations, no drawings, no images and 
the visual makeup of the page carries minimal 
significance.
However, at a criti-
cal moment in Glas, Der-
rida raises another binary:
48Paradigm|Syntagm
The only truly open game 
is the unplayed game
The division between paradigmatic and syn-
tagmatic is often shown on a graph, similar to 
the difference between metaphor and metony-
my. The paradigm is the replaceable, that which 
is placeholder. The syntagm is the ordered, lin-
ear thread. The syntagm constitutes languages’ 
one dimensional 
operation. The 
paradigm opens 
language into 
two dimensions 
through poten-
tiality. Reflexivity 
then constitutes 
a third dimension 
to language. We 
see this clearly in Glas. The sentence com-
prises the first dimension, the layout the 
second (including both the words used and 
unused, paradigm here signifies not just the 
potential for other words, but the position 
in two-dimensional space of the words we 
do see), the commentary across the gutter, 
the third. We might even hypothesize a fourth 
that reaches across pages and even into other 
texts (intertextuality). It is through the interplay 
of paradigm and syntagm, linear and spatial, 
actual and virtual, that a text constructs and 
deconstructs itself. Paradigm and syntagm 
are the warp and woof, if you will, of the text. 
Lev Manovich has asserted that to a cer-
tain degree new media favors the paradigmat-
ic over the syntagmatic: “Interactive interfaces 
foreground the paradigmatic dimension and 
often make explicit paradig-
matic sets. Yet, 
they are still or-
ganized along 
the syntagmat-
ic dimension” 
(232). The de-
sign process in 
new media pri-
marily revolves 
around choices, 
utilizing the file/folder metaphor. However, the 
end result is almost always syntagmatic. Gam-
ers are greeted with paradigmatic choice, but 
through their own actions reduce the infinite into 
the finite syntagm of narrative structure. The only 
truly open game is the unplayed game. Why is 
the syntagm unavoidable even in new media? 
Why does new media insist on this lan-
guage-like sequencing? My hypothesis 
is that it follows the dominant semiologi-
cal order of the twentieth century - that 
of cinema. Cinema replaced all other 
modes of narration with a sequential 
narrative, an assembly line of shots which 
appear on the screen one at a time. For 
centuries, a spatialized narrative where 
all images appear simultaneously domi-
nated European visual culture; then it 
was delegated to "minor" cultural forms 
Syntagm
Pa
ra
di
gm
Metonymy
M
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as comics or technical illustrations. "Real" 
culture of the twentieth century came to 
speak in linear chains, aligning itself with 
the assembly line of an industrial society 
and the Turing machine of a post-industri-
al era. New media continues this mode, 
giving the user information one screen at 
a time. At least, this is the case when it 
tries to become "real" culture (interactive 
narratives, games); when it simply func-
tions as an interface to information, it is 
not ashamed to present much more in-
formation on the screen at once, be it in 
the form of tables, normal or pull-down 
menus, or lists. In particular, the experi-
ence of a user filling in an on-line form 
can be compared to pre-cinematic spati-
alised narrative: in both cases, the user is 
following a sequence of elements which 
are presented simultaneously. (232-3)
We should pause for a moment and realize that 
here the comic slips again into its traditional role 
of “spatialized narrative.” Is this sequential art? 
Somewhat. The narrative facet certainly is, and 
the word spatialized reminds us of Spiegelman’s 
“time represented in space.”  However, for 
Manovich it occupies a space between data-
base and narrative, paradigm and syntagm. 
Manovich at first appears ambivalent on 
the place of spatialized narrative. He wishes 
to set up a binary between database and nar-
rative, but the spatialized narrative provides a 
third option, “following a sequence of elements 
which are presented simultaneously.” Cinema 
then supplies the split, firmly occupying the po-
sition of narrative. Manovich finds himself inter-
ested then in films that problematize this easy 
division. He cites Vertov’s 
Man with a Movie Camera 
as a multilayered database 
projected into narration:
The overall structure of the film is quite 
complex, and on the first glance has little 
to do with a database. Just as new media 
objects contain a hierarchy of levels (in-
terface - content; operating system - ap-
plication; web page - HTML code; high-
level programming language - assembly 
language - machine language), Vertov's 
film consists of at least three levels. One 
level is the story of a cameraman filming 
material for the film. The second level is 
the shots of an audience watching the 
finished film in a movie theater. The third 
level is this film, which consists from foot-
age recorded in Moscow, Kiev and Riga 
and is arranged according to a progres-
sion of one day: waking up - work - lei-
sure activities. If this third level is a text, 
the other two can be thought of as its me-
ta-texts. Vertov goes back and forth be-
tween the three levels, shifting between 
the text and its meta-texts: between the 
production of the film, its reception, and 
the film itself. But if we focus on the film 
within the film (i.e., the level of the text) 
and disregard the special effects used 
to create many of the shots, we discover 
almost a linear printout, so to speak, of 
a database: a number of shots showing 
machines, followed by a number of shots 
showing work activities, followed by dif-
ferent shots of leisure, and so on. The par-
adigm is projected onto syntagm. (240-1)
50But Manovich’s system is too content based, leaving little room for formal analysis. This “if” 
of his penultimate sentence signifies a moti-
vated analysis with which I am uncomfortable. 
Instead, I think we would find a more promis-
ing avenue for paradigm in the analysis of the 
film across layers. At any moment, each of the 
layers becomes evident to the viewer and the 
others are hidden. This interplay of presence 
and absence creates the metatextual. Here 
we have more than the spatialized narrative, 
we have the textured text, woven through 
with significations at once paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic, metaphoric and metonymic. Nor 
need we restrict ourselves to film as medium. 
Katherine Hayles has extended 
Manovich’s database analysis to Mark Dan-
ielewski’s remediated film, 
House of Leaves (forthcom-
ing). House is of course a 
text, not a film, but it borrows 
much from of the cinematic. 
Danielewski’s father we must remember was a 
film maker, while Danielewski himself did sound 
for the Derrida documentary. Which brings us 
to Danielewski’s appropriation of Derrida in 
House. House of Leaves consists of multiple texts 
within texts. First there is The Navidson Record, 
a documentary film following a renowned pho-
tojournalist who discovers that his new house 
is haunted by space: it is bigger on the inside 
than on the outside. Next, there is a disserta-
tion entitled House of Leaves, written by a blind 
man named Zampanò. Our protagonist, Johnny 
Truant, discovers the dissertation and creates 
a third text, the one we hold in our hands, by 
adding notes to Zampanò’s text. Slowly two 
stories unfold, Navidson’s, as told by Zam-
This interplay of presence and 
absence creates the metatextual
Danielewski Family Circus
Danielewski’s relationship with his family is 
complex to say the least. The short story that 
became House of Leaves was a metaphor for 
his strained relationship with his film maker 
father. “He showed it to his father in the hos-
pital, who understood it was about their rela-
tionship. The father responded by becoming 
enranged, taunting Mark by saying he should 
… quit wasting his time writing and get a job 
at the post office” (Hayles, Writing Machines 
126-8). His sister, the rock singer Poe, has 
worked on joint enterprises including a tour 
that coincided with Danieleski’s House of 
Leaves book tour.
This is not for you
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Decoupage|Tressage
panò, and Truant’s, as told through footnotes 
to Zampanò’s text. That Danielewski’s text is 
not only readable, but actually enjoyable by a 
popular audience, is a testament to his dedica-
tion to cinematic pacing throughout the book. 
When one story lags, the other picks up. His 
fourth chapter in particular, Labyrinth, borrows 
heavily from Glas, expanding the typographi-
cal play into a claustrophobic, textual labyrinth.
While House of Leaves’ interplay of 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic tropes steps 
beyond the bounds of linear text, it still remains 
within a fairly verbal world. Its visual compo-
nents are always at the service of the text, 
and never vice versa. He has traded logocen-
trism for what Mark Taylor calls logo centrism:
Contrasting interpretations of reality lead 
to alternative aesthetic strategies. While 
logocentrism struggles to erase signifiers 
in order to arrive at the pure transcen-
dental signified, logo 
centrism attempts to 
extend the sign to in-
finity by collapsing the 
signified in the signifier. 
Union with the real—regardless of how the 
real is understood—holds out the prom-
ise of overcoming alienation and achiev-
ing reconciliation. (Disfiguring 222-223)
Danielewski’s plot mirrors his technique holding 
out (at once promising and  denying) the pos-
sibility of escape from the chain of signification, 
an exit from the house which we are always al-
ready inside. My own system, then, must main-
tain an interest in both visual and verbal modes 
without privileging either (whether image as 
real or text as sufficient) while also realizing their 
distinction from each other: Logocentrism and 
logo centrism, Scylla and Charybdis. Jonathan 
Hickman’s work provides just such a navigation.
Jonathan Hickman’s The Nightly News shocked 
the comics industry with its antiestablishment 
message and nonconformist style. Coming out 
of a career in graphic design, Hickman cre-
ated not just a new style but a new possibil-
ity for comics. His slick layouts look more like 
glossy magazine pages than superhero comics. 
This two page spread from issue one of-
fers an example of Hickman’s a/typical layout 
(2-3). The text boxes in the upper left contain 
simple narration, but look a bit more like menu 
bars than text boxes. Below that we have what 
looks like a well designed business proposal. 
On closer inspection, the proposal includes 
disturbing facts clothed in an ironically cheer-
ful tone: “To find out more about globalization, 
read below. However, if you’re like me and 
only care about your own personal entertain-
ment (certainly not anything like children dying 
of dysentery in Togo), keep reading on the 
next page!” The images on this page oscillate 
from realistic to abstract images with a happy 
medium found in the stylized white outlines of 
protesters found standing on top of the pro-
posal. In the upper right we find the masthead, 
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The necessary if not sufficient 
condition required to speak of 
comics is that the images will be 
multiple and correlated in some 
fashion
including a table of contents for the comic. Be-
low that the narration continues down into an 
image of three protestors drawn (finally) in what 
appears to be a fairly traditional pencil and 
ink comic book style (though Hickman is always 
generous when it comes to ink, rebelling against 
the principal of bounding line and embracing a 
kind of apeiron). The protestor’s signs are blank, 
but we find captions above, offering us more 
biting sarcasm aimed at the status quo. In the 
lower right we find “*the {voice} says: what are 
you willing to do?” “The voice says” acts as an 
icon, alerting us to a special kind of text, simi-
lar to the icons used throughout the for Dum-
mies series. The text following is formatted the 
same as the narration above but with a differ-
ent color. The entire page is fairly monochro-
matic, using various shades 
of red, pink and orange. 
The example of Hick-
man serves a few purposes 
here. First, it completely 
resists interpretation as sequential art. There 
are no panels, let alone gutters. While Hick-
man does use panels on subsequent pag-
es, it is by no means the norm of the book. 
However, The Nightly News is obviously a 
comic. If we were to define it as a comic on 
the basis of its few examples of sequential 
panels, then any textbook that utilized comics 
as examples would also have to be a comic. 
Second, it offers a chance to investigate 
Thierry Groensteen’s concepts. As mentioned 
earlier, Groensteen utilizes the concepts of 
spatio-topia and arthrology (corresponding 
roughly to the terms I introduced at the begin-
ning of this chapter, decoupage and tressage, 
respectively) to interpret comics. Hickman’s 
work resists restricted arthological interpre-
tation as it has no strips, no gutters, no strict 
sequence. However, it is suited quite well to 
the tressage of general arthrology in its re-
peated motifs, icons, and color (Hickman is 
careful and consistent in his monochromatic 
palettes, oscillating between the narrative 
present [reds] and various flashbacks [blues]) 
and, more obviously, to the decoupage of the 
spatio-topical system through its layout. Howev-
55er, these two criteria do not make it a comic, for they could apply equally well to other media. 
Groensteen, wisely, does not seek to 
define comics (indeed, he rejects any efforts 
to define comics quite clearly), but to provide 
a “foundational principle,” iconic solidarity: “The 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition required to 
speak of comics is that the images will be multiple 
and correlated in some fashion” (19). This signi-
fies a great advance over either the sequential 
or the historical/cultural definition by moving to-
wards a foundational principle, or center, and 
in this way guides my own pursuit. However, 
Groensteen does not seem sufficiently per-
turbed or inspired by the fact that his necessary 
condition could describe an issue of Sports Illus-
trated, a genetics textbook, or Watchmen with 
equal fidelity. Instead, he likens it to the frus-
tration of trying to define literature without re-
sorting to claims of cultural superiority or formal 
naïveté (that is to say, literature can be neither 
“good” texts nor mere words 
in sequence). This issue, of 
course, still haunts literature 
departments, but there have 
been a few compelling solu-
tions. One is seen in the gradual expansion of 
literary studies to include e-texts, films, comics, 
plastic arts, inanimate objects, political theo-
ries, et cetera ad infinitum. How did literature 
manage to move itself from the margins of the 
humanities to its center in the latter half of the 
twentieth century? By defining itself through its 
own central practice, the production and anal-
ysis of meanings, rather than through its limits. 
Can comics perform a similar metamorphosis? 
If so, we must correct Groensteen’s 
foundational principle of “iconic solidar-
ity.” Groensteen himself proceeds by ana-
lyzing comics not by means iconic solidar-
ity, but primarily and throughout his work by 
the principles of decoupage and tressage.
|Discourse
Where have we gotten then? From a firm di-
vision between image and text we’ve moved 
to decoupage and tressage. We’ve made 
a Heideggerian move from nouns to verbs 
at least. However, we’ve yet to make the 
supreme Heideggerian move of the always 
already reflexive. I will leave that to the next 
chapter. For now, we will end with Lyotard 
and the question of any ending at all. 
There is no absolutely Other, but there 
is the element which splits itself, over-
turns itself, that constitutes the face-to-
face and the sensible at the same time; 
there is the ‘there is’ which is not initially 
heard speech, but the work [oeuvre] of 
a sort of drift-work [travail de dérive], 
splitting the single element into two 
sides and leaving them in this disequi-
librium of which ethical life speaks, 
but that is the disequilibrium of the 
seer and the visible, which is unheard 
56speech. …
     But to know what happens as a 
consequence of mixing speech and 
gesture, of dissolving saying in seeing: 
either speaking is silenced, or the seen 
is necessarily already like speaking. 
(Lyotard, “Taking the Side of the Figural” 
36, DF 11)
The hymen must be preserved, resutured so 
that it can again be violated through mul-
timodal dialogue, moving across and back, 
weaving, creating a text which will truly require 
braiding, tressage. This chap-
ter has not yet done that. My 
visual play has heretofore re-
mained restrained to discourse. 
But as Lyotard reminds us, this is 
not sufficient. Yet we must also 
resist seeing it as a promise of 
ultimate escape, as Jacques 
Ranciére reminds us:  
The Image—that is, the 
‘original image’ of Chris-
tian theology, the Son 
who is not ‘similar’ to the 
Father but partakes of 
his nature. We no longer 
kill each other for the 
iota that separates this 
image from the other. 
But we continue to re-
gard it as the promise 
of flesh, capable of 
dispelling the simula-
cra of resemblance, the artifices of art, 
and the tyranny of the letter. (8)
The next chapter will be devoted to hanging 
the twin heads of Lyotard and Ranciére on the 
ship with which we will sail twixt whirlpool and 
sea monster.
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59Here we find ourselves once 
again with the text, but this 
time nobody has written it, and 
it reads itself.
Jean-Francois Lyotard 
("Taking the Side of the Figural" 36, DF 12)
We need to remember again that Lyotard’s 
figural is neither identical nor unrelated to the 
visual. He introduces it as a supplement to text. 
The given is not a text, there is a density 
to it, or rather a difference, a constitu-
tive difference, which is not to be read, 
but to be seen; this difference, and the 
immobile mobility which reveals it, is 
what is continually forgotten in signifying 
it. (34, DF 9)
Lyotard likens this difference to the unconscious 
and expression, calling it laterality. To say that 
this density signifies the figural is to fall into the 
trap of discourse: 
depth greatly exceeds the power of the 
reflection that would like to signify it, to 
place it in its language, not as a thing, 
but as a definition. Meaning is present 
as the absence of signification; yet signi-
fication takes hold of it (and it can, one 
can say everything), and it is exiled on 
the borders of a new speech act. Here 
the death drive is always intertwined 
with Eros-Logos. The construction of 
meaning is only ever the deconstruction 
of signification. (42-43, DF 19)
Whence my own argument for decentering 
over definition. To define figure would be to 
forfeit the game. Some may find this incredibly 
disheartening, but I see in it great promise and 
great danger. Here we get to the heart of 
composition, the construction of meaning. 
In this chapter I begin by finishing our discus-
sion of Lyotard’s Discourse, Figure from chapter 
two. This draws us into a discussion of reflexiv-
ity and media. Finally, I draw a new vision of 
composition that is at once multimodal and 
reflexive. Throughout there will be tangents, re-
buses, discursive figures and figural discourses, 
including three Greek words beginning with 
alpha: aletheia, apeiron, and apophansis.
Figure
60
Lyotard critiques the structuralist no-
tion that the unconscious is structured like 
a language. For him, the unconscious is the 
matrix-figure. The matrix-figure precedes the 
figure-form and the figure-image, acting as the 
impossible origin of all fantasy and desire. It 
is the other of discourse. However, this is not 
figure qua figure, but rather something else. 
The figural describes all three levels (image, 
form, matrix), while the discursive only has re-
course to the first two levels. The figure-image 
is what we see, what we might normally think 
of as the visible. Lyotard calls the figure-form 
the schema of a scene, its layout, architecture, 
centering. While it is obviously visible, it is not 
what we might call visual in the traditional 
sense. The figure-matrix is invisible, indescrib-
able, immersed in the unconscious. There seem 
to be linguistic components 
to the unconscious. How-
ever, they are by no means 
discursive. The unconscious 
is figural. Perhaps the uncon-
scious is the only place where figure is neatly 
divided from discourse. However, everything 
on this side of the unconscious is “adulterated 
by discourse” as Lyotard will say (“Connivances 
of Desire” 333, DF 271).
Reverie, dream, phantasm are mixtures 
containing both viewing and reading 
matter. The dream-work is not a lan-
guage; it is the 
effect on language 
of the force exerted 
by the figural (as 
image or as form). 
(“Dream-work” 50, 
DF 270). 
Earlier, Lyotard implies that the figural ex-
ists as some kind of referent of which language 
always falls short. This is not to endlessly 
repeat that there is no outside-text, nor does 
it put figure on a referential pedestal of truth. 
The construction of meaning is 
only ever the deconstruction of 
signification. 
¢l»qeia 
If a lÒgoj as ¢pÒfansij is to be true, its Being-true is ¢lhqeÚein in the 
manner of  ¢pofa…nesqai—of taking entities out of their hiddenness and 
letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). (Heide-
gger, Being and Time 262, H 219).
Heidegger has perhaps done more than anyone to bring ¢l»qeia (alētheia) 
into philosophical parlance. His reading of it in Being and Time, complicated 
and continuously reflected upon throughout his life, centers on the word’s 
etymology. Those unfamiliar with Greek may seem annoyed by the seemingly 
obscure pedantry of this tangent should note Heidegger’s warning:
we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate 
business of philosophy is preserve the force of the most elemental words 
in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding 
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Truth, Lyotard argues, occurs between the two, 
or rather, as the event of their noncoincidence. 
And this is the figural, not the real world, but 
the forces that move between language and 
the depths it describes, depths of the uncon-
scious and the real which are ever the same. 
Nor should we merely oppose discourse 
to figure thinking we’ve found a more elemen-
tal way of dividing the given, 
Lyotard’s intuition … is that figure and 
discourse cannot be opposed. Unlike the 
history of the aesthetic, which has much 
at stake in distinguishing them as incom-
mensurable ontological territories, in 
Lyotard’s view, figure and discourse are 
divided not by a bar but rather by only 
the slightest of commas. (Rodowick 5)
Nor am I the first to struggle to pin down 
the exact relationship of discourse to figure in 
Lyotard’s text. Geoffrey Bennington has written 
brilliantly on Discourse, Figure without arriving 
at any clear-cut conclusions,
The figure is always 
already bound up 
with the discursive, 
and only this could 
account for the existence of a book 
such as Discours, figure. This is not to 
reduce the argument of the book to a 
dialectic: the battle of discourse and 
figure is never, even in principle, re-
solved either way. The ‘critical function’ 
of the work is not that of delivering up 
the primary process (this would itself 
be an illusion of the secondary process 
(DF 23), but of resisting its absorption 
into the secondary, from within the 
secondary. Conscious thought is all for 
secondary revision, and is disconcerted 
by its failure to bind and order. To the 
extent that ‘truth’ irrupts in the event of 
that failure, then it is not surprising that 
¢l»qeia 
from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a 
source of pseudo-problems. (262, H 220, italics in original)
These pseudo-problems arise when we refer to Seinfeld as deconstruction or 
a computer as multimedia (How many media exactly? Is there a literal news-
paper inside it? A book? A movie? The computer is a single medium that re-
mediates previous media). When we fail to think critically, thought “levels off” 
and becomes mere common knowledge. We can also hear in Heidegger’s 
taboo a search for origins. This search, and its futility, will concern much of 
this chapter. For now, however, we will pursue truth.
¢l»qeia can be broken into two parts: ¢ (a) and l»qeia (letheia). The first 
denotes negation, the second concealing.  From these Heidegger constructs 
a complex theory of truth involving revealing and concealing which attempts 
to circumvent the correspondence theory while maintaining something like the 
common meaning of truth. This theory gets reworked throughout Early Greek 
Thinking. Heidegger spends time with Heraclitus’ fiftieth fragment, 
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tÕ m¾ dànÒn pote pîj ¥n tij l£qoi;
How can one hide himself before that which never sets?
He points out that the word for hiding here is l£qoi, the core of ¢l»qeia. 
The thing which never sets for Heidegger is being, which makes possible 
truth, ¢l»qeia as unconcealing. Heidegger spends a bit of time talking about 
the light metaphor that truth is thus involved in, both because truth is an un-
setting sun and because concealing involves the play of light and dark. The 
unsetting sun of being, for Heidegger as well as Heraclitus, is logos: “LÒgoj, 
in whose lighting they come and go, remains concealed from them, and 
forgotten” (122). ¢l»qeia makes possible assertion, the ¢pÒfansij which will 
concern our next tangent.
Lyotard brings up truth early on in Discourse, Figure in the context of 
utopia, to which he returns at the end of the book:
Freud has taught us what utopia is; utopia strictly defined. Utopia is that 
¢l»qeia 
Discours, figure should itself scarcely 
form a harmonious totality, or that my 
own account of it should have caused 
me so much difficulty, and required so 
much secondary revision itself. (101)
Lyotard subverts discourse from within by 
pointing to its supplement, figure. Lyotard does 
not clearly define his primary term, let alone 
advocate a turn toward it. He does not merely 
maintain the question of the figural as always 
open, but instead he maintains the figural as 
the question which opens. 
Finishing the penultimate chapter of 
Discourse, Figure, Lyotard 
writes, “Now we under-
stand that the principle of 
figurality which is also the 
principle of unbinding (the 
baffle) is the death drive: ‘the absolute of anti-
synthesis’: Utopia” (“Fiscourse Digure,” 357, 
DF 354).  Lyotard arrives at the death drive 
circuitously. He proceeds through Freud’s “A 
Child Is Being Beaten” (SE XVII.1-123), building 
various tables for analysis. One table shows 
the progression of the verbalized phantasy of 
the abuse victim:
(346, DF 342)
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truth never appears where it is expected. . . . truth shows itself as an 
aberration when measured by signification and knowledge. Truth is out 
of tune. To be out of tune in discourse is to deconstruct its order. Truth in 
no way passes through a discourse of signification, its impossible topos 
cannot be located by the co-ordinates of the geography of knowledge. 
Rather, it makes itself felt on the surface of discourse by its effects, and 
this presence of meaning is called expression. (“Taking the Side” 41, DF 
17)
Elle détonne, truth is out of tune. Détonne signifies clashing, being off 
key, but its homonym détone signifies the destruction such a statement im-
plies. Truth has nothing to do with correspondence at all. In fact, truth surpris-
es us by not corresponding, by appearing unexpectedly. The tuning involved 
may hearken back to Heraclitus’ palintropoj (palintropos, backturning). For 
Heraclitus there is a harmony to the world, a logos which aligns all things 
through tension. Lyotard recognizes the tension but refuses the harmony.
¢l»qeia 
Here we may glean two axes, namely 
horizontal relationships and a vertical pro-
gression. The horizontal relationships oscillate 
between love, hate, and beating among ac-
tors and victims. Lyotard articulates the vertical 
progression as four transformations: active to 
passive voice, feminine to masculine gender, 
definite (“me,” “the”) to indefinite (“a”), and the 
disappearance of the extension of the predi-
cate (“by an adult”). The effect common to all 
of these transformations is a distancing, dis-
sociation, deconstruction, which requires Freud 
to construct before he may interpret, because 
“regression has pushed the deconstruction of 
the verbal and iconic representatives so far 
that the signs produced by desire no longer 
satisfy the conditions for recognition by the 
preconscious, and there is almost nothing left 
to interpret” (352, DF 347). 
Is this a delicate way of 
saying that Freud’s ultimate 
construction (“masturbato-
rial phantasy” not “abuse victim”) has little to 
do with what is presented to him? Perhaps, 
but Lyotard continues into an investigation of 
beating. The beating here signifies both the 
genital and the anal-sadistic, both love and 
hate, Eros and Thanatos/Logos. Lyotard further 
connects the beating to the Iamb, the rhythmic 
dot-dash of poetry or a heartbeat. It’s not that 
one is eros and the other thanatos. Rather, 
thanatos causes the gap between the dot 
and the dash, eros pushes its connection. If we 
transfer the metaphor to gaming, eros provides 
the play, thanatos the board. Lyotard’s transla-
tor Mary Lydon sums the section up:
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¢pÒfansij
In Being and Time and again in “The Question Concerning Technology,” 
Heidegger invokes ¢pofa…nesqai (apophainesthai) in his discussion of phe-
nomenology. The word is a middle verb and, according to Lidell and Scott, 
means “to show off.” It is made of two parts, ¢po, meaning “away, out, off,” 
and fa…nesqai, meaning to show and connected, as Heidegger notes, with 
fîj, light. Interestingly enough, fèj means man (the accent mark distinguish-
es the two only when spoken as the majority of Greek texts did not include 
them). 
Heidegger makes a great deal of the fact that ¢pofa…nesqai is in the 
middle voice, neither active nor passive. The middle voice often denotes a 
reflexive verb, “I blank myself.” The middle voice also appears to have been 
gradually phased out so that by the time of written records we will often find 
a verb in the middle voice that carries a completely different (idiomatic and 
not necessarily reflexive) meaning than the active form of the same verb. 
Some philologists have therefore theorized that there was a point in which the 
middle voice was the only voice and that the active and passive were added 
(24)
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(some would say divided) later. 
With Heidegger’s erasure of the distinction between subject and object, 
we can understand his love of the middle voice. Objects are not “seen by” 
subjects, nor do subjects “see” objects, rather things show themselves. It is 
this showing with which Heidegger concerns himself. The fa…nesqai (phain-
esthai) of ¢pofa…nesqai becomes the pheno of phenomenology. The very 
voice of the verb foreshadows Edmund Husserl’s immanent transcendence.
Heidegger often uses a noun derived from the verb, ¢pÒfansij (apo-
phansis), which means statement, declaration. However, there is another 
noun that comes from ¢pofa…nesqai, ¢pÒfasij (apophasis, note the missing 
n), which can mean a sentence, decree, or list. I bring this up because there 
are two words spelled ¢poÒfasij with two completely different meanings. The 
second word means negation, and is far more common than the ¢pÒfansij 
meaning sentence. This second word is taken from ¢po and fhm… (phēmi), 
meaning to speak. We get the term apophatic discourse from this second 
word.
¢pÒfansij: sentence and its negation. The two meanings are indistin-
guishable and therefore always already there when using either. Logos and 
thanatos. Eros and the death drive. 
“Now we understand that the principle 
of figurality which is also the principle of 
unbinding (the baffle) is the death drive: ‘the 
absolute of anti-synthesis’: Utopia” (“Fiscourse 
Digure” 357, DF 354).  The principle of figural-
ity is the death drive. It should be no surprise 
to us that discourse would line up with Eros (as 
Norman Brown had already stressed), but to 
assign figure the position of thanatos comes as 
quite a shock. Lyotard presaged this in the first 
chapter when he rejects the possibility of any 
unified theory: 
We have renounced the madness of 
unity, the madness of supplying a first 
cause in a unitary discourse, the fantasy 
of the origin. The Freudian utopia main-
tains us under the rule dictated by the 
so-called death drive, 
which is that the 
unification of diver-
sity, even in the unity 
of discourse (even 
in that of Freudian theory), is always 
repelled, always forbidden. (“Taking the 
Side of the Figural” 42, DF 18)
The figural (under the command of the 
death-drive) resists any possibility for a unified 
discourse. Here we may distinguish Derrida’s 
différance from Lyotard’s difference. Lyotard 
situates difference in the figural (always 
already intertwined with discourse) whereas 
Derrida sees différance inherent in discourse 
without any need to invoke the figural. The 
difference is subtle, but telling, hinging on Uto-
66pia, both “good place” and “no place” in the 
original pun. For Derrida, discourse will always 
be capable of the former. For Lyotard, figural-
ity always occupies the latter.
Discourse, Figure, then, anticipates The 
Differend. The given entails a pockmarked 
landscape of difference and repetition, un-
translatable, unsmoothable. Everywhere we 
look we find differends, injudicable regions 
between places, utopias. The call then is not 
to smooth over, but to bear 
witness to new idioms, to 
the construction of new 
places, to the composition 
of new topoi, always between and across mo-
dalities. After all, jouissance only ever exists as 
a difference between two states. This disserta-
tion constructs incompossible theories of such 
a composition, each theory in tension with the 
others, never failing into a unity.
Dans la technique psycha-
nalytique, il n'est point 
besoin d'un travail spécial 
de synthèse; cela, l'individu 
s'en charge mieux que nous.
In the psychoanalysis, 
there is no need for a 
special work of synthesis; 
here, the individual does 
it better than us. 
Letter from S. Freud to O. Pfister, 
October 9, 1918 (DF 389)
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Rudolphe Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror 
builds and complicates a case for reflection as 
the central problem of Western metaphysics. 
He initially creates a history of reflection, from 
Socrates’ “know thyself” through Descartes’’ 
skeptical reflection and into Hegel’s absolute 
reflection. Reflection here means more than 
careful consideration of an object. It pro-
gresses toward thought which takes the self 
as its object, then takes ever and ever closer 
objects for reflection (self - thought - reflec-
tion). With Heidegger, the subject-object rela-
tionship has been complicated sufficiently to 
merit dropping the term “reflection” altogether 
– Heidegger uses Besinnung, which Gasché is 
careful to distinguish from reflection.
Besinnung, consequently, is the term by 
which Heidegger calls the non-reflexive 
capturing of what is turned back to 
through a destruction of the history of 
ontology, not only insofar as its repre-
sentations of Being are concerned, but 
also as concerns its major methodologi-
cal concept of reflection. (117)
Heidegger’s Destruktion makes way for Der-
rida’s deconstruction. 
Here we return to the impossibility of the 
hors-texte with which I have already identified 
¥peiroj
In the earliest surviving fragment of Greek philosophy, Anaximander introduc-
es the concept of tÕ ¥peiron (to apeiron), “the infinite” (Barnes 28ff.).  Jona-
than Barnes sums up Anaximander’s “Urstoff” (original material out of which 
all things came) thusly: “the first principle or element of things, the original and 
originating mass of the universe, was apeiros, unlimited” (29).  This seem-
ingly simple limitlessness is complicated by the realization that originary is in 
itself a limit (whence Lyotard’s pseudarche).  As such, Anaximander’s apeiron 
prefigures Derrida’s shocking statement that “différance, in a certain and very 
strange way, (is) ‘older’ than the ontological difference or than the truth of Be-
ing” (133).  The limitless is a necessary precursor to a world predicated upon 
limitation (differentiation).   Through calling attention to the fundamental limit-
ing inherent in epistemology and language, the Milesian Anaximander may 
have posthumously influenced the Ephesian Heraclitus.
That Heraclitus makes sidelong reference to Anaximander in his open-
ing fragment has, to my knowledge, gone unnoticed far too long.  Heraclitus’ 
opening fragment reads, 
Although this account [lÒgoj] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, 
Reflection eflection
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Derrida. Gasché makes clear that for Der-
rida this does not mean that all is language (a 
reading I have perhaps leaned toward) but 
that there can be no final arbiter of meaning: 
the general text … has no extratextual 
signified or referent, no last reason, 
whether empirical or intelligible, at 
which its referring function could come 
to a final halt. It also means that the 
generalized text does not refer to some-
thing outside the system of referentiality 
that could do without being referred to, 
but that its referentiality is such that it 
extends abysmally out of sight without, 
however, entailing the text’s self-reflexiv-
ity. The absence of all extra-text, about 
which one could decide independently 
of the textual system of referral, implies 
that there is no one final meaning to 
the text. Again, it must 
be repeated that 
this is so not because 
of the general text’s 
semantic wealth or 
unfathomable depth, 
nor because of the finitude of its human 
decipherer, but for structural reasons. 
(282)
Note first that there is no depth to the 
general text. This is not to make of it a plane 
of immanence (as will be shown below). Nor is 
the text totalizing in the sense of excluding any 
real world. It is more closely aligned with a 
structural (though not structuralist) analysis of 
Heidegger’s referential totality (on which see 
below).  
Referral itself is made possible by the 
separation of self and other, of subject 
both before hearing it and once they have heard.  Although all things 
come to pass in accordance with this account, men are like the untried 
[¢pe…roi] when they try [peirèmenoi] such words and works as I set forth, 
distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is.  But other 
men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of 
what they do asleep. (K.1, D. 1, Charles Kahn’s trans.) 
While the first word, logos, is one of the most recognizable of Greek words, 
the other two may be gleaned from our introduction to tÕ ¥peiron—the first 
(¢pe…roi) being the masculine plural version of the same word, the second 
(peirèmenoi) being a verbal form lacking the negative prefix.  However, the 
question might arise as to what (in)experience has to do with infinity.  To an-
swer that, we first trace the history of the infinite.
Liddell and Scott’s Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon records three 
separate words (n.b. not meanings) spelled ¥peiroj (apeiros). The first is 
a Doric version of ½peiroj, meaning land (as opposed to sea or air).  The 
second is defined as “without trial or experience” and traced to pe‹ra (peira).  
The third, defined as “boundless, infinite, countless,” is traced to pe‹raj 
(peiras).  The latter two of these words are negative forms of a word (pe‹ra) 
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and object, the arche-trace. The trace is 
constitut(ed)ive of/by différance. Derrida 
notes, 
And we will see why that which lets 
itself be designated différance is 
neither simply active nor simply pas-
sive, announcing or rather recalling 
something like the middle voice, saying 
an operation that is not an operation, 
an operation that cannot be conceived 
either as passion or as the action of a 
subject on an object, or on the basis 
of the categories of agent or patient, 
neither on the basis of nor moving to-
ward any of these terms. For the middle 
voice, a certain non-transitivity, may be 
what philosophy, at its outset, distrib-
uted into an active 
and a passive voice, 
thereby constituting 
itself by means of this 
repression. (Margins 
of Philosophy 9)
The original philosophical move was to di-
vide the middle voice into active and passive 
thereby separating subject and object. Heide-
gger’s reinvocation of the middle voice divorc-
es his ontology from traditional philosophy as 
it demolishes the subject-object opposition. 
In short, the arche-trace must be un-
derstood as the fold of an irreducible 
“bending-back,” as a minimal (self-)differ-
ence within (self-)identity, which secures 
selfhood and self-presence through the 
which means an attempt or try and related forms include the idea of pierc-
ing or passing over, hence limit.  The ¥peiroj therefore means without either 
experience or limit.  This particular word cluster descends into experiment, 
empiric, pirate (one who makes an attempt), emporium (either a place of at-
tempts or a meeting of limits), port, and experience (Hasley §296-7).  
Apparently the word originally connoted testing something by poking at 
it.  Hence it would evolve notions of limit (determined by trial), experience, 
and piercing.  Somewhere behind all this lurks Pirsig’s notion of the rhetorical 
scalpel, which establishes limits—and thereby determines experience—by 
piercing the Urstoff.  The concept of tÕ ¥peiron becomes incredibly produc-
tive then for Anaximander, but it remains to be shown why Heraclitus would 
invoke such a word with such semantic weight.  Perhaps its ambiguity is 
indicative of Heraclitus’s sibylline style which, “oÜte lšgei oÜte krÚptei ¢ll£ 
shma…nei”(K.33, D.93).1   
This punning signification should be allowed only if productive.  Seem-
ingly, Heraclitus’ use would be just the opposite—why would Heraclitus link 
his inexperienced listeners with Anaximander’s Urstoff?  Perhaps it was an 
1 “Neither states nor lies but signifies” (my trans.).
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detour of oneself (as Other) to oneself. 
(Gasché 192)
The trace then makes possible self reference 
through identification of distinct entities at the 
same time that it makes self-reference impos-
sibile by making identification always approxi-
mate.
The immediate take away is that, as a 
reference system, the general text cannot get 
outside itself, nor ever refer to itself exactly 
(see Kurt Gödel). In this sense, there can be no 
reflexivity:
The illusion of self-reflection of a text 
is witness only to the representational 
function of a text, not to its representa-
tion of something outside the text or 
it self-representation. It is an effect of 
the text’s nature as a system of referral. 
(291)
Referral makes reflec-
tion possible and impossible 
in the same movement. The 
general text is a “system of 
traces” based upon meta-
phor. 
Metaphor makes possible the originary 
split of the middle voice, the beginning of phi-
losophy. Derrida concludes, “différance, in a 
certain and very strange way, (is) ‘older’ than 
the ontological difference or than the truth of 
Being” (Margins of Philosophy 22). Différance 
then reveals a certain metaphoricity in being. 
Gasché sees in Derrida’s notion of the meta-
phoricity of the general text, a subtle gesture 
toward the transcendental:
Since, as an “originary” synthesis, 
metaphoricity is more originary than 
what I have formerly referred to as 
insult to Anaximander (long dead by this point).  Perhaps an attempt to sepa-
rate himself from Anaximander’s empiric followers.  I would however argue 
that much more is at stake than a 2500 year old squabble.
Hereclitus’ first sentence plays with the word logos.  Normally the phrase 
“this logos” would refer to the book itself—a sort of proem preparing the 
reader for what is to come.  Yet by claiming both that “this [logos] holds for-
ever” and that men fail to understand it both “before hearing it and once they 
have heard,” Heraclitus points toward a more elegant reading of logos (Kahn 
96-7).  Rather than a mere account or argument it is the discourse of nature 
itself, possibly language itself.  As Kahn writes, 
The tension between word and content is essential here, for without it we 
do not have the instructive paradox of men who are expected to under-
stand a logos they have not heard. (98)
Playing between medium and message, Heraclitus unites them (and this, 
over two millennia before Marshall McLuhan).  The logos is not only the struc-
ture of his book but the argument itself: both form and content. 
 The careful wording of the next sentence (really still the first in the 
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transcendentality, and since it also com-
bines with the most exterior qualities of 
metaphor, with metaphor’s exteriority to 
the concept, I shall try to define it as a 
nonphenomenologizable quasitranscen-
dental. (295)
Let us aim at an understanding of this 
final phrase through a division first. 
Nonphenomenologizable signifies the 
recognition of the limits of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology always entails a return to 
Sachen selbst, the things themselves. Gasché 
writes, “Derrida’s inquiries are concerned with 
a difference that is no longer phenomenologi-
zable, that has no “itself” to 
itself but that, in its irreduc-
ible plurality, ceaselessly dif-
fers from itself” (88). When 
discussing metaphoricity, 
différance, or trace there can no longer be 
any “itself.”
By quasitranscendental Gasché signifies 
an alternative to Heidegger’s finite transcen-
dentals. Finite transcendentals are the constitu-
tive features of Dasein, “quasitranscendentals 
are, on the contrary, conditions of possibility 
and impossibility concerning the very concep-
tual difference between subject and object 
Greek), sets up a delicate play between experience and empiricism. The 
statement that “all things come to pass in accordance with this account” once 
again plays toward the new science that had been brewing in Miletus—a 
blend between philosophy and proto-empiricism.  Heraclitus is quick to chal-
lenge such a reading by saying that “men are like the untried [¢pe…roi] when 
they try [peirèmenoi] such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each 
according to its nature [fÚsij] and telling how it is.” Again the idea of phy-
sis (as opposed to nomos) common in the new science rears its ugly head, 
promising a simple resolution. Instead, the subtle phrasing of the central 
section yields more complex readings. The complexity hinges upon the word 
“like.” Kahn calls this “a surprising phrase; for it suggests that in fact men 
do have the experience in question” (99). This problem may be dis-solved 
through the implementation of Kahn’s earlier argument about the logos: if it is 
universal and originary, then all have experienced it already.
Finally we have reached the apeirotic. The aporia is made evident in the 
central phrase:
¢pe…roisin ™o…kasi peirèmenoi
They are like the inexperienced [or limitless ones] even as they experi-
ence. (My trans.)
Fortuitously the congruence between the two terminal words in this phrase 
appears, granting it a certain harmony in its paradox. If we invert our usual 
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and even between Dasein and Being” (317). 
The quasitranscendentals (metaphoricity, trace, 
différance) precede Dasein.
Nonphenomenologizable quasitran-
scendentals occupy a position between the 
transcendental and the empirical and be-
tween immanence and transcendence thereby 
coupling the two binaries. It is through Der-
rida’s move away from phenomenology that 
the transcendental blurs into transcendence. 
Transcendentals imply a 
transcendence through 
the hierarchical principle 
of identity. However, when 
identity is under erasure, 
immanence reasserts itself 
within transcendentals. 
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari’s im-
manence does not lie outside of thought, but 
rather makes thought possible:
¥peiroj
interpretation, we find that people are like the apeiron itself when they experi-
ence the logos. As we learn to listen to the logos, we find that form and con-
tent merge. Rather than Heraclitus’ statement being about the logos, it be-
comes a part of the logos. As we study the structure of language, we find that 
we are an expression of language rather than the reverse.
Always already returning to us we see Plato’s notion of rhetoric as experi-
ence (empeiria) rather than art (Phaedrus 462 C). Plato calls rhetoric a “made 
art” and when asked by Polus of his meaning replies, “I mean a certain habi-
tude [™mpeir…a]” (Lamb’s trans.).  Empeiria, as you may have guessed, stems 
from the same root as apeiros. Concordantly, it provides a useful analog to 
Heraclitus. Rhetoric is indeed an experience—an experience in the infinite, 
boundless Urstoff from which reality is constructed: a discourse on the figural. 
Heraclitus somehow manages to inform Plato’s disparaging remarks about 
rhetoric even after his death. Deleuze and Guattari recognize that the imma-
nence of the rhetorical subject lies in its existence as habit: 
Empiricism knows only events and other people and it therefore a great 
creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines the sub-
ject, a habitus, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the 
habit of saying I. (What is Philosophy 48)
(What is Philosophy 37)
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Not just the trace, not just 
presence-absence, period, 
indifferently discourse or fig-
ure, but the primary process, 
the principle of disorder, the 
incitement to jouissance.
These three thinkers—Derrida, Deleuze, 
and Lyotard—all seek to subvert and combine 
the twin binaries of immanence-transcendence 
and transcendental-empirical. Lyotard makes 
clear his distinction from Derrida:
As we pursue the analysis we come 
up against a density, an opacity: the 
locus, I will assume, of the figural which 
deconstructs not only discourse but 
the figure, in as much as the figure is a 
recognizable image or a regular form. 
And underneath the figural: difference. 
Not just the trace, not just presence-
absence, period, 
indifferently discourse 
or figure, but the 
primary process, the principle of disor-
der, the incitement to jouissance. Not 
some kind of interval separating two 
terms that belong to the same order, 
but an utter disruption of the equilibrium 
between order and non-order. As we 
sound these depths of the pseudarche 
we may perhaps get a handle on the 
truth of difference, whose presence was 
already felt in the tangible order, the 
order of the visual field, but where it is 
simply a metaphor. Its proper field, the 
environment it requires in order to try to 
establish itself, is the pseudarchaic. (“The 
Dream-work,” 334-5, DF 328)
Figure is not merely a trace. The given is not a 
text. 
I have so far been reading Discours, 
Figure as a complex response to Of Gramma-
tology. Lyotard later clarifies this relationship:
¥peiroj
Rhetoric is an experience which yields infinite inexperience.  Through 
looking through language, rather than at it, people “are oblivious of what they 
do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep.”  This epistemo-
logical somnambulism reflects a public incapable of laughing at/with the ses-
quipedalian philosophizing in which this aside revels.  Instead the demand is 
to “be clear,” a notion as dishonest as it is impossible.  Hopefully it has found 
its way into the hands of a reader who glances off of it rather than staring it in 
the face.  Only in this manner can it provide sufficient misreadings to merit its 
own creation.
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(Dérive 228-9, Quoted in Bennington 102)
The line is not the letter. The image Lyo-
tard constructs for dealing with their relation-
ship is the Moebius strip interlaced with a 
band. This construction may have originated 
as a Moebius strip which was cut (like the 
cut in the middle voice), but this must always 
remain pseudarchic. We have no access to the 
figure as origin, whether in a historical sense, 
or in a more personal, psychoanalytic sense. 
Instead, we are surrounded by a given which 
is constituted by both discourse and figure, 
forever intertwined. 
WindowMirror
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One way of seeing/reading the 
immanence-transcendence relation-
ship is with the images of windows 
and mirrors. Transcendence hypoth-
esizes a window through which the 
subject gazes at the object. Imma-
nence requires instead a mirror which 
folds the plane upon itself. Nor need 
facilitate a consistent reflection, an 
aedequatio. Instead, it must be con-
vex or concave, bent like the comma 
separating/joining discourse, figure.
The image is taken from Bolter 
and Gromala’s Windows and Mir-
rors, which advocates reflexivity in in-
formation design. They first show that 
current Information Design canon 
requires transparency and abhors reflexivity, prefers windows to mirrors. In the window meta-
phor, GUIs are transparent, showing 
you information as it is. This is of course, 
just a myth, though a useful one, to be 
sure. Users rarely see information as it 
is (except perhaps in the most applied 
uses like statistical and cad software). 
Nathan Shedroff, as well as Stuart 
Selber, would argue that Information 
Design always carries with it the myth 
of transparency. The alternative would 
be a mirror, which reflects its own 
methods, capabilities, and user. Reflex-
ive GUIs encourage users to reflect on 
the process itself. 
Think of the relative reflexivity 
and transparency of the Macintosh 
When we are encouraged 
to look through technologies to our 
work rather than at the technologies of 
our work, we perpetuate the false as-
sumption that the relationship between 
a technology and its design is "natural" 
and not conventional. Moreover, we 
discourage users from examining how 
they might modify or work around tech-
nologies that fail to support their back-
grounds, educations, learning styles, 
and worldviews. (§ 5)
Stuart Selber offers an intriguing view of 
the effect of technology on technical com-
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One aspect of an experience that can 
make it surprising and amazing is that 
of confronting one’s beliefs. When we 
are challenged to rethink possibilities 
(when our beliefs and expectations 
are confronted by the evidence in front 
of our eyes) we can have a profound 
reaction. (6)
Nathan Shedroff replaces Information 
Design with Experience Design. Shedroff 
creates a progression, Data→Information→
Knowledge→Wisdom (34-59). Information 
Design works at the first two levels, using 
data (passive, given) to construct informa-
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OS and Linux. For the most part, 
OS X is designed to work thought-
lessly. A user’s immediate impulse 
for getting something done should 
be the way that it works. On the 
up side, this narrows the learning 
curve tremendously while meeting 
experienced users’ gut need for a 
feeling of immediate control. On the 
other hand, Linux, an open-source, 
cross-platform operating system, 
forces users to learn how it works on 
a much deeper level. Rather than 
anticipateing users’ every move, Linux requires 
a bit of flexibility on its users’ part. Linux’s major 
advantage is its flexibility in return. Users can 
redesign every aspect of the operating sys-
tem, customizing it to their own needs on the 
fly.
Normally, these are viewed through the 
lenses of Usability and Customizability. Us-
ability = good. Customizability = good. Usability 
and customizability are assumed to be in-
versely related. Various information designers 
have found ways of splitting the difference. 
Think of the EQ on the receiver of a modular 
stereo. The more aspects users are allowed to 
control, the more difficult the device is to use. 
Apple’s designers have reinvented the EQ for 
the iPod by combining usability and customiz-
ability brilliantly. Rather than increasing dials, 
the iPod’s EQ system multiplies presets: quality 
over quantity in an interesting way 
munication. He first addresses 
three myths of technology: the myth of prog-
ress, the myth of access, and the myth of 
transparence. Technology does not produce 
real progress, but is a complex system with 
benefits and disadvantages. Merely giving 
everyone access to technology will not de-
crease the distance between the haves and 
have-nots. Technology does not have to aim 
at transparency, nor does it often achieve 
that goal. 
tion (meaning). With the added dimensions 
an experience entails, we move from infor-
mation to knowledge (deeper, personal), 
and occasionally to wisdom (generalizable 
approaches and values). Reflection makes 
possible the transition from knowledge to 
wisdom.  
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Like I said, OSs are usually seen through 
the lenses of customizability and usability. 
Instead, I’d like to look through the lens of 
user adaptability. OS X is an incredibly stable 
system, but when it does crash, users are 
often completely helpless. They lack the tools 
with which to adapt to breakdowns. On the 
other hand, Linux crashes far more often, but 
its users are left relatively unfazed. Linux gives 
its users tools with which to adapt. When us-
ers are taught to look only through the GUI, 
they internalize a technological myth: users’ 
desires should be met immediately; if they are 
not, then the machine has 
failed; if the machine has 
failed, users are inculpable. 
Conversely, users who 
are taught to look through 
technology learn how technology works. They 
realize that computers will only do what users 
tell them and that, most likely, if something has 
gone “wrong,” it is the user’s fault and can 
therefore be solved by the user. 
This may seem far afield of comics, dis-
course, and figure. However, if you’ll bear with 
me for one last tangent, we can build a new, 
more useful understanding of comics.
Heidegger’s Hammer
Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit 
roughly correspond to windows and mirrors 
respectively. Zuhandenheit, often translated 
by “readiness-to-hand,” signifies Dasein’s 
relationship to tools during use. Vorhandenheit, 
often translated by “presence-at-hand,” entails 
the conspicuousness of tools which are not 
currently usable for one reason or another. 
The interplay of ready-to-hand and present-
to-hand has recently been integrated into 
usability and cognitive science research. (cf. 
Dotov et al.) Heidegger’s hammer, then. 
Heidegger employs a hammer as his 
primary example (Being and Time, 97-107: H 
68-76) . If I hold the hammer and use it for 
hammering, then the hammer is “ready-to-
hand” [zuhanden]. In a sense, the hammer is 
invisible. I do not think, “Alright Jason, pull the 
hammer back, now bring it back firmly, but 
with just a touch of flexibility so that it doesn’t 
bounce to much, and use the bounce of the 
hammer off of the nail to create a kind of 
rhythm with which to continue hammering until, 
ah, there the nail is in.” Instead, my thoughts 
look a little more like, “Hammer. Nail. Hammer 
nail,” though even that may be much more 
thought than I generally give to hammering 
while hammering. 
Now, if in the course of hammering, 
something goes horribly awry, the hammer 
will become “present-at-hand” [vorhanden]. 
My thoughts will look something more like 
this: “Hammer. Nail. Hammer nail. Hammer 
nail. Hammer na—sweet cupcakes, my thumb! 
Why hammer why?! We had an agreement!” 
Now every movement of the hammer be-
comes completely reflexive. Now my thoughts 
are on the process of hammering and how it 
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works. My hammering actually gets worse as 
I find that I can’t hammer while thinking about 
hammering. However, I also might discover 
new ways of hammering that prevent me from 
crushing my thumb. Perhaps the new methods 
eventually turn out to be too 
slow. The hammer is failing 
again (though without caus-
ing me to scream). I look to my 
watch and instinctively move 
the hammer from zuhanden 
tool to conspicuous Vorhan-
denheit. “Perhaps if I do this, I 
can hammer more quickly and 
still avoid crushing my thumb. 
Let’s see … yes!” This oscillation 
describes not just a special circumstance, but 
our basic mode of being in the world.  
According to Heide-
gger, these two modes 
reveal something about the 
world as it is. In the ready 
to hand, we discover the 
referential totality of the world. The world is 
a system, and everything we access works in 
Vorhandenheit
Zuhandenheit
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that system in some relation to other things in 
that system. A hammer would not be a ham-
mer if we gave it to an alien who has never 
seen a nail. The presence-at-hand reveals 
the inescapability of objective reality, a more 
traditional, Cartesian reality which Heidegger 
does not deny, but complicates. The hypotheti-
cal alien would indeed have an object in its 
hands, and could examine and analyze that 
object, even determining what we use it for. 
These are all present at hand uses. However, 
it would then occupy a completely different 
position in the alien’s referential totality (prob-
ably something like “artifact discovered on 
distant planet used in conjunction with other 
artifacts for attaching things”), assuming the 
alien partakes of Dasein in a way similar to us. 
I promised above that this would bring 
us back to comics, to discourse, figure. Though 
this may do some disservice to Heidegger’s 
terms, we can see a certain tendency for 
text to act more as ready-to-hand and image 
to act as present-at-hand. With text, we are 
encouraged to look through, into the content, 
beyond the medium itself. With image, we are 
encouraged to look at, seeing brushstrokes, 
lines, curves, drops, and the medium itself. This 
is more true of the discourse|figure distinction 
than of text vs. image. Discourse concerns itself 
primarily with meaning, not form. Figure, on 
the other hand, cares intimately about form 
and content simultaneously. 
None of this is to say that text does 
not reflect. I have already given multiple 
examples of texts which reflect and of texts 
which engage in the interplay of discourse 
and figure. While my examples have all been 
twentieth century so far, we could of course 
include Tristram Shandy, the Book of Kells, 
and any number of other documents in a 
list of metatexts engaging 
in the interplay of figure 
and discourse. My MA 
thesis traced these roots 
through Shakespeare and 
into Homer. As the opening 
section of this chapter made clear, there is no 
discourse without figure.
However, in text (and here I am speaking 
primarily of print or digital alphabetic artifacts 
not Derrida’s general text) the distinction 
between looking through and looking at is 
sharp. In text reflexivity often causes humor, 
shock, a distinct shift in reading modes. How-
ever, in paintings for instance it is not uncom-
mon to shift easily from symbolic readings to 
noticing shading, color, line, stroke, etc. The 
shift occurs more easily in the realm of the 
figural. Note especially here that discourse 
equals looking through, but figure does not 
necessarily equal looking at. Instead, the figur-
al consists of interplay. This was foreshadowed 
in my first chapter during the discussion of the 
Moebius strip. The figural is the pseudarchè 
of the discursive. The discursive is never truly 
isolated from the figural. 
Comics encourage this interplay in a va-
riety of ways. First, by juxtaposing images and 
text, readers are forced to oscillate between 
reading (looking through) and seeing (looking 
at). However, comics complicate this by hav-
ing readers see words and read images, as 
shown in chapter two. In fact, this oscillation 
regularly happens in each element: reading 
the image while reflecting on its composition, 
seeing the text balloon and reflecting on how 
its content relates to its form in subtle and 
informative ways. This interplay is central to 
reading comics; in my own experience, more 
central even than the closure of the gutter. 
80
Marshall McLuhan defined comics as a 
cool medium for two reasons: they are low 
definition (cartoony) and highly participatory 
(amplification through simplification and the 
closure of the gutter). Chapter one explained 
the closure of the gutter, while chapter two 
showed why I don’t feel it’s the key to comics’ 
uniqueness. Amplification through simplification, 
a concept I’ve not yet covered, is McCloud’s 
way of saying that because of the reduced 
definition of comics, their cartoony character, 
comics require the reader to intuit more, and 
also to more greatly identify with characters. 
The cartooniness of comics has changed 
greatly in the last fifty years, with comics 
becoming more and more complex and more 
and more interested in their own composition. 
At the same time, many documents benefit 
from amplification through simplification, which 
might be another way of discussing the CBS 
(Clarity, Brevity, Sincerity) model of compo-
sition, alternately praised and lambasted 
by Richard Lanham (Economics of Attention 
140-2). Comics, then, can be separated from 
other media by neither the gutter nor their 
cartooniness. 
Comics maintain their participatory 
nature in spite of a variety of levels of defini-
tion. Their participatory nature, however, is not 
wedded to the gutter or simplicity of form. The 
above pages have built an argument instead 
for their interplay of two diverse acts: looking 
through and looking at, which can be restated 
as reading and seeing. 
One interpretation would be that such 
oscillation better imitates the world of our ex-
perience. This interpretation 
would be similar to Hubert 
Dreyfus’ dismissal of Carte-
sian models of artificial intelligence: they do 
not adequately take into account the world as 
Dasein encounters it. While Dreyfus saliently 
critiques a certain kind of information design, 
his critique does not adequately address 
composition. To do so would be to assume that 
the goal of composition is mimesis. Instead, we 
might say that the basis of composition is put-
ting together (com-posit) of disparate concepts 
and modes, that this kind of oscillation is built 
into composition from the etymological level 
up to the most theoretical. 
Here I must resist a tendency toward a 
hegemonic espousal of comics. Other theorists 
have called various media “meta media.”  Vid-
eo, digital media, the internet have all been 
cited as so-called container media which 
encompass (and by implication supersede) all 
previous (other) media. However, to embrace 
the differend is to recognize, 
There is no genre whose hegemony 
over the others would be just. The philo-
sophical genre, which looks like a meta-
language, is not itself (a genre in quest 
of its rules) unless it knows that there is 
no metalanguage. It thereby remains 
popular, humorous, (Differend 158)
comical. Nor should we consider rheto-
ric or composition metalanguages. They will 
always carry with them the danger of hege-
mony. And as Lyotard writes at the end of The 
Differend,
The only insurmountable obstacle that 
Cool Media
81the hegemony of the economic genre 
comes up against is the heterogeneity 
of phrase regimens and of genres of 
discourse. This is because there is not 
‘language’ and ‘Being,’ but occurrences. 
(181)
The only insurmountable obstacle that 
the hegemony of current-traditional, C-B-S 
style composition comes up against is the 
heterogeneity of multimodal composition.
So far I’ve argued that all composition is 
multimodal. Why advocate multimodal compo-
sition if all texts are multi-
modal? It may seem like I’m 
not advocating anything at 
all. However, by invoking 
reflexivity I am creating a new vision of multi-
modal composition, one that is interested in its 
own composition and mediation. A reflexive 
multimodal composition binds discourse to fig-
ure while recognizing its own construction. The 
practical application of that theory comprises 
the second half of this dissertation.
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Said that as keen, illustrious 
ornament,
As a setting for geraniums, the 
General,
The very Place Du Puy, in fact, 
belonged
Among our more vestigial 
states of mind.
Nothing had happened because 
nothing had changed.
Yet the General was rubbish in 
the end.
IV
Two things of opposite natures 
seem to depend
On one another, as a man 
depends
On a woman, day on night, the 
imagined 
On the real. This is the origin 
of change.
Winter and spring, cold copu-
lars, embrace
And forth the particulars of 
rapture come.
Music falls on the silence like a 
sense,
A passion that we feel, not 
understand.
Morning and afternoon are 
clasped together
And North and South are an 
intrinsic couple
And sun and rain a plural, like 
two lovers
That walk away as one in the 
greenest body.
In solitude the trumpets of 
solitude
Are not of another solitude 
resounding;
A little string speaks for a crowd 
of voices.
The partaker partakes of that 
which changes him.
The child that touches takes 
character from the thing,
The body, it touches. The cap-
tain and his men
Are one and the sailor and the 
sea are one.
Follow after, O my companion, 
my fellow, my self,
Sister and solace, brother and 
delight.
V
On a blue island in a sky-wide 
water
The wild orange trees continued 
to bloom and to bear,
Note
The following excursus bridges the two halves of the 
book: knowing and doing. It engages in traditional 
argument with aleatory form.  Please print the entire 
excursus on double sided copies, shuffle all pages 
except this one, and arrange the pages into a book, 
with this page as the cover. Then staple the center. 
The images and the text will then arrange themselves 
around this center into always new arguments. This 
rhizomic argument has no beginning or end, and is 
all beginning.
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There is 
always an 
excluded 
third
conversation, words between two or perhaps three. The differ-
ence here is important: dialogue or dialectic. 
I claimed in the first excursus that dialectic is a conversation 
with oneself. I drew my definition from Michel Serres:
Dialectic makes the two interlocutors play on the same side; 
they do battle together to produce a truth on which they 
can agree, that is, to produce a successful communication. 
(67)
I implied that by enacting a conversation, a dialogue I was es-
caping this kind of totalitarian version of truth implicit in dialectic. 
Serres is not so sure:
To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek 
to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion 
of the third man. The most profound dialectical problem is 
not the problem of the Other, who is only a variety-or a 
variation of the Same, it is the problem of the third man. 
We might call this third man the demon, the prosopopeia of 
noise. (67)
There is always an excluded third, a supplement whose history 
resides behind the official story. 
In the first excursus I counted to two. A great improvement, I 
feel, over most dissertations which can only count to one. I have 
tried in this excursus to count higher. Once one counts to three 
something changes and there is always more and more and more. 
We do not need to count to four, for now we can count as high 
as we like.
The question of rhetorical device returns now with prosopo-
peia, in which our interlocutors speak for a third man, NOISE. I 
might propose another device, aposiopesis. Rather than putting 
words into another’s mouth, perhaps I could let myself be cut of-
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refLection 
determines 
graphism
its own demise. Not only do they inform our current moment, but 
such a juxtaposition offers uncanny visions of the future.
Andre Leroi=Gourhan makes language an outlet of evolu-
tion. The slow expansion of the brainpan coupled with changes 
in the hand and mouth facilitate gesture and speech. However, 
figure has a separate origin.
We can therefore say that while motor function determines 
expression in the techniques and languages of all anthro-
poids, in the figurative language f the most recent anthro-
poids reflection determines graphism. (188)
For Leroi Gourhan the tie between word and thing is reflection, 
abstraction. The first marks were not mimetic but abstract: “gra-
phism did not begin with naive representations of reality but with 
abstraction” (188).  Notes, numbers, shapes, female symbols. 
We might think then that the discursive precedes the fig-
ural. In terms of mimesis and language, we’d be right. Primative 
drawings “reflect the very slow development—lasting more than 
10,000 years—of efforts to render with the hand a content that 
verbally had already been mastered” (373). The earliest inscrip-
tions were likely aides memoire. However, the figural is not merely 
the visual, as we have seen. Lyotard rebuts Leroi-Gourhan by 
invoking the thinkness of the world (DF 83) and pointing to the 
importance of male and female symbols in these early drawings. 
This importance points us toward the original site of fantasy, the 
differences between the sexes, and therefore to not the discursive 
but the figural.
Lyotard’s rebuttal makes way for reflection to be added as 
a subsequent function for the figural through the guise of technol-
ogy. Composition was from its beginning multimodal, reflexive, and 
dependent upon fantasy, the figural, which is always the agent of
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What 
invented 
whom?
a return of the repressed. Ontogeny recapitualtes phylogeny in 
the individual and the multiplicity.
The history in question is that of dasein, always ek-sisting 
outside of itself through prostheses. Stiegler continues,
The logic of the supplement, always already the supple-
ment’s history, is a techno-logic through which inorganic 
matter is organized and takes on the appearance of the 
living organism which is the originary supplement. Since 
this “logic” is comprehensible only through its history, it is a 
dynamic whose engine is différance. (Disorientation 4)
A différance engine, if you’ll pardon the pun. I refer of course to 
William Gibson and Bruce Sterling’s The Difference Engine, the 
ur-steam punk novel. Gibson and St rling propose a new techno-
logical history in which Charles Babbage actually carried out 
his plans to create a computer in the mid nineteenth century. The 
resulting society experienced the information and industrial revolu-
tions in overlap. Steam punk as an aesthetic offers us a glimplse 
of the texture of the future anterior. The coming community flies an 
airship while wearing bad-ass goggles.
Stiegler’s point, however, is the history of the supplement, 
a repressed history which will have returned. The supplement in 
question is technics, or, more accurately, supplementarity is tech-
nics. In the first volume, Steigler is careful to confuse the organic 
and the inorganic. Interrogating the phrase “The invention of the 
human,” he notes, “the ambiguity of the genitive imposes the 
following question: what if the ‘who’ were the technical? and the 
‘what’ the human?” (134). What invented whom?
All this hinges on the “ambiguity of the genitive. If poetry is 
“intricate evasions of as,” as Wallace Stevens writes (“An Ordi-
nary Evening,” §8), perhaps philosophy is vested interrogations of 
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The third meaning 
disturbs 
and resists 
metalanguage
signification as signifiers and signifieds. 
Barthes’ doesn’t think so. He posits a third meaning beyond 
the obvious and the metaphorical,
The obtuse meaning is a signifier without a signified, hence 
the difficulty in naming it. My reading remains suspended be-
tween the image and its description, between definition and 
approximation. . . . the obtuse meaning is outside (articulated) 
language while nevertheless within interlocution. (67)
The third meaning remains excluded, not by either interlocutor, but 
by language itself. This is why so many are uncomfortable with 
terms like “visual rhetoric” which seem to place visuals firmly under 
the thumb of the logos. 
However, t e logos is a place of third meanings as well, and 
I am not persuaded rhetoric is or ever was tied to signification. 
Barthes’ third meaning does not rely exclusively on the visual but 
rather embodies any kind of discretization of narration, breaking 
the flow,
In short, what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is 
metalanguage (criticism). . . . obtuse meaning is discontinuous, 
indifferent to the story and to the obvious meaning (as signifi-
cation of the story). (67)
The third meaning ruptures and resists metalanguage. In this sense, 
defining comics as sequential art excludes the third meaning, or 
sees it as an unhappy accident, interrupting the flow of meaning 
across gutters.
My own definition of comics, however, relies upon the third 
meaning as its primary mechanism. The correlation supplied by the 
reader between image and text, can of course embody the first 
two meanings alone. However, the juxtaposition of image and text 
found in comics creates a supplement, one which speaks to us of
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resistance 
is resisted
historical movement.
However, resistance is always resisted by the structure of 
rhetoric itself, as Vitanza points out,
As hard as I might try, I could never exclude all binaries, 
for they keep creeping back in. Parataxis becomes hypo-
taxis; hypotaxis, parataxis. Just as anything that has been 
repressed, purged, excluded eternally returns such as thirds. 
And, yes, yes, yes, I would do what I am capable of doing 
when doing hystery and schizography to enable these thirds 
to creep and ooze in and in and in, back into The History of 
Rhetoric. I want to denegate The History. (22)
Opening the gap between figure and discourse is never an issue 
of saying the right thing. There is no othography. Instead, it consists 
in always saying the wrong thing in new ways. Binaries reemerge 
where we least thought they would. Hopefully, though, we can 
make a space, a gap for thirds to “ooze in and in and in, back into 
The History of Rhetoric.” 
And moreover it is this very difficulty, rhetoric’s resistance 
to our resistance that lets us know we are working against REAL 
forces, not “mere rhetoric.” Žižek asks, “is not, for a human being, 
‘reality’ ONTOLOGICALLY defined through the minimum of RESIS-
TANCE — real is that which resists, that which is not totally mal-
leabl  to the caprice  of our imaginatio ?” (“No Sex” para. 10). 
The real resists us at each step. We may want to open third 
spaces and allow an endless free play of signifiers, as the post-
structuralists are often accused of wanting. But the play, serious as 
it may be, is always a play on something: always bound to reality 
even in its resistance to reality. The pleasure principle has no hope 
of evading the reality principle. 
If resistance is resisted, the way out lies in our acceptance of
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we still long 
nostalgically 
for the 
materiality 
of images
materiality itself, for nothing can exist without form. One might 
argue that Nothing has a form, that it is the naked form of supple-
mentarity itself.
Image seems different from text in that it always has mate-
riality, wheras text is abstract and arbitrary. This is less true after 
the digital revolution. The image communicated on the left half of 
this page has no more or less materiality than the words on this 
half. And yet, it still retains a semblance of materiality over and 
above the text, as Ranciére notes, 
The imprint of the thing, the naked identity of its alterity in 
the place of its imitation, the wordless, senseless materiality 
of the visible instead of the figures of discourse — this is what 
is demanded by the contemporary celebration of the im-
age or its nostalgic evocation: an immanent transcendence, 
a glorious essence of the image guaranteed by the very 
mode of its material production. (9)
Whereas Stiegler wants to emphasize the discretization of the 
image, Ranciére stresses its continuity, even if the continuity is a lie. 
Even at our most cynical we still long nostalgically for the material-
ity of images.
For Ranciére, Barthes’ critique of images balances precari-
ously between words and things:
But the semiologist who read the encoded messages of 
images and the theoretician of the punctum of the wordless 
image base themselves on the same principle: a principle 
of reverse equivalence between the silence of images and 
what they say. (10)
The gap, the gutter is not between the right side of the page and 
the left only — it resides in the image itself. Perversing Ranciére’s 
quote, I propose a reverse equivalence between the loquacity of
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Figure needs 
no material 
other than 
psychic
images and their critique. Are images mimetic reproductions of a 
real world or unique creations that are part of the world?
Mark Tansey depicts poststucturalist philosophers in photo-
realistic scenes. In one piece, Derrida and DeMan fight to the 
death at the edge of a waterfall. In another, Harold Bloom over-
sees the (de)construction of the grand canyon, made completely 
out of text. His work denies realism, expressionism, and the hetero-
cosm, instead relying on a more self-aware mimesis: “In  contrast 
to the assertion of one reality, my work investigates how different 
realities interact and abrade” (Danto 132). The mere fact that a 
work exists means that it becomes part of the world it supposedly 
imitates. 
And yet these two modes, discourse and figure, seem like 
two very different worlds. Discourse seems abstract, the letters 
arbitrary signifiers of speech. Figure has a materiality to it. Derri-
da would deny that speech precedes writing. Lyotard argues that 
figure needs no material other than psychic. Serres finds ethical 
implications in attempts at orthography,
To exclude the empirical is to exclude differentiation, the plu-
rality of others that mask the same. It is the first movement of 
mathematization, of formalization. In this sense, the reasoning 
of modern logicians concerning the symbol is analagous to 
the Platonic discussion of the geometric form drawn in the 
sand: one must eliminate cacography, the wavering outline, 
the accident of the mark, the failure of the gesture, the set of 
conditions that ensure that no graph is strictly of the same 
form as any other. (69)
To exclude that which does not fit the ideal is to deny our own 
materiality. When technical writing demands clarity, brevity, and 
sincerity, it implicitly excludes the figural that lies at the center of
estRucturing
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To distract ourselves from the unwatchable 
drubbing of the Clemson Tigers in the ACC 
championship game, my colleague Josh Hilst 
introduced me to a party game he enjoys 
with his wife, a combination of Pictionary and 
“telephone.” Every player begins with a stack 
of paper. Each writes a simple phrase and 
passes the stack. Each player then draws a 
picture of the phrase then passes the stack 
again. Looking only at the picture, the next 
person tries to recreate the original phrase 
(although deliberately obfuscating the origi-
nal phrase through feigned stupidity is much 
more fun). The play continues, alternating from 
image to text and back, until each stack has 
rotated fully around the circle arriving at its 
originator. The originator then shows the last 
entry and walks through the stack backwards 
to reveal the original entry. Hilarity ensues. 
Beer helps.
Being the pedantic academe I am, after 
I had a few drinks in me, I wrote “there is no 
outside-text” on a card and passed. By the 
time the stack returned to me, I saw a fear-
some logos threatening a diminutive text. The 
path between has ultimately been lost, but I 
thought it interesting how a party game could 
enact deconstruction so fittingly. With this 
simple game we move from Derrida’s logo 
centrism to Lyotard’s assertion of the figural as 
an outside text, an unconscious, a real which 
precedes and shapes the symbolic: a logos 
which threatens the text which purports to tell 
it.
The translator acts as a middle ground, 
a gap. In chapter one, I argued that the gap 
in comics is not between but within panels—
I move the critical moment from interpanel 
play to intrapanel play. With chapter two, I 
problematized the notions of text and image, 
visual and verbal, so as to broaden the effects 
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The fig-
ural is 
of my first 
move. The 
gap exists 
across the 
actual (syn-
tagmatic), 
the virtual 
(paradig-
matic), the 
page (decoupage), the work (tressage), and 
ultimately across discourse itself. The figural 
is this gap. Chapter three traced the figural 
into the unconscious through Lyotard, begin-
ning to lay the groundwork for a composition 
which would encourage the reflexive synthesis 
of discourse and figure. Reflexive multimodal 
composition plays between transparency 
and reflection, Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit 
and Vorhandenheit 
respectively. McLu-
han’s system of hot 
and cold media fits 
this dichotomy in 
terms of participa-
tion but falls behind 
in terms of defini-
tion. Advances in 
technology have 
increased partici-
pation and defini-
tion simultaneously 
leading to a cooling 
across media.  
This chapter 
begins a broad 
sketch of Rhiz|comics, 
a composition 
between and 
across media and 
modes. Bernard Stiegler 
offers a complex, nuanced 
historical understand-
ing of technology and 
our relationship with it. 
Whereas chapter two 
found examples of print being remediated 
by an increased focus on image and text, 
here I refer to hypermedia, games, websites, 
computer programs, videos, for examples and 
paradigms of rhiz|comics. Recent technological 
advances have drastically changed the im-
portance of delivery, yet the academy seems 
oddly isolated from many of these changes. 
Ignoring the importance of delivery, students 
and scholars have become alienated from 
their labor. The remaining sections investigate 
a return to delivery in scholarship.
Logocentrismt i
logosl
logologo
logologo
logologo
logologo
logologo
logologo
Post-structuralism’s critique of “l centrism” creates 
a new “l  centrism” by privileging language over 
image. Mark Taylor writes,
Contrasting interpretations of reality lead to 
alternative aesthetic strategies. While l cen-
trism struggles to erase signifiers in order to 
arrive at the pure transcendental signified, l  
centrism attempts to extend the sign to infin-
ity by collapsing the signified in the signifier. 
Union with the real—regardless of how the real 
is understood—holds out the promise of over-
coming alienation and achieving reconciliation. 
(Disfiguring 222-223)
The  speaks to us through us. Rather than 
returning to the hierarchy of l centrism, we may 
challenge the abstraction of  centrism and 
ground language in action: applied grammatology. 
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On December 19, 1991, Penn and Teller ap-
peared on NBC’s The Late Show with David 
Letterman. I was ten, so I’m almost certain I 
never saw it live (there’s no way I was allowed 
to stay up that late), but I vividly remember 
their magic trick. Penn, the loquacious front 
man of the duo, asked to 
see Dave’s expensive watch. Teller, the silent 
partner, goofed around with Penn, pretending 
to almost drop the watch, and then smacked 
it on Dave’s desk, threw it to the floor where 
Penn crushed it to bits with a sledge hammer 
and began stomping on the watch’s remains. 
Dave was shocked; Penn and Teller acted 
nonplussed. Just to show there were no hard 
feelings, Penn led Dave to a deli case full of 
dead fish, wheeled out for this occasion, and 
offered Dave his pick of the lot. Still unable to 
reconcile the loss of his watch, Dave went with 
the rainbow trout. Penn then proceeded to lay 
newspaper across Dave’s desk and clean the 
fish. With a surprised look on his face, Penn 
drew Dave’s attention to the watch, sitting in-
side the gutted fish. Dave removed the watch, 
which at this point of the trick reeked horribly, 
and Penn and Teller danced victoriously.
Magic tricks are one of the purest 
examples of rhetoric our society. As a rhetoric 
scholar interested in citizenship and agency, I 
should say that law, politics, or medicine are 
the purest examples of rhetoric in our society. 
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But none of those 
examples encour-
age the interplay 
of reflection and 
persuasion which 
facilitate magic 
tricks. At the end 
of a book full 
of magic tricks, 
Penn and Teller 
reflect on their eagerness to reveal the 
secrets that made them famous,
Deciding whether to explain a 
magic trick is an aesthetic/personal 
choice. It is not like selling military se-
crets in wartime. No infant has ever 
died of magic trick exposure. Still, 
you should con-
sider your goals. 
If you want credit 
for being clever, 
you should prob-
ably not 
tell. Good 
tricks usu-
ally have 
dopey, un-
impressive explanations. Look at 
the Letterman Fish/Watch trick. 
If you saw us do the trick on 
TV, you probably thought we 
were amazing sleight-of-hand 
wizards. Then we told you how 
the trick was done, and you realized 
we were just liars willing to pay a man 
to hide in a table full of cold fish guts. 
Of course, we had a reason for telling 
you. We thought it made a good story. 
Good stories make 
good books, and 
people buy good 
books. (Jillette and 
Teller 209, italics in 
original)
Penn and Teller are triply reflective. First, 
they reflect on the trick 
itself, the original rhe-
torical act. They make its 
tropes explicit, like the 
importance of feign-
ing carelessness with 
Dave’s watch. Then, they 
reflect on their reflection 
abstractly: should one 
expose one’s tricks or 
not. Finally they reflect on their own motives 
for sharing the first two reflections: money. 
The more seemingly more rhetorical 
examples of law, politics, and medicine share 
magic’s use of tropes and tricks as well as 
its dependence on gadgets and technology. 
The lawyer uses precedence 
and theatre, relying upon the 
technology of the codex to 
persuade an audience. The 
politician’s microphone facili-
tates the audience’s interpel-
lation into specular society. 
The MRI 
reveals to 
the doc-
tor not a 
mere body, but a docile 
body already normal-
ized. However, none of 
those three situations 
encourage the reflection 
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Rheto-
rics 
Mul-
Aristotle defined rhetoric as
ʼalla to ʼidein ta ʻuparconta 
piqana peri ʻekaston
the ability, in each particular case, to 
see the available means of persuasion.
Looking over the history of tech-
nology and rhetoric, it seemed 
obvious that today we have 
more means than ever before. 
The last century has seen an 
incredible expansion of persua-
sive means. The history of this 
expansion has engendered a 
variety of metanarratives, often 
of progress and decline:  
How did people live before the 
things were so much better off before they 
invented this newfangled  
Rhetorics multiply with 
technologies. In order to 
understand the current 
relationship(s) between 
rhetoric and technology we 
will begin with their inter-
mingled histories.
How then should we 
define technology? Here I 
do not of course mean just 
computers, as I have 
implied in the drop menus above. Rather, 
technology is an externalization of self 
allowing humans to construct/modify our 
world. Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and 
Time, gives us a useful framework for 
discussing such a view of technology. 
wrapped up in magic.
Even should magicians choose to main-
tain secrecy, their tricks are always dependent 
upon reflection. After all, no child runs up to 
a doctor after a successful surgery and asks 
how docile bodies work. These more scholarly 
examples depend on a 
deliberately constructed 
transparency that magi-
cians eschew. Magic tricks 
depend on reflection, on 
the revelation of their means, most specifically 
on delivery and its relationship with technol-
ogy.
?
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The being of humankind 
is to be outside itself
In the first volume The Myth of Epimetheus, 
Stiegler recalls us to the anthropogenic myth 
of Epimetheus and Prometheus. In the begin-
ning, Epimetheus was charged with giving 
each of the creatures means whereby to 
defend themselves. However, when he got 
to humans, he found that he had neglected 
to save any gifts for them (Epimetheus means 
afterthought). Prometheus (forethought), think-
ing quickly, stole the arts from the gods and 
gave them to us. 
Yet, this gift is our curse: we are always 
already in need of prostheses, tools with 
which to enable ourselves:
Man invents, discovers, finds (eurisko), 
imagines (mêkhanê), and realizes what 
he imagines: prostheses, expedients. A 
pros-thesis is what is placed in front, 
that is, what is outside, outside what it 
is placed in front of. However, if what 
is outside constitutes the very being of 
what it lies outside of, then this being is 
outside itself. The being of humankind is 
to be outside itself. In order to make up 
for the fault of Epimetheus, Prometheus 
gives humans the present of putting 
them outside themselves. (The Myth of 
Epimetheus 193)
At a certain point in prehistory, evolution 
moved out, from the biological to the techno-
logical. Since then humans have been defined 
as external to themselves. Da-sein ek-sists.  
Stiegler defines these prostheses for us:
Prosthesis means “placed-there-in-front.” 
Pros-theticity is the being-already-there 
of the world, and also, consequently, 
the being-already-there of the past. 
Pros-thesis can be literally translated 
as pro-position. A prosthesis is what is 
proposed, placed in front, in advance; 
technics is what is placed before us. 
(235)
The term proposition recalls us to the sen-
tence, both thought and speech. Every 
proposition is placed before and therefore 
outside of its speaker/thinker. We are in turn 
propped up by these false limbs, in fact de-
fined by them:
Dasein is outside itself, in ec-stasis, 
temporal: its past lies outside it, yet it 
is nothing but this past, in the form of 
the not yet. By being actually its past, 
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it can do nothing but put itself outside 
itself, “ek-sist.” But how does Dasein 
eksist in this way? Prosthetically, through 
pro-posing and pro-jecting itself outside 
itself, in front of itself. (234)
Humankind’s dependence upon prostheses, 
its inherent externality, results not just from our 
beginnings, but our modes of 
living. To be is to be out-
side oneself: to “ek-sist.” As a 
result that which makes us human is forgotten. 
Our false limbs become phantom limbs, an 
integration of technology and organics—a 
hybrid creature.
We are in a state of perpetual incompleteness, 
outside of ourselves and outside of our tools. 
Lacking tooth and claw we default to pros-
theses, tools which are at once part of us and 
outside of us.
Jacques Lacan notes, “we find in man a 
veritable specific prematurity of birth” (“The 
Mirror Stage” 4, italics in orginal). We are un-
able to defend ourselves or get food at birth. 
In his second volume, Disorientation, Stiegler 
connects technology more explicitly to Lacan’s 
mirror:
The mirror constitutes an interminable 
maieutics of the self in which exterior-
ity is constitutive (the desiring body 
originarily instrumentalized), reflecting 
a Gestalt, producing in it a remarkable 
symmetry in which the object delays 
itself. (Disorientation 26)
The key word, constitutive, reflects the term 
formative in the full title of Lacan’s essay: “The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of 
the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experi-
ence.” The recognition of self in a mirror ushers 
the infans (unspeaking) into the symbolic order. 
Stiegler also invokes the splitting of the sub-
ject, a subject both premature and delayed. 
For Lacan our maturity lies not in equip-
ping ourselves with any conventional tool, but 
with the most conventional tool: language. 
Stiegler takes the same approach, first point-
ing out the prematurity of man and correlating 
that to language: “They do not yet possess the 
art of the political, which will be made neces-
sary by their prematureness, directly ensuing 
from the technical” (Epimetheus 188). The art 
of the political, the ability to have conversa-
tion, is the first and primary art. The true gift 
of Prometheus was not just fire, but the : 
“Language, the  as language, occurs . . . 
through technics, through the theft of the fire 
and the ‘arts’ (tekhnai)” (194). So language is 
merely another tool. 
Or so it might appear if Stiegler were 
not quick to correct:
The metaphysical illusion from Plato on-
ward that turns language into a means 
through which humans express them-
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selves, rather than its being located 
as the site of their very constitution, is 
abundantly criticized by Heidegger. Yet 
it is the same error that induces con-
sideration of an instrument as a means.      
. . . But if the instrumentalization of lan-
guage is possible, this is only because 
its instrumentality is inherent to it. (205)
Language is not a means to an end any more 
than technology. Rather, they are our very 
mode of living. We are defined through lan-
guage not vice-versa, and yet that does not 
diminish language’s technicity and instrumen-
tality. The sophists, we must remember, saw 
language as a techne, for which Plato lam-
basted them. He had forgotten the instrumen-
tal nature of the , or rather, of mythos. 
As we have seen Stiegler expands 
on this instrumentality in the second volume, 
continuing, 
This dynamic [the constitution of the sub-
ject through delay], proceeding from an 
originary exteriority . . . , is experienced 
in life as prostheticity: the mirror stage is 
essential unaccomplishment; the mirage 
is deformation. All mirrors are deforming 
ones, just as much the tekhnê of the 
gaze as of time. There are only clumsy, 
gauche memories, especially when they 
are accurate. . 
(Disorientation 27)
Whereas volume one portrays the exterior-
ity of Dasein primarily through the lenses of 
speech and thought, volume two expands 
to what might be more typically considered 
technology: writing, print, photography, film, 
and computers. The division 
between the two hinges upon 
Daseins’s retentional finitude 
and the role of tertiary memory. 
Coming out of Heidegger and Husserl, 
Stiegler describes three types of memory. 
Primary memory is continuous memory, all 
memories which construct the present; it may 
last moments or minutes. Secondary memory 
denotes the construction of memories from 
one’s discontinuous past: my first trip to the 
zoo, my favorite high school teacher, what I 
ate for breakfast yesterday. Tertiary memory 
allows for a memory outside of oneself: I 
remember the five canons of rhetoric handed 
down to me from Cicero, the War of 1812, 
and the germ theory of disease. This tertiary 
memory is made necessary by retentional 
finitude: I can remember what happened to 
me, but I cannot remember what happened 
to Napolean, unless someone passes that 
memory onto me via tertiary memory.
Stiegler introduces the terms “tertiary 
memory” and “retentional finitude” in the first 
volume to introduce linear writing’s overcoming 
of the latter. He calls this new techne “literal 
synthesis.” However, “Writing is no longer, for 
us, of ‘recent constitution.’ And we must know 
what that means” (224). We stand then at 
an age in which something other than literal 
synthesis appears:
We would knowingly affirm here, in plain 
and somewhat brutal terms, that it is a 
form of writing, linear and phonological, 
that gives this opening [the opening up 
of the epoch of historiality]. . . . [We] des-
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ignate the completed form of alphabet-
ic writing (phonological writing), literal 
synthesis. A temporality that is deferred 
belongs in principle to literal synthesis. In 
the second volume of this work we will 
develop the notions of analogical and 
numerical synthesis, which dominate 
contemporary technology, oriented, 
inversely, by an asymptotic tendency 
toward real, live temporality, temporal-
ity without detour, that is, toward a 
particular atemporality—one that does 
not exclude the work of différance but 
conceals it in an essential manner. (230, 
italics in original)
This “particular atemporality” comprises 
a digital age characterized by oral 
components: ubiquity, 
integration, return to rhet- o-
ric, kairos over chronos, formulaic-ness, etc. If 
linear phonological writing was characterized 
as closed, the coming digital era seems intrinsi-
cally open. 
In the first volume of Technics and Time, 
Stiegler examined why Dasein is defined 
through prostheticity. Volume two explains 
how this prostheticity relates to disorientation 
throughout modern history, specifically in liter-
ate and post literate Dasein (Disorientation 7). 
We saw that he connects this disorientation 
with reflection. Let us engage in our own return 
inquiry (Rückfrage) into this relationship.
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Stiegler carefully distinguishes mnemo-technics, 
what are often sloppily called “media,” from 
other technics:
All supplement is technics, and all 
supplementary technics is a storage me-
dium “exteriorizing” a program. But all 
technical supplement is not thus a tech-
nics of memorization: mnemo-technics 
only appears after the Neolithic period. 
And “the history of being” (the properly 
“historical” age of historiality) begins 
along with the history of language. (8, 
italics in original)
Mnemo-technics begin with language, writing 
and orality intertwined in the trace. Stiegler’s 
first volume dealt with this relationship. The 
second begins with an analysis of orthogra-
phy, both writing and righting, rectitude (13). 
Whereas language’s inception began the 
overcoming of retentional finitude through 
tertiary memory as oral tradition, writing 
introduces rectitude, thus (de)stabilizing ter-
tiary memory as more correct than primary or 
secondary. The advent of tertiary memory is 
constitutive.  Tertiary memory as writing over-
comes retentional finitude through instrumental 
retentionality. 
But that is not all, “This instrumentality 
opens the possibility of a Rückfrage” (37). 
Writing opens the space for reflection: “The 
writer is affected in writing, encountering and 
reflecting on the writerly self” (37). Writing 
brings with it a new disorientation, incommen-
surability of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
memory—a false continuity between phenom-
ena defined precisely through their discontinu-
ity. However, this fault is overcome with an 
intensification of reflection.
In a more recent article, Stiegler sum-
marizes and updates the ideas presented in 
Disorientation: “The analogico-digital image 
is the beginning of a systematic discretiza-
tion of movement – that is to say, of a vast 
process of the grammaticalization of the 
visible” (“The Discrete Image” 148-9, italics in 
original). To summarize and rewrite Stiegler’s 
argument, discretization consists of a series 
of epochal steps. Linear writing discretizes 
speech and speaker; print, writer and writing; 
photography, participant and viewer. With 
photography, this discretization is still analog. 
The digitization of photography separates 
then and now: “The digitization of the analog 
destabilizes our knowledge of the this was, 
and we are afraid of this. But we were afraid 
discrete
a. 1a. Separate, detached from 
others, individually distinct. Op-
posed to continuous.
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of the analog, too: in the first photographs we 
saw phantoms” (152, italics in original). If the 
verb discretize disorients the viewer, this is 
intended. We might have substituted the verb 
separate, however discretize has a particular 
meaning: the breaking of continuity (154). The 
general movement of discretization away from 
continuity results in reflexivity. Language allows 
speakers to reflect on their situation in a new 
way. Writing made new forms of reflexivity 
possible, “no geometry without instrumental re-
tentionality” (Disorientation 37). What of these 
new modes of discretization, then?
Just as certain kinds of writing actu-
ally liberate certain kinds of reflexivity 
(for example, certain kinds of linear, 
alphabetic writing, 
without which law, 
science, and in par-
ticular history would be inconceivable), 
so certain kinds of image-objects are 
doubtless destined to liberate reflexiv-
ity in the domains of the visible and of 
movement, just as alphabetic writing 
reveals the discrete characters of lan-
guage. (“The Discrete Image” 162, italics 
in original)
Stop. 
Reread that quote.
The historical materialist 
cannot do without the con-
cept of a present which is 
not a transition, in which 
time originates and has 
come to a standstill. For 
this concept defines pre-
cisely the present in which 
he writes history for his per-
son. Historicism depicts the 
“eternal” picture of the past; 
the historical materialist, an 
experience with it, which 
stands alone. He leaves it to others to give them-
selves to the whore called “Once upon a time” in 
the bordello of historicism. He remains master of 
his powers: man enough, to explode the continuum 
of history. (“Theses on the Philosophy of History” 
para 16)
The term continuity likewise carries a historical weight 
through Walter Benjamin’s critiques of reproduction 
and history. 
Discontinuity links Benjamin’s two 
critiques. Photography explodes a 
moment from the continuum of time 
in the same manner that the histori-
cal materialist explodes a moment 
from the continuum of history. Histor-
icism and cinema both rely upon the 
construction of a false continuity. 
It may be that 
the continuity 
of tradition is 
mere sem-
blence.  But then precisely 
the persistence of this sem-
blence of persistence pro-
vides it with continuity. (The 
Arcades Project N19,1)
102Now, revise that quote.
Multimodal composition is “doubtless 
destined to liberate reflexivity in the domains 
of the visible and of movement.” Writing 
changed the way we thought. So far I have 
argued that new media changes the way we 
write. Now I lay my cards on the table: new 
media changes the way we think in a funda-
mental way. For Heidegger, Stiegler’s muse, 
reflexivity is the fundamental defining charac-
teristic of Dasein: “Dasein is an entity which 
does not just occur among other entities. 
Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact 
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue 
for it” (Being and Time 32, H:12). Dasein is the 
being for whom being is an issue. If we are 
to take Stiegler seriously, we must recognize 
his claim for what it is: new media constitute a 
redefinition of Dasein.
For Heidegger Dasein has its being 
at issue ontically, ontologically, and ontico-
ontologically. Dasein exists (ontic). Dasein 
is determined by ex- is-
tence (ontological). Dasein is 
able to reflect on existence 
and on Dasein’s determination by existence 
(ontico-ontological) (34, H:13-14). This funda-
mental definition of Dasein affects composition. 
Dasein composes ontically, ontologically, and 
ontico-ontologically. Because of the general 
unwieldiness of these terms, I have so far used 
transparency and reflexivity to correspond to 
translate ontic and ontological, respectively. 
Ontico-ontological composition describes 
the work you are currently reading and its 
ilk: metacompositional works of composition 
theory.
Multimodal composition bears with it a 
redefinition of composing in all three senses. 
Ontically, we write differently now. New me-
dia remediate the old. Composition changes 
with each new epoch. Ontologically, new 
media change the way composers think about 
composing. This is another way of saying that 
remediation affects all five canons of rhetoric, 
not just delivery (as has often been naively 
understood). Finally, new media changes com-
position theory. This last point too often goes 
unnoticed. Ontically, composing with a word 
processor is different than composing with a 
typewriter or with paper and pen. Ontologi-
cally, Richard Lanham knows this. Greg Ulmer 
tells us that logic itself changes with new me-
dia: the advent of conduction over deduction 
and induction. However, the ontico-ontologic 
ontico-ontologicalonticntologicalcomposition isco position isco position is
discreet
a. 1. Showing discernment or 
judgement in the guidance of 
one's own speech and action; 
judicious, prudent, circumspect, 
cautious; often esp. that can be 
silent when speech would be 
inconvenient.
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change is un(der)reported. Why? While we 
feel the effects of remediation across all five 
canons, we identify it with delivery, and we 
scholars are alienated from our scholarship 
primarily through the outsourcing of the canon 
of delivery.
Stiegler promises the overcoming of 
this alienation through cinema and televi-
sion. While he does not specifically mention 
desktop video editing, YouTube, the ubiquity of 
video cameras, these technologies should be 
read across his conclusions:
The real problem here is to rethink or 
think otherwise what Hollywood has up 
to this point done in the domain of the 
culture industry, to which cinema and 
television belong. For what it has done, 
it has done in accordance with a reify-
ing schema, and by opposing produc-
tion to consumption, that is to say: by 
putting analysis on one side (production) 
and synthesis on the other (consump-
tion). Technology is giving us a chance 
to modify this relation, in a direction that 
would bring it closer to the relation of 
the literate person to literature: it is not 
possible to synthesize a book without 
having analyzed literally oneself. It is 
not possible to read without know-
ing how to write. And soon it will be 
possible to see an image analytically: 
“television” [“l’écran”] and “text” [“l’écrit”] 
are not simply opposed. (“The Discrete 
Image” 163, italics in orginal)
The overcoming of the separation of produc-
tion and consumption in video through the 
aforementioned technologies has not gone 
unnoticed. We are actually quite overwhelmed 
Stiegler introduces the concept of 
“epochal redoubling” in Disorientation. It revolves 
around a series of puns. Epoche here means both era 
and suspension, thereby combining phenomenology with 
historicality. Indeed, it refers to the suspension of each 
era by the subsequent era (think of the bracketing 
of oral culture involved in literacy, or the bracketing 
of silent film through the talkies). The redoubling 
refers to an acceleration of change. Not only are 
things moving more quickly, but they are speed-
ing up (moving more and more quickly). Redou-
bling also carries with it the dichotomies of doubles: 
Epimetheus and Prometheus, Technics and Time, 
what and who, and the mirror image Stiegler so deftly 
interrogates throughout Disorientation. 
“Great 
moments of 
technical innovation 
are moments of suspen-
sion. In its development, 
the technics that interrupts 
one state of things im-
poses another.” (“The 
Discrete Image” 
149)
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with this consequence of new media. Likewise, 
this realization has had an effect upon schol-
arship with the advent of journals like Kairos, 
which “strive[s] to bridge the gap between 
print and digital publishing cultures” by publish-
ing “texts authored specifically for publication 
on the World Wide Web” (Eyman and Inman). 
The conditions in place when Dialectic of 
Enlightenment was written no longer hold 
sway in the same way. The blurring of lines 
between author, text, and reader outlined by 
(post)structuralist and reader response theo-
ries have been enacted with the advent of 
generation YouTube. What does composition 
look like now? Rhiz|comics.
Rhiz|comics does not undo the argu-
ments of reader response criticism, nor does it 
repeat them. Instead it complicates the terms 
reader and response. The acceleration of the 
expansion of rhetorical means changes our 
conception of reading, linking it to its etymo-
logical roots. To read has always been also to 
write. Heidegger points us 
to the roots of the Greek 
legein as gathering (Early 
Greek Thinking 61). Imagine what it must have 
been like for illiterate Greeks to see the act of 
reading: someone takes a miasma of obtuse 
signs and gathers them into coherent ideas. To 
read is to com-pose.
Lawrence Lessig creates the metaphor of 
two types of culture: Read Only and Read-
Write (Remix 28-9). Read only culture is epito-
mized by the culture industry: passive audienc-
es watch/read/listen from their couches while 
media operate unidirectionally from corpora-
tions to audiences. THEY produce while WE 
consume. Read-Write culture problematizes the 
Cartesian subject-object dichotomy by (com)
positing the text as rhizome.
“It is not possible to read without know-
ing how to write.”
A reading which is always already a 
composition—rhizcomics, rhizcomposition. 
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Deleuze and Guattari propose the rhizome 
as a way of looking at texts. There is the 
traditional (Ramusian) tree model of the book, 
based on hierarchy and genealogy—every 
leaf has its root, every page its conceptual 
origin. 
A first type of book is the root-book. 
The tree is already the image of the 
world, or the root the image of the 
world-tree. This is the classical book, as 
noble, signifying, and subjective organic 
interiority (the strata of the book). The 
book imitates the world, as art imitates 
nature: by procedures specific to it that 
accomplish what nature cannot or can 
no longer do. The law of the book is 
the law of reflection, the One that be-
comes two. (A Thousand Plateaus 5)
Art as a mirror held up to nature, mimetic, 
representative, relying on a transcendental 
signifier. To this, Deleuze and Guattari oppose 
the rhizomic image of the book:
The same [aparallel evolution] applies 
to the book and the world: contrary 
to a deeply rooted belief, the book 
is not an image of the world. It forms 
a rhizome with the world, there is an 
aparallel evolution of the book and the 
world; the book assures the deterrito-
rialization of the world, but the world 
effects a reterritorialization of the book, 
which in turn deterritorializes itself in the 
world (if it is capable, if it can). Mimicry 
is a very bad concept, since it relies on 
Throughout Spring and All, William Carlos Williams proposes 
a theory of art that conflicts with traditional mimetic theo-
ries.  To call it a theory may be a stretch—it is difficult to lump 
Williams’ various assertions into a cohesive whole—, but 
certainly he everywhere affirms the creations of the imagination as separate 
from nature. In his closing prose section Williams sums up what he means by 
“Imagination”:
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description nor an evocation 
of objects or situations, it is to say that poetry does not tamper with the 
world but moves it—It affirms reality most powerfully and therefore, since 
reality needs no personal support but exists free from human attention 
as proven by science in the indestructibility of matter and force, it creates 
a new object, a play, a dance which is not a mirror up to nature but—
As birds’ wings beat the solid air without which none could fly so words 
freed by the imagination affirm reality by their flight.  (149-50)
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binary logic to describe phenomena of 
an entirely different nature. (11)
The relationship between the book and the 
world is similar to that of Dasein. Dasein is 
always already in the world (but not of the 
world). The book does not communicate unidi-
rectionally with the world, nor vice versa, nor 
even both, that is to say, the world and book 
do not exist in two-way communication. Instead 
each constitutes, composes itself and the 
other and even itself in and through the other. 
After Heidegger, subject and object become 
complicated: so too with authors, texts, and 
readers. They are not identical and yet they 
are inseparable. 
The world has become chaos, but the 
book remains the image of the world: 
radicle-chaosmos rather than root-
cosmos. A strange mystification: a book 
all the more total for being fragmented. 
At any rate, what a vapid idea, the 
book as the image of the world. In 
truth, it is not enough to say, “Long live 
the multiple,” difficult as it is to raise 
that cry. No typographical, lexical, or 
even syntactical cleverness is enough 
to make it heard. The multiple must be 
made, not by always adding a higher 
dimension, but rather in the simplest 
of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the 
number of dimensions one already has 
available— always n - 1 (the only way 
the one belongs to the multiple: always 
subtracted). Subtract the unique from 
the multiplicity to be constituted; write 
at n - 1 dimensions. A system of this kind 
could be called a rhizome. A rhizome as 
subterranean stem is absolutely differ-
ent from roots and radicles. (6)
The multiple is made by subtracting the unique. 
By separating the separable (which does not 
ek-sist) we are left with the inseparable.
This was the process of the first half 
of this work. I attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
separate image and text, visual and verbal, 
discourse and figure. The relationship of image 
to text is that of the rhizome. It is not linear. 
Chapter one redefined (decentered) comics, 
breaking with a linear, sequential definition 
and embracing a more rhizomatic one:
Principles of connection and heteroge-
neity: any point of a rhizome can be 
This passage embodies Williams’ view of the relationship 
of art to reality.  He describes art first pragmatically: not to 
tamper, not to avoid, but to move reality.  Next he investi-
gates its affirmation of reality and the implications thereof: since reality needs 
not, art creates anew.  Williams then envisions that new creation (dance, play) 
in opposition to Hamlet’s description of mimetic theatre: a mirror held up to 
nature.  Finally, unable to define art adequately (or explicitly) Williams cuts off 
his sentence with a double-dash—
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connected to anything other, and must 
be. This is very different from the tree or 
root, which plots a point, fixes an order. 
(7) 
This is very different from Eisner and McCloud 
whose theories assume a transparency of text: 
words reveal things and pictures help us by 
getting us closer to things. Instead comics as 
rhizome demand more and more connections, 
and reflect the experience of reading comics 
more closely.
McCloud’s notion of closure, reader re-
sponse across the gutter, is too linear, sequen-
tial. As we saw in Lyotard, 
the reader provides the 
synthesis of discourse and 
figure, responding consciously and uncon-
sciously across gaps. However, we must note 
that the response is recursive, iterative. As in 
the previous sentence, I have relied heavily 
upon the use of scesis onomaton throughout 
this chapter: allowing multiple synonyms to co-
exist, offering the reader a chance to gather, 
read, close, synthesize. This is rhizomic writing. 
Rhizcom(ic)position. 
I will speak, therefore, of a letter. 
Of the undeliverable letter, if the rhe-
torical tradition, and most of the speculations 
which have ventured into it, are to be be-
lieved. 
I will speak, therefore, of the hand-
delivered letter which it apparently has been 
necessary to insinuate, here and there, into the 
often resistant canon of rhetoric; and to do 
so in the course of a writing on writing, and 
also of a writing within writing whose different 
trajectories thereby find themselves, at cer-
tain very determined points, intersecting with 
a kind of gross paronomasia, a lapse in the 
discipline and law which regulate writing and 
keep it seemly.
All apologies to Derrida, the spectre that 
haunts this dissertation, the name on the return 
address of this undeliverable text. Liber non 
liber est: the book/letter is not free. The can-
ons of rhetoric have been liberated somewhat 
throughout the twentieth century, no doubt as 
an effect of (post)modernism and the avant 
garde. However, to use an archaic form, we 
must liberate delivery in order to learn to 
write more deliverly.
Deleuze and Guattari saw that linear 
writing did not have to obey the rule of the 
line but could offer new, open lines of flight:
To attain the multiple, one must have a 
method that effectively constructs it; no 
typographical cleverness, no lexical agil-
ity, no blending or creation of words, 
no syntactical boldness can substitute 
Delivérance
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for it. In fact, these are more often than 
not merely mimetic procedures used to 
disseminate or disperse a unity that is 
retained in a different dimension for an 
image-book. Technonarcissism. (22)
Technonarcissism makes us think that an oral 
digitality promises an era of openness impos-
sible in the print age. Deleuze insists that if 
we did not seek openness then, we would not 
now: “A language is never closed upon itself, 
except as a function of impotence” (8). Tech-
nonarcissism falls into the trap linguistics has 
fallen into: that of thinking epistemically rather 
than technically. Their tendencies toward tran-
scendence, toward transparency, make writing 
a signification, an entrance 
into the real. Deleuze and 
Guattari counter that 
“Writing has nothing to 
do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, 
mapping, even realms that are yet to come” 
(4-5). When thought radically—or even rhizo-
matically—all forms of technê (whether oral, 
print, or digital) can map or trace. 
The rhizome is not a special type of 
book, but perhaps a way of composing (which 
is done by those traditionally considered 
readers at least as much as it is done by those 
traditionally considered authors)—a way of 
composing that connects invention to delivery.
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s mightier 
than the 
sword. 
In 
the case of 
Peter Ramus, 
this would not 
seem to be the 
case. 
Ramus, 
the 
closeted 
i n te l l ec tua l , 
found himself 
quite liter-
ally forced 
to accept the su-perior-
ity of deeds over 
words as he was 
c u t down in his room 
It is customary in writing about mnemo-tech-
nologies to give a nod to Plato’s portrayal of 
Socrates as Luddite. In the Phaedrus, he tells 
the story of two Egyptian gods, Theuth and 
Thamus. Theuth invented numbers, arithmetic, 
geometry and many other things, including let-
ters (reminding us of Stiegler’s statement that 
you can’t have one without the other). He 
then presented these inventions to Thamus 
who judged each. In displaying letters, Theuth 
promised “an elixir of memory and wisdom.” 
Thamus responded, “O most ingenious Theuth, 
one man has the ability to beget arts, but the 
ability to judge of their usefulness or harmful-
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, 
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s 
m
et
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d 
cemented a new 
mode of thought. He 
used dichotomy ex-
tensively, breaking 
things into either-
or statements, flow 
charts that served 
as heuristics. In his 
mind there were al-
ways two branches, 
not an unbearable 
multiplicity.
Which brings 
us to our second 
definition. Ramus 
also signifies a 
branch of the Greek 
letter gamma (g), 
which Pythagoras 
employed to de-
scribe the two roads 
of life: virtue and 
vice. Ramus’ dialec-
tic serves in a simi-
lar way. In fact the 
on August 26, 1572 during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Mere words could 
not save him from the sharp edge of a blade that decapitated him or the rough 
hands that threw him out the window. However, in many ways he lived on. Walter 
Ong claims that Ramus marks the turning point from Renaissance to Modern Age 
and that his methods reside in every textbook and indeed in the very foundations 
of modern academia. If we are going to get down to the core of who Ramus is 
(which of course, is the core of who we, his inheritors, are), we must paradoxically 
stay close to the surface.
Puns are of course superficial. They distract from the real significance of a 
text and point sidelong rather than downward—the direction of proper hermeneu-
tics. However, this lateral movement, far from any kind of equivocal sidestepping, 
engenders new 
thought while 
evading the trap 
of transcendent 
interpretation, 
the goal of which 
always resides 
underneath a 
text. 
R a m u s ’ 
name provides 
many rich points 
of departure for 
discussions on 
what it might 
mean to be 
modern (or at 
least contempo-
rary). The term 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s 
might well de-
scribe this essay 
in both surface 
and content—for 
this essay might 
ness to their users be-
longs to another” (274e) 
— one may invent, but 
another must judge use-
fulness. Thamus saw writ-
ing to be not a memory 
producer, but a memory 
eraser: 
This invention will 
produce forgetful-
ness in the minds of 
those who learn to 
use it, for they will 
not practise their 
memory. Their 
trust in writing, 
produced by ex-
ternal characters 
which are no part 
of themselves, will 
discourage the 
use of their own 
memory within 
them. You have 
invented not an 
elixir of memory, 
but of remind-
ing; and you of-
fer your pupils the 
appearance of 
wisdom, not true 
wisdom, for they 
will read many 
things without in-
struction and will 
therefore seem to 
know many things, 
when they are for 
the most part ig-
norant and hard 
to get along with, 
since they are not 
curly bracket which so often 
exemplifies this dialectic “{” 
could perhaps be a gamma 
turned ninety degrees with 
the emphasis placed upon 
the branches rather than 
their con-
nective trunk. 
O n g 
p o i n t s 
out that 
this bi-
nary logic 
shares an 
uncanny 
(Das Un-
h e i m l i -
che, in-
d e e d ) 
resem-
blance to 
d i g i t a l 
c o m -
p u t e r s 
( x v i ) . 
R a m u s 
gives us 
a heuris-
tic which 
finds only 
what it 
a l r e a d y 
k n o w s : 
t h i n g s 
are either A or 
B with no room for middle ground. 
Upon circularly proving 
this thesis the modern lets 
out a perverse gasp of “(h)
eureka”.
Letting out our own 
cry of discovery, we find 
that a third possible definition 
wise, but only appear wise. (275a-b)
Because this all occurs during a discussion on the supposed merits of rhetoric, Plato is quick to get 
back to the point. He has Phaedrus accuse Socrates of making up stories, only to have Socrates 
reply with an appeal to the ways things once were:
The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplic-
ity to hear an oak or a rock, provided it only spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes 
a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only 
whether his words are true or not. (275b-c)
Plato thus exemplifies two things. First, he shows us that even the most careful of philosophers have 
Luddite tendencies—or, to nod at our grandparents: the TV was not the first technology to turn 
our minds to mush. Second, he stresses the Greek conception of truth—one already in flux as he 
was writing. In an oral culture, truth is momentous—concerned with the present not chronologi-
cal history; it does not matter whether or not there were any historical 
figures of Theuth and Thamus who had this conversation, 
only that the conversation itself is true in our own 
time. In a written culture, ethos takes precedence 
over exigency; whether or not someone really 
said something (and their relative reliability) 
becomes more important than whether or 
not it has relevance to the moment. In rhetori-
cal terms, this signifies the death of kairos 
(time as expressed in terms of quality and 
exigency) at the hands of chronos (clock time 
or historical time). 
Many have argued that the computer 
has given us back our kairos.
Commenting on the similarities between 
digitality and orality, Richard Lanham moves us away 
from technics and toward philosophy:
When we ask how elec- tronic technology affects 
us, then, we are inquiring, in terms of electronic technol-
ogy, into the most profound distinction in Western culture. 
The rhetorical/philosophical distinction, though it grows 
from the technological dis- tinction between oral 
pending 
of course upon 
the dictionary, “m
em
-
brum
 virile” or “a m
an’s 
yard”. In laym
an’s term
s, a penis. It’s true. A
t the core of R
am
us’ nam
e not only lies the 
ram
ifications he w
as so incapable of, but perhaps his m
ost salient characteristic. H
e w
as 
a dick. W
hich is perhaps w
hy he w
rote so m
uch.
A beautiful, raven-haired classm
ate of m
ine offered an interesting counterpoint to 
l’ecriture fem
inine. S
he w
as a half-Libyan, half-E
gyptian theory geek w
ho w
rote her body 
in cursive. O
nce, w
hen I drank a few
 too m
any, she held m
y head as I m
ade m
y ow
n con-
tributions to a friend’s gar-
den. A few
 days later w
e 
stood on the top floor 
of 
the 
de 
Young 
m
useum
 gaz-
i
n
g 
over the S
an 
Francisco 
skyline. 
S
he said that perhaps 
the act of w
riting is it-
self a kind of “w
om
b 
envy”. 
In 
other 
w
o
rd
s
, 
of 
ra-
m
us has been 
obscured 
(even 
pruned) by our rather 
prudish 
(and 
puden-
dal) Latin dictionary. 
W
e 
are 
given, 
d
e
-
and literate cultures, concerns more than 
technology. It debates opposed theories 
of human motive, human selfhood, and hu-
man society. (Lanham 203)
Yet each of these last items, “human motive, hu-
man selfhood, and human society,” are by nature 
prosthetic, technical. 
Orality certainly seems like the Real. It is 
multimodal, relevant, and dynamic. It cannot be 
located in any medium but overtakes all media 
within which it comes in contact. Think of a speak-
er using PowerPoint or posters. The rhetor become 
inseparable from the moment, from the oral com-
ponent of the presentation. Likewise, in conversa-
tion anything is fair play—from a nearby squirrel, 
to the weather, to a book. Yet, just as Derrida 
showed us that writing is not the representation 
of speech, so too Stiegler shows us that second-
ary orality is not mimetic but rhizomatic in nature. 
While digital media are certainly tied to orality, 
they provide no more exit from the instrumentality 
of language than oral culture did for Plato. 
The history of rhetorical theory could be 
told as a marginalization of the canon of delivery. 
In an oral culture, rhetoric is overly concerned 
with enunciatio, hand motions, paraverbal com-
position. Literacy represses the paraverbal. Re-
cent technological advances have drastically 
changed the importance of delivery, yet the 
academy seems oddly isolated from many of 
these changes. Ignoring the importance of deliv-
ery, students and scholars have become alienat-
ed from their labor. Electracy signifies the return 
of the repressed.
Imagine a world in which scholars are not 
allowed to come up with their own ideas. Instead, 
journals and publishers give scholars specific 
ideas for research. 
Or a parallel universe in which journals con-
trol the organization of articles, whether or not 
they should have a hook, where the literature 
review should go. 
writing is man’s sublimation for his own 
lack of ability to create biologically. 
This does not diminish l’ecriture 
feminine, but rather frees it from the Ra-
mist methods of male hegemony.
Interestingly, Ong often describes 
Ramus’s heuristics in terms of matrix. 
Matrix, descending from mater, denotes 
a womb. In Ramus’ case his womb pro-
duced more writings. The creation of a 
text is prosthetic in that it creates some-
thing outside of its author which is still 
very much its author. It is both apart 
from and a part of its creator— much 
like a fetus, which brings us to the core 
of what it means to be human in more 
ways than one (to have a part of oneself 
be outside oneself). Yet rather than liv-
ing this out, Ramism separates creator 
from created and stresses the outside-
ness of text rather than its internality. 
In contrast, l’ecriture feminine enables 
an author to step from dialectic to dia-
logue. 
The difference between these two 
terms may seem negligible. They are 
etymologically identical, both coming 
from saying (legî) and between (dia). 
They describe a conversation between 
two people. However, dialectic stresses 
the rightness of one over the other. Dia-
lectic is debate. It cuts the world firmly 
into two halves: right and wrong (or Py-
thagoras’ virtue and vice). As such, it 
aims at transcendence, getting to the 
heart of the matter. Dialogue on the 
other hand recognizes two subjects not 
necessarily in conflict, but perhaps a 
harmony of opposing ideas. As such, it 
evokes immanence. Its participants aim 
not at a heuristics of finding truth but of 
producing more dialogue.
Returning now to our original pun, we find that for Ramus the pen acts as 
sword, di- viding issues in half. Is it necessary to remind the reader 
o f the phallic connotations of both sword and pen to 
t h e Latin mind? Perhaps. The act of inscription be-
comes a double entendre for penetration, used 
punningly by Milton for example. Likewise the 
image of sword, if not already phallic enough, 
is coupled with the connotations of vagina, 
which of course originally meant sheath. The 
term vagina thus exemplifies phallologocen-
tric thinking by showing that it is not an organ 
but a container. The vagina for the phallol-
ogocentric man is always viewed in terms of 
t h e penis and never vice versa. When all you 
h a v e is a hammer, everything looks 
like a nail, and when all you have is a 
dick, everyone gets screwed.  
The link between the literate revolution 
(Ramus) and penis betrays the underlying 
castration complex of modern society and 
its subsequent fe- tishization of the pen/
text. Phallogocen- trism presupposes 
linearity. If we are to castrate the logos 
we must cut the line and move toward 
nonlinear, nonbinary thought founded not 
upon depth of meaning but upon superficial mul-
tiplicity. At the core of Ra- mus’ heu-
ristics lies this crucial puncept. B y 
keeping close to the surface, we avoid the traps o f 
transcendence and embrace an immanence 
which allows dialogue over dialectic. 
What might this look like? Well, for 
starters, it might look like this. It would em-
ploy puns, biography, fragmentation, and 
metatextuality. Puns, as stated previously, tie 
us to an immanent heuristic rather than a tran-
scendent hermeneutic. Biography reconnects 
the author to her text, overcoming a fundamen-
tal division in phallologocentrism. Fragmentation i n -
versely disconnects the normally connected. Rather than a 
glossy veneer, this new text offers a patchwork quilt or col- lage which 
shows its sutures. Metatextuality offers the final blow against transcendence, ironi-
P u b -
lishers could man-
date style guidelines going 
far beyond the scope of MLA or 
APA, having specialized stylists who 
would rewrite articles to maximize 
the use of specific rhetorical tropes. 
Now, what if journals and pub-
lishers separated scholars from the 
delivery of their work, from its 
layout and design? Sud-
denly we are 
back 
to our own uni-
verse. Rhiz|comics offers the 
possibility of changing our world 
ever so slightly to allow scholars influ-
ence on the delivery of their research, 
connecting invention with delivery.
We must remember that Socrates 
was right. We have forgotten more 
because of our technicization 
than we have remembered. 
His diagnosis was 
co r -
rect, but his prog-
nosis was lacking. Forgetting 
constitutes our humanity as much 
as instrumentality and prostheses. We 
will be forever outside ourselves in the 
new digital age; not necessarily further 
from the Real but certainly capable 
of new lines of flight. In dealing with 
them, we must remember our for-
getting: remember that the 
desktop or web-
cally pointing out the impossibility of metapositions. 
Therefore, when I say it would look like this, I do not mean the above 
stated list, but this section itself. This section employs the cut. Returning 
us to our original introduction by way of (dialectic?) reversals it asks the 
following question: “The penis: Mightier than the sword?”
site 
a r e 
m e r e 
metaphors 
and not be 
taken in by the 
illusions we cre-
ate. We must 
avoid the myth 
of transpar-
ency which tells 
us that virtual 
representations 
are another 
reality. Simul-
taneously we 
must beware of 
thinking of the 
Real as impos-
sible and re-
moved. Rather 
than tip-toeing 
between Scylla 
and Charybdis, 
Deleuze and 
Guattari offer 
us a nomadic 
war machine 
that blasts as 
it constructs. 
The rhizome 
bridges the 
gap between 
reflection and 
transparency.
Rhizcomics in the Classroom
Plays Wellwith
Others
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Rhizcom(ic)position reintroduces delivery into the composition classroom doubly: in the students’ 
production of multimodal texts and in the teacher’s delivery of lessons. In this chapter I’d like 
to highlight each of these individually. The first part of the chapter focuses on the student side: 
teaching electracy with student mystory projects. The second part describes what I term “aug-
mented pedagogy”—using teaching as electracy.
Electracy refers to a new kind of literacy, 
one based on electricity and digitality, one 
characterized by a new kind of logic. While 
deductive and inductive logic are of course 
quite familiar, electracy’s conductive logic 
may raise an eyebrow or two. Deductive 
logic proceeds from generals to particulars (all 
men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore 
Socrates is mortal) while inductive does the 
reverse (My father was mortal, so was his, 
so was his, therefore all men must be mortal). 
To this electracy adds a third kind of logic: 
conductive logic. Conductive logic might 
meditate upon the Proto-Indo-European root 
of mortal, mbrotos, and its surviving ancestor in 
the negative: the immortal ambrosia fruit salad 
sitting in the deli-case.
Greg Ulmer developed a tool to teach, 
theorize about, and practice electracy and 
conductive logic. The "Mystory" (pronounced 
"my story" or "mystery" depending upon how 
one feels at the moment) engages all five of 
the rhetorical canons (inventio, dispositio, elo-
cutio, pronuntiatio, and memoria) and thereby 
teaches composition and teaches through 
composition (referencing both writing to learn 
and learning to write pedagogies). Ulmer 
writes, "A mystorical essay is not scholarship, 
not the communication of a prior sense, but 
the discovery of a direction by means of writ-
ing" (Teletheory 113). Writing to learn cannot 
be separated from its counterpart so easily: 
Although “writing to learn” has fre-
quently been isolated from “learning 
Mystory as 
Multimodal 
Composition
117to write” in workshops, often by means 
of a split between so-called “formal” 
(“learning to write”) and “informal” (“writ-
ing to learn”) assignments, conscien-
tious workshop leaders try to keep the 
connections before the minds of partici-
pants. (Thaiss 303)
A multimodal mystory project connects the for-
mal and informal. The non-traditional demands 
of conductive logic free the students to write 
to learn, while the fact that these are major 
projects forces them to learn to write. Reflect-
ing on the impact of technology upon CAC, 
Reiss et al. write,
But the influence of technologies has not 
changed the basic tenets of CAC. Indeed, we 
expect these technologies to extend our ability 
to insinuate CAC concepts like writing to learn 
and collaborative learning. Electronic media 
also can extend our ability to expose students 
to a variety of purposes and audiences as 
well as to spread students’ involvement in 
complex communication projects across the 
curriculum and across their tenure at our institu-
tions. (xviii)
Because this experiment was conducted 
in a technical writing classroom, some faculty 
may not see its use in other disciplines. Howev-
er, if CAC has taught us anything, its that the 
rules of composition apply to any discipline in 
which people communicate, that is, all of them.
Ulmer’s mystory engages four differ-
ent categories and ties them into a single 
multimodal text: career, entertainment, family, 
and community history. Career engages the 
professional scope: specific issues in one’s 
career/discipline that need 
to be addressed. Entertain-
ment can include anything 
from Brittany Spears' latest 
malapropism to a favorite novel. Family invokes 
autobiographical data. Community history 
can refer to anything that constitutes history: 
perhaps Clemson's recent issues with race 
relations or a famous civil war battle fought 
nearby or even a twelfth century Japanese 
shogun. The connections between these 
diverse subjects must be superficial: no themes 
in the traditional sense, but rather repetition 
of signifiers across discourses (the model of the 
puncept).
Ulmer’s theory of electracy answers the 
calls of Gunther Kress (among others) for a 
new media literacy. As Kress is careful to point 
out,
we can no longer treat literacy (or ‘lan-
guage’) as the sole, the main, let alone 
the major means for representation 
and communication. Other modes are 
there as well, and in many environments 
where writing occurs these other modes 
may be more prominent and more 
significant. (35)
Kress later notes that each new “literacy” also 
entails a new writing system, not in the sense 
of letters (from which literacy gets its name) but 
in the sense of representation and recording 
(61-4). As such, visual and oral rhetorics enter 
the picture. While much has been written 
recently on visual and multimodal rhetorics, 
the work of Todd Taylor, Diana George, and 
Scott McCloud are of particular note. 
118During my technical writing class in the 
Fall of 2007, we read the second chapter of 
McCloud’s Understanding Comics to introduce 
basic rhetorical concepts such as amplification 
through simplification, McCloud’s way of say-
ing that clarity and brevity can create sincerity. 
Early in the semester, the class also read the 
first few chapter’s of Internet Invention. Stu-
dents were by and large puzzled by Ulmer’s 
project.
As a result, I attempted to teach theory 
through practice through two sections of a 
technical writing course. Each section was 
given the same syllabus, which called for 
four main multimodal projects throughout the 
semester, pulled together into a single narra-
tive or "Mystory". This narrative would take the 
form of a website that would link all four proj-
ects. The Mystory had to include four themes: 
career, entertainment, history, and family. For 
the course, each theme became a project. 
In the analysis which follows, I will trace the 
projects of two students' mystory assignments, 
pseudonymously called Kelly and Kevin.
I asked students to sketch their own 
Mystory, assigning each category a medium 
(e.g. entertainment as graphic design, history 
as website, career as graphic narrative, family 
as film—though any combination was possible). 
Through the sketch they also were asked to 
discover (the Mystory is after all a heuristic) a 
single image that would unite all four threads 
(Ulmer's “image of wide scope” or “puncept”). 
That image, as described above, had to be 
superficial and yet connective. Kelly chose 
soap and Kevin chose the Ark.
The students were divided into groups of 
four or five and given the 
assignment of writing in-
structions for each medium. 
Each student was to be-
come an expert in the medium and then teach 
the rest of the group. The more traditional as-
signments of instructions, memos, and project 
reports were then created as adjuncts to the 
Mystory project. Students wrote instructions on 
a medium, sent each other memos about their 
projects, and created two project reports at 
the end of the semester (one written individual 
report and one multimodal group report). 
The class progressed through each medium 
sequentially, although the Mystory category 
differed from student to student (i.e. while all 
began with graphic design, some depicted 
entertainment visually while others chose fam-
ily, etc.). Each medium took up three weeks of 
class time. The first week focused on learning 
the software and at the end of the week the 
instructions assignments were due. At the end 
of the second week, rough drafts were due. 
The final project was turned in at the end of 
the third week.
Each assignment was organized to help 
the students progress sequentially. The graphic 
design segment helped the students learn 
the basics of visual rhetorics. The web seg-
ment built on this by focusing on visually-based 
(rather than text-based) design. The graphic 
narrative taught the principles of timing, fram-
ing, and editing that the students would later 
use for the video project.
For the graphic design component, stu-
dents created posters, fliers, package designs, 
and website backgrounds. While they were 
119not required to use any software in particular, 
Adobe Illustrator and Photoshop were recom-
mended and, with a few exceptions, used by 
the students. After a few class periods de-
voted to studio time learning the software, the 
students turned in rough drafts of the proj-
ects. Most students learned quickly that the 
projects demanded more of their time than 
they had thought and their rough drafts were 
noticeably lacking. However, the final drafts 
blew me away. 
Kelly, a nursing major, designed the 
cover of a nursing magazine that depicted 
a revolutionary new hand 
sanitizer. Kevin, a secondary 
education major, chose to 
present a modified picture 
of his home as an ark of safety, complete 
with a ninja-squirrel security force. Kelly stayed 
relatively close to the assignment's guidelines 
throughout, while Kevin only nodded at them 
occasionally.
For the web design segment, I was 
unable to get my students access to Dream 
Weaver and was forced to recommend they 
use free software like Mozilla Composer. I 
asked the students to create an image-based 
Website that would look identical across 
browsers and computers. Using images al-
lowed the students to dictate every facet of 
the site's appearance. Most of these sites still 
included a great deal of words (or rather, 
pictures of words), but by proceeding from text 
to image to design, they made a site that was 
on the whole more aesthetically pleasing and 
more readable.
During this segment students created a 
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front page for the entire project as well as a 
web-project contained within. Kelly created a 
history of soap operas and a main page with 
soap-dish buttons. Kevin's lack of adherence 
to the guidelines led to a much more creative 
main page, a fake dictionary entry in which 
each definition linked to a separate page 
of the Mystory. His history section offered a 
polished website devote 
to the ark of Bukhara, an 
ancient fortress in Bukhara, 
Uzbekistan. 
In the graphic narrative section, students 
made a comic using a free trial download of 
ComicLife. This relied on all their prior learning 
by involving visuals, texts, and the web exper-
tise to integrate it into their site. Some students 
imported photographs they had taken them-
selves to tell a story. Others drew their images 
121free-hand or used images from the web. Kelly 
told the story of her experience at a Christian 
camp and Kevin created a cynical retelling 
of Noah's ark in which mythical animals are 
kicked off the ark one-by-one by a cantanker-
ous, 8-bit Noah. 
The final section, video, was by far the 
most difficult for students. Most had only two 
alternatives for software: the bug-ridden, 
crash-prone Windows Movie Maker or the 
ram-dependent, complex Adobe Premier; 
both of which exceeded the capabilities of the 
school-supplied laptops. Students also found it 
difficult to either make or find footage. Video 
cameras were out of reach for most and even 
stock footage was difficult to import. However, 
having worked extensively with video in the 
past, I warned the students of all these pitfalls 
ahead of time and recommended they have 
all their footage together and imported at 
least a week before the final was due. Once 
they finished the video, they still had to upload 
it to YouTube and link it to their site.
Kelly created a fake Entertainment To-
night spot about Kelly Rippa and Clay Aiken's 
recent run-in on Live! She used clips from the 
show and did a voice-over 
to pull it all together. Kevin 
followed a well-known 
internet genre, the fifteen 
second version of a feature film. He titled his 
video "Raiders of the Lost Ark in fifteen sec-
onds". It opens with a character telling Indy, 
"Any army with the Ark of the Covenant 
before them would be invincible." A sudden 
jump-cut gives us the Nazi's eventual destruc-
tion at the hands of the Ark and we cut back 
to Indy saying, "Haven't you guys ever been 
to Sunday school?" The simplicity belies the 
subtly ironic humor of the piece, again fitting 
with the genre.
Looking back on the projects, I’ve noted 
some strengths and weaknesses. Conduc-
tive logic encourages abnormal thought (cf. 
Bruffee and Myers) which can in turn result in 
paradigm shifts. The creativity it engages can 
help students take ownership of composition. 
However, by its very nature it forces students 
to get off track.
One of my favorite projects from that 
semester was a comic composed by a student 
I’ll call “Keith.” Keith, a civil engineering major, 
prepared a graphic narrative combining vari-
ous mystorical elements. I’ve included his comic 
in its entirety on the next few pages.
Likewise, multimodal composition helps 
students realize that the message is never 
independent of the medium. Throughout the 
semester, students meditated on the potential 
uses of each medium: Should I make a video 
resume? Should I make a website instead of a 
research paper? The answer to both of these 
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126is probably no. However, students noticed 
how useful videos are in instructions and 
reports. The experience the gained through 
working with the media then was not just 
technical but also theoretical.
Multimodal composition also has its 
downsides. It’s much more demanding for both 
students and teachers. For me, attempting to 
teach new media can often become an epic 
battle with the very technology I had earlier 
lauded. In the feedback from the semester a 
pattern emerged. While some students em-
braced new technologies, others resisted. An 
electrical engineering student approached me 
at the end of the semester, saying that he had 
never been forced to think creatively before at 
school. It was one of the most fulfilling classes 
he had ever taken, he told me. Another 
student asked why he would ever need to 
know how to make a website. His inability to 
see the practicality of my instruction left me 
dumbfounded.
The next semester, I decided to make the 
mystory a smaller project, teaching each me-
dium as an end to itself and offering the stu-
dents a moment of self expression only at the 
end of the semester in the mystory project. I 
taught each medium through in class exercises 
(visual remixes, document design, etc.). At the 
end of the semester students were allowed to 
choose a medium for their mystory. Students 
really flourished under the new system. Upon 
further reflection, much of what students had 
articulated the previous semester as resistance 
to technology seemed to be resistance to 
forced self-expression. 
Not only were students more interested 
in the technology through-
out the semester, but the 
mystories at the end of the 
semester were far more 
innovative. Students pushed the boundaries of 
what are traditionally understood as media. 
I received mystories as comics, film, fortune 
cookies, and even prescriptions. One student, 
a graphic design major, incorporated all four 
elements of the mystory into a single poster.
I began to wonder how I might incorpo-
rate the lessons I’d learned from my students 
into my own teaching. How could I teach with 
electracy? I found the answer in augmented 
pedagogy.
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Augmented 
Pedagogy
In efforts to teach (with) electracy, I used 
Adobe Breeze (now Adobe Connect) and 
traditional lecturing to achieve an augmented 
reality pedagogy. Adobe Breeze incorpo-
rates webinar modalities: chat space, video 
conferencing, collective notepads, and shared 
control of screens. By using emerging software 
like Adobe Breeze simultaneously with a 
traditional lecture we create an augmented 
classroom. Students are free to engage in 
chat based conversations while the teacher 
lectures, thereby encountering the material in 
multiple representations. 
Adobe Breeze can easily be co-opted 
and used in the composition classroom to 
teach (with) electracy on two levels: thinking 
and doing. First, the augmented classroom 
allows us to better exemplify electracy through 
samples: websites, PowerPoints, Flash games, 
etc. Second, it allows students to experience 
electracy for themselves in the classroom, thus 
making possible conductive (and often pro-
ductive) leaps within the traditionally hege-
monic academic environment. 
By giving students the freedom to chat 
tangentially during the lecture, the classroom 
becomes a more playful and potentially more 
productive environment. The lecture becomes 
a base off of which students riff. Abnormal 
thought becomes acceptable, even encour-
aged. As a result, I hoped students would think 
in new and exciting ways and tend to pay 
closer attention as their tangential thought 
results from things stated in the lecture.
The basic research question was (How) 
does the augmented classroom (lecturing 
while students use chat technology etc.) pro-
duce in students abnormal discourse and an 
increased critical awareness of their relation-
ship with all technologies?
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My initial forays into electracy had been in-
spired mainly by Ulmer’s research. For this new 
project, I began casting a wider net.
An obvious place to begin was Heide-
gger's "The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy." Heidegger's seminal article highlights 
the effects of technology on humans and vice 
versa. Rather than technology serving humans, 
humans are made to serve technological 
thought. He invents key issues like "enframing" 
and "standing reserve". Yet, techne seems to 
be humanity's mode of being. It both blocks us 
from being and opens new ways of being. He 
ends by quoting Rilke: "Poetically man dwells 
on the earth," and technology is our poetry. 
The article offers vocabulary for analyzing the 
ethical dimensions of emerging technologies, 
allowing us to reflect upon the complex issues 
my project raised. 
Following Heidegger (and integrating 
Leroi-Gourhan's work in evolutionary biology), 
Bernard Stiegler's Technics and Time connects 
emerging technology with human evolution 
and the experience of exteriorization. I’ve al-
ready summarized much of Stiegler’s multivol-
ume work. It provided a theoretical framework 
for analyzing the relationships students will 
have with augmented pedagogy. Individual 
students have to undergo new levels of exte-
riorization which may result in self-alienation. 
However, as something is lost something else 
is gained. Students gain a larger awareness of 
their own technological position even as they 
lose their assumed presence.
The concept of augmented pedagogy 
depends largely on Walter 
Ong's concept of second-
ary orality, a communication mode that follows 
literacy and parallels orality in many of its 
characteristics. Some of its major features are 
decompartmentalization, resurgence of kairos, 
and a return to mythos over logos. When 
compared with Ong's work on Peter Ramus, 
we discover a new rhetoric far less hegemonic 
than the traditional phallologocentric model. 
In hindsight we can connect with him not only 
the work of Derrida (whom he references 
throughout), but Deleuze and Guattari, Ulmer, 
and Stiegler. Ong, like Heidegger, Stiegler, 
and Ulmer, provides the theoretical framework 
within which I formulate the experiment.
Ulmer's corpus has investigated many 
of the pedagogical implications of applying 
the theories of Ong, Derrida, Heidegger, 
and Stiegler. Rather then merely teaching 
about deconstruction, he teaches students to 
deconstruct actively and furtively through his 
Mystory assignments. Ulmer poses perhaps 
the best example of the pedagogical linkage 
in his title Applied Grammatology. Ulmer and 
those who would follow him seek to apply 
Not to follow in the 
footsteps of the 
masters but to seek 
what they sought 
Not to follow iN 
the footsteps of the 
masters but seek 
what they t 
- Basho
Future 
Anterior
129the theoretical findings of deconstruction and 
poststructuralist philosophy. However, we must 
also look to our own roots in both industry 
and the classroom.
On the industry side, Nathan Shedroff in-
troduces the concept of Experience Design, a 
design aimed at the user's overall experience 
rather than merely filling a user's immediate 
needs. An experiential design engages users 
holistically rather than compartmentally (cf. his 
delineation of data-information-knowledge-
wisdom found in Chapter 3 of this volume). Us-
ers are people not numbers. The augmented 
classroom offers a holistic experience, engag-
ing students as partners in knowledge creation 
rather than mere consumers of information. 
Todd Taylor’s “Design, Delivery, and 
Narcolepsy” recognizes the issue of attention 
deficit in the classroom—in this case due to no 
mental illness, but rather to poor classroom 
design. As Janice Redish has noted, “Students 
truly learn only when they are actively en-
gaged in constructing knowledge for them-
selves. Lecturing at students rarely results in 
real learning” (80).Taylor eventually calls for 
a classroom designed along the principles 
established by Donald Norman (and furthered 
by Nathan Shedroff), one in which students 
participate instead of sleeping.
When bringing technology into the 
classroom, we bring students face to face with 
the oft neglected rhetorical doctrine of kairos. 
Michael Harker brilliantly discusses varying 
definitions of kairos and its use in the classroom 
culminating in a move from rhetorical triangle 
to a rhetorical pyramid consisting of ethos, 
pathos, logos, and kairos. We've already seen 
the importance of kairos to 
a rhetoric of digital tech-
nology. He differentiates 
between Aristotelian and 
Isocratean kairos. The first puts emphasis on 
appropriateness, the second on timeliness. In 
composition we can teach appropriateness 
through conventions and timeliness through re-
writes. This may seem to have little or nothing 
to do with technology and Harker certainly 
never makes the connection. However, the 
central rhetorical principle of new media is not 
one of the big three (ethos, pathos, logos) but 
kairos. Timeliness becomes essential in teach-
ing digital literacy, no longer in the sense of 
rewriting, but now in interactivity. Internet time 
is time full of now (invoking Walter Benjamin, as 
Harker does). The internet teaches us to teach 
kairos. Augmented pedagogy incorporates 
delivery and kairos with digital media.
Simmons and Grabill explain that technol-
ogy enables and increases civic responsibility. 
Interactive technologies depend upon col-
laboration throughout the invention process. 
By designing interactive experiences, the 
performance itself becomes another moment 
of collaboration. Participation is then moved 
outward, causing students to be civically 
responsible members of society. 
Andrea Lunsford provides another 
bridge between theory and practice. Lunsford 
begins by placing us in the context of Ong's 
secondary orality and juxtaposing a second-
ary literacy: 
As I'm using it, then, secondary literacy 
advances a looser prose style, infil-
trated by visual and aural components 
130to mirror the agility and shiftiness of lan-
guage filtered through and transformed 
by digital technologies and to allow 
for, indeed demand, performance. To 
describe such literacies, we need more 
expansive definitions of writing along 
with a flexible critical vocabulary and 
catalogue of the writing and rhetorical 
situations that call for amplified, per-
formative, and embodied discourses of 
many different kinds. (170)
She describes modes of writing that are closer 
to speaking (Shankar and Rosenberger's "sprit-
ing"), resulting in a writing 
that is "epistemic, performa-
tive, multivocal, multimodal, 
and multimediated"(171). 
This writing aligns most closely with the fifth, 
sometimes forgotten, canon of rhetoric: deliv-
ery. She describes attempts to integrate this 
new writing in the Program for Writing and 
Rhetoric at Stanford University, mostly with 
little success. Despite this, she makes a call to 
all first year writing instructors to engage these 
new technologies. 
Reflection 
Redux
When reflecting on most research that incor-
porates technology and pedagogy, we are 
too often confronted with the unquestioning 
belief in the myth of transparency—technology 
is an invisible medium, something with which 
we get things done (see my discussion of Stu-
art Selber in Chapter 3). The issue is one of 
seeing technology in the classroom as mainly 
CMC (Computer Mediated Communication) 
and rarely HCI (Human Computer Interaction) 
let alone augmented reality, a strange hybrid 
we might call Computer Mediated Interac-
tion. Few take into account the greater impli-
cations (technology is by no means invisible) 
and possibilities (technology may be used as 
augmentation rather than pure medium) of 
technology. Current compositionists tend to 
see technology as CMC rather than HCI.
In WAC for example, Mike Palmquist’s 
“Notes on the Evolution of Network Support 
for Writing Across the Curriculum” offers a 
recap of the history of technology in WAC, 
beginning with the introduction of the word 
processor in the eighties to the adoption of 
online writing labs throughout the nineties. 
At the end he introduces the Online Writing 
Center, mentions some of the impediments 
to OWLs and OWCs, and calls for further 
investigation by WAC scholars. The article 
provides a good bit of context for where 
WAC, and most writing pedagogy, has been 
with regard to technology. Specifically, it 
illustrates my major point that until now almost 
all pedagogical scholarship has focused on 
technology as pure medium not augmented 
reality. Palmquist suffers from this error more 
131than most, ultimately confusing human and 
computer networks (computer networks are 
more than mere CMC).
In his 2007 article, “Technological 
Activism,” Dickie Selfe calls for a pedagogy 
that teaches students to use technology and 
to reflect upon it. He includes pedagogi-
cal appendices on applying these lessons 
to investigating digital environments. I follow 
Selfe's suggestion by teaching students to both 
perform and analyze technology. However, 
his assignments put more stress on collecting 
and interpreting data than on critically analyz-
ing technology. I determined to include more 
theoretical grounding and reflection in my own 
development of augmented pedagogy.
Stuart Selber offers a much more bal-
anced view of the effect of technology on 
composition. He presents three myths of 
technology: the myth of progress, the myth of 
access, and the myth of transparence. Tech-
nology does not produce real progress, but 
is a complex system with benefits and dis-
advantages. Merely giving everyone access 
to technology will not decrease the distance 
between the haves and have-nots. Transpar-
ency is not the ultimate goal of technology, 
nor should it be. He states that technology 
has brought five basic changes. Technology 
has moved us from reception to engagement, 
from the classroom to the real world, from text 
to multiple representations, from coverage to 
mastery, from isolation to interconnection, and 
from products to processes. Selber's reflections 
on transparency provide an interesting foil on 
the one hand to Selfe, and on the other to 
Bolter and Gromala (their Windows and Mir-
rors is largely an exposition 
of the myth of transparency).
Sonny and Jamie 
Kirkley's article on "Blended 
Learning" features a potpourri of theory and 
pedagogy. They outline issues involved in 
designing the learning environment (an environ-
ment concerned with space, surely, but also 
with various media and their relative purity). 
They track pedagogy through a constructivist 
perspective, the goal of which "is the creation 
and transfer of context-dependent, flexible 
and adaptive learning and complex problem 
solving" (44). Augmented reality technology 
allows for this. While, most of the technology 
they use involves the use of virtual reality and 
space mapping, its theory applies to the use 
of Adobe Breeze in the classroom.
Finally, my experiment called for a reflec-
tion on abnormal thought. Kenneth Bruffee's 
analysis of Kuhn provides arguments for 
promoting abnormal discourse in composition 
classes. Greg Myers furthers this by showing 
that group work will never achieve abnormal 
thought, but merely reinscribes students into 
preconstructed knowledge discourses. Teach-
ing with emerging technology, especially 
Adobe Breeze, may encourage students to 
reflect upon their own relationship with tech-
nology and generate the kind of abnormal 
thinking Bruffee and Myers call for. Rather 
than enforcing consensus, anonymity mixed 
with face-to-face interaction helps students 
who normally would not communicate in one 
of those modes to get their ideas out. Students 
are able to think more tangentially because of 
it.
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Set-Up
My experiment attempted to discover whether 
or not participating in an augmented class-
room produces knowledge about electracy 
and writing. Can students write better after 
using Breeze? What kinds of writing does it 
encourage? How does teaching in the aug-
mented classroom differ from merely using 
technology in the classroom? Does it effect 
in them a more aware relationship with all 
technologies? I hoped to discover not only the 
benefits of augmented pedagogy, but also 
the impediments. 
My methodology aimed at each of the 
two assessment goals: abnormal thought and 
increased critical awareness of technologies. 
During the literature review I posed two ad-
Figure 1
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133ditional issues that became evident during the 
study: kairos and participation. I judged stu-
dents' ability to engage in abnormal thought 
by evaluating their discussions. I gauged their 
awareness of technology by assessing in-class 
writings done at the end of each class. While 
there were no specific measures, the evalu-
ation procedures explain themselves. These 
writings each focused on a different reflection 
question (e.g. What technologies have you 
used today? How do different technologies 
influence your writing?). 
Our school had bought licenses for 
Adobe Breeze, a webinar themed program 
that enables teleconferencing. The program 
consists of various “pods” displayed in real 
time across all users’ screens. Examples of pods 
include chat, note, share 
(for displaying PowerPoint 
or flash presentations) and 
video pods. Figure one 
shows (from left to right) the main chat space 
along with a roll sheet and note pod. This is 
the Breeze configuration for the lecture por-
tion of this study. During the lecture, students 
were able to discuss in the main chat pod and 
follow the outline in the note pod. Figure two 
shows the Breeze configuration for the discus-
sion segment. Here there are four chat spaces 
open, with a quarter of the class in each chat 
pod. I was able to thus view all four groups 
and participate in each, both aloud and in 
text.
While I experimented with Breeze a few 
Figure 2
134times throughout the semester, I decided to 
focus my experiment upon a specific lecture 
given in two sections of my Technical Writing 
course. The lecture was on the third chapter 
of Richard Lanham's The Economics of Atten-
tion: http://www.rhetoricainc.com/eofa Chat 
occurred during lecture and then students 
were placed into groups to answer one of 
four questions. The initial question was placed 
at the top of each group chat pod. During 
the first class period, group members were 
moved through all four groups. My second 
section's class remained in the same groups 
the entire time. The goal of this rotation was to 
determine the degree to which the anonymity 
of the digital environment prompts students to 
think tangentially. The first section had enough 
trouble with the rotations that I did not repeat 
them in the second. After 
group discussion had gone 
on for approximately twenty 
minutes, a secondary ques-
tion was then asked of all the groups:
How has this experience been different 
based upon the media in which it was per-
formed? I.e. what would it have been like if I 
was the only one with a computer and I had 
made you talk in groups instead? 
What about if I had no computer either 
and just gave a lecture and then told you to 
discuss in groups?
Will this class period change the way you 
act during the rest of the day at all? How?
I recorded both sections’ classes and 
later reviewed the results.
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Having overviewed the recordings, I have 
divided the results into four categories: kairos, 
abnormal thought, participation, and aware-
ness of relationship with technology. While I 
initially aimed at merely discussing abnormal 
thought and relationship with technology, the 
actual process led me to add these additional 
sections as well.
Results
The
Kairos
First, let's look at sections that reflect strides 
in the kairotic dimension of rhetoric. Kairos, 
defined broadly, would result in a focus on the 
present, maximizing class time. One example 
would be when a student asked aloud if the 
class could have the day before Thanksgiving 
Break off. I responded (again, aloud) that they 
should write up a proposal and send it to me. 
Immediately the chat board lit up:
Student A: I said i could 
do it
Student B: that will work
Student A: [student's 
email address]@clemson.
edu
Student C: So, who wants 
to be in charge of put-
ting everyone's quotes 
together?
Student C: ok good!
Student D: How about "Ja-
son, if you come to class 
on the tuesday before 
Thanksgiving, you will 
be a loser and no one 
will like you. Hence, no 
class."
Student A: just send them 
ASAP
Student E: lol
Student B: haha
Student F: or if you come 
to class, no one will be 
here
Student F: hence, we can 
all just agree not to 
come
Student E: sucks for him 
lol
Student F: agreed? (Ses-
sion 1, Main Chat) 
While their mutiny never occurred, they did 
compile a very nice proposal done in a more 
traditional format—complete with an actual 
rhetorical argument—and I gave them the day 
off. This conversation happened only aloud in 
my other section and the proposal was nota-
bly lacking, taking the form of a bulleted list of 
136reasons to get the day off. 
Students also noted that Breeze let them 
feed off each other simultaneously. Conversa-
tions therefore went further more quickly than 
they would have if they'd only been aloud. 
Student E: It would have 
been a less interesting 
discussion because this 
lets me feed of every-
one's comments 
Student D: we talk more 
on the computer because 
of electracy. oral dis-
cussion would not get as 
much done and would not 
be as entertaining
…
Student G: we can scroll 
through and see what ev-
eryone is saying
Student G: if we are 
talking, we can't rewind 
the conversation
Student D: and you dont 
have to worry about let-
ting someone have time to 
speak
Student H: true true
Student E: its more fun 
with computers...this way 
i will actually listen 
lol
Student I: i agree to 
that
Student D: true dat!
Student G: lol, i remem-
ber not liking it all 
that much when we did 
this the first time (Ses-
sion 1, Group Chat)
The students grasp in practice the kind of en-
gaged learning scholars like Redish call for. In 
a world of such simultaneous communications, 
kairos is even more impor-
tant than in orality. 
When asked to reflect 
on their experience with 
Breeze, students pointed to the oral and 
textual dimensions of electracy:
Student J: I would prob-
ably leave if I had to 
listen to jason for an 
hour or more
Student J: no offense ja-
son
Student K: we could have 
only done one discussion 
at a time without comput-
ers
Student A: thats true
Student J: Class wouldn't 
have been very efficient
Student J: plus nothing 
would have gotten done 
…
Jason Helms: can you en-
vision even more helpful 
things that can be done?
…
Student J: It is more en-
tertaining but, it also 
helps class to.
Student J: It would be 
way to confusing to have 
this type of discussion 
out loud
Student K: it makes class 
more enjoyable and usu-
ally less confusing
Jason Helms: [Student 
J], good point, run with 
that: why would it suck 
out loud?
Student J: Everyone talk-
ing about different top-
ics and then about the 
137assigned one
Student J: would confuse 
people
Student J: an the teacher 
wouldn't have a clue on 
what was going on
Student A: i agree be-
cause with different con-
versations going on
Student A: it is just 
easier that way
Student A: b/c the other 
discussions dont apply to 
me but this one does 
Student A: it keeps peo-
ple seperated but togeth-
er as well
Student J: good point. 
(Session 1, Group Chat)
While such a conversation would obviously be 
unfeasible aloud, participants 
evidently felt that the defi-
ciencies of a more traditional 
oral discussion (one at a 
time with hands raised) went 
without saying. 
Traditional discussions certainly allow for 
much less “chatter”, and, though staying closer 
to the task at hand, sacrifice the learning of 
the silent majority to the whims of the vocal 
minority. Students also reflected on the posi-
tives and negatives of kairotic dialogue:
Student L: i think that 
we've all gotten used to 
using this medium so it's 
easier to communicate on 
here now
Student L: if you had 
asked us this question on 
the first time we used 
breeze, i think the re-
sponse would be different
Student L: 
the first 
time, i 
didn't enjoy 
it, i thought 
it was impersonal 
Student L: but now it's 
easier to just type out 
what im thinking without 
knowing that i'm not go-
ing to interrupt anyone
…
Student C: I didn't care 
for it either, but I like 
it now...communication is 
more open
…
Student L: i also feel 
like it's similar to oral 
communication as well 
though b/c you can 
still go off on tan-
gents
Student C: this 
won't change the 
way I act at all 
though
Student C: there are more 
distractions with this 
too
Student L: especially 
when the side chat board 
is up...sometimes i feel 
like we get less done. 
(Session 1, Group Chat)
While the group chat spaces opened up 
communication and allowed students to better 
follow their own trains of thought, the aug-
mented lecture seemed to some to be less 
effective. For all their heralded multitasking 
abilities, it seems even the Nintendo Genera-
tion finds it difficult to negotiate the spoken 
and the written.
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Abnormal 
Thought
Again, working off of Thomas Kuhn and Gregs 
Ulmer and Myers, I sought to create oppor-
tunities for abnormal and tangential thought. 
Often these opportunities can backfire (as in 
the case of the near mutiny noted above), but 
I've found that when their potential pay-off 
outweighs their risks. 
At one point in the group chat, students 
were asked to look at an interactive resume 
done for a job in interactive design. They 
responded by connecting it back to the Ulme-
rian Mystory project I had assigned and their 
ePortfolios required by the school:
Jason Helms: Reflect on 
the following job ap-
plication: http://www.
rhetoricainc.com/eofa/e_
of_a/media/mateo.html
Jason Helms: Remember, 
the original was inter-
active, not a movie. Do 
you find it persuasive? 
How could you do some-
thing similar in your 
field? Remember, unless 
your field is interac-
tion design (as this per-
son's is) you don't have 
to show off your interac-
tion design skillz. In-
stead, show off skillz 
your employer might want 
(computer hacking skillz, 
bow-hunting skillz).
. . .
Student J: Its just show-
ing how well he can use 
interactive design
Student M: thats really 
neat
Student J: Its really 
well put together
Student J: Depending on 
the job I would hire him
Student M: yeah if i 
needed someone to make 
bad ass computer stuff 
hed get hired
Student J: Agreed
Student M: You could just 
make a mystory type of 
resume with little film 
clips of your work de-
pending on the field
Student M: thats kinda 
Their feeding off of each other increased 
what Ulmer calls conductive logic (and what 
one of my students referred to as "conjective 
thinking or whatever it is" thereby stumbling 
upon a rather useful amalgam of conductive, 
conjunctive, and conjecture. The resulting term 
might embody a Lyotardian 
version of electracy, con-
junctively relying upon "and 
… and … and" and based 
upon little more than intuitive conjecture. The 
figure erupts into discourse.
139what that whole new E-
portfolio thing is with 
the school. (Session 1, 
Group Chat)
Clearly students are completely capable of 
making connections from theoretical discus-
sions back to their discipline and eventual 
career if we just let them. While the prompt 
directed them towards personal reflection, the 
connections toward the school’s “ePortfolio” 
system were the students’ own. Abnormal, 
tangential thought has the power to surprise 
even its instigator. 
Another turn down this road saw stu-
dents reflecting on how digitality reveals a 
tacit ethos:
Student N: i feel like 
the print readers would 
be the OCD types, or old 
people stuck iin their 
ways
. . .
Student N: the "bi-sta-
ble" seriousness allows 
one to look at a work, 
and analyze it, take 
things not so seriously
Student O: ok, that fits 
me
Student O: I never take 
anything seriously
Student O: well, except 
for during times of occa-
sional mental breakdown
Student P: Seriousness is 
for noobs.
Student N: a lot of peo-
ple read something and 
take it for absolute...
graphics etc, restate or 
emphasize the text and 
allow you to think more 
about and 
form person-
al opinions 
about the 
author, text, 
etc. 
…
Student O: I'm really not 
understanding the meaning 
of alphabetic seriousness
Student P: That's what we 
are proving is overrated
Student O: my fault for 
being on a bus during 
class on monday
Jason Helms: so alphabet-
ic is through
Student P: Darn Fencing
Jason Helms: oral is at 
(like when someone mi-
speaks and we all laugh)
Jason Helms: digital is . 
. .
Student 
O: both?
Student 
N: yes, 
but a 
very styilized analyti-
cally conformist way of 
looking at things
Student O: typos = mi-
speak. (Session 2, Group 
Chat)
While the conversation occasionally seemed 
to get away from the point, the students 
were able to maintain focus with a minimum of 
coaxing. “Seriousness is for noobs” (n00bs is 
current internet slang for the technologically 
naïve) could well be the battle cry of a new 
generation of Homo rhetoricus, one discov-
ered through abnormal thought.
Some students reflected on the extra 
Seriousness is 
for n00bs
140time it takes to type answers rather than talk:
Student R: It seems 
weird.  I think there are 
more tangents with this 
media.
Student Q: hmm, it takes 
longer to type than to 
talk as well, that would 
have been different
Student R: More time 
means more free thinking. 
(Session 2, Group Chat)
While a traditional class discussion would have 
probably led to lengthier responses, those 
responses would probably be less thorough. 
Others reflected on the way in which the 
augmented classroom places "seriousness and 
craziness" face to face, unknowingly invoking 
Lanham's homo seriousus and homo rhetoricus:
Student C: More of us 
probablyt do 
pay attention 
but it isn't 
to important 
class infor-
mation
Student L: it's about 
random conversation...
it's the juxtaposition of 
seriousness and craziness
Student C: So there could 
be a trade off...I feel 
like that's up to the 
teacher though (session 
1, Group 3)
The instructor obviously needs to be much 
more alert and involved in the augmented 
classroom. I was constantly pushed to the limits 
of my attention, lecturing while reading a chat 
space and then jumping from group to group 
in the discussion segment.
Participation
Answering Todd Taylor's vision for a classroom 
environment designed to combat narcolepsy, 
the augmented classroom offers multiple 
means for teachers to increase participation. In 
fact, lack of participation becomes incredibly 
obvious to both teacher and fellow students. 
At one point I was able to pick out the one 
student in class who was working on some-
thing else (she hadn't typed anything in five 
minutes) and the rest of the students joined in 
when I asked her to join us. The very fact that 
only one student was not participating is a 
great success for any teacher willing to admit 
the fact that all too often the majority of our 
students are passive and bored.
 During the reflection period, students 
noted their own increased desire to partici-
pate in the discussion with Breeze, not only 
because of its entertainment value, but also 
because it makes demanding theoretical dis-
cussions easier to follow:
Jason Helms: can you en-
vision even more helpful 
things that can be done?
Jason Helms: (serious 
question, cuz i'm still 
just experimenting with 
141it)
Student J: It is more en-
tertaining but, it also 
helps class to.
Student J: It would be 
way to confusing to have 
this type of discussion 
out loud
Student K: it makes class 
more enjoyable and usu-
ally less confusing
Jason Helms: [Student 
J], good point, run with 
that: why would it suck 
out loud?
Student J: Everyone talk-
ing about different top-
ics and then about the 
assigned one
Student J: would confuse 
people
Student J: an the teacher 
wouldn't have a clue on 
what was going on
Student A: i agree be-
cause with different con-
versations going on
Student A: it is just 
easier that way
Student A: b/c the other 
discussions dont apply to 
me but this one does 
Student A: it keeps peo-
ple seperated but togeth-
er as well
Student J: good point. 
(Session 1, Group Chat)
I was especially surprised that they noted 
that I could pay better attention to them with 
Breeze. Also, the statement of separation and 
unity revealed the general tenor of the class. 
Participation was individualized for students, 
but the teacher was able to participate in 
all conversations at once 
(partially due to the fact 
that I was the one who had 
posed the questions and 
they were faced with them for the first time). 
Though the teacher may feel more responsive, 
students still betray a sense of isolation in a 
mostly silent room of furious typing.
 In a traditional group discussion, 
students are typically able to discuss whatever 
they want so long as the teacher is currently 
paying attention to another group. In the aug-
mented classroom, teachers can move quickly 
from group to group monitoring participation:
Student T: tell you the 
truth none of it bothered 
me i really just dont 
want to be productive at 
this time 
Student U: if i was more 
away i prob wouldve liked 
that better
Jason Helms: [Student V], 
if you don't like video 
or text, what do you pre-
fer?
Student T: no offense ja-
son
Student V: understand-
able...its like 8:30 am
Student U: He prefers to 
sleep i think
Student V: yeah, things 
did move around. they 
had the block of text and 
then the words dissap-
peared to make it easier
Jason Helms: WAKE UP!!
Student U: say his name, 
it may help
Student V: if you just 
142read the text it kept go-
ing on and on about the 
same thing "in different 
words"
Student V: im awake. 
sorta. (Session 2, Group 
Chat)
Students who might nor-
mally get away with 
sleeping with their eyes 
open are forced to par-
ticipate. 
Students also began to 
explain concepts to each 
other, displaying yet 
another check on lack of 
participation:
Student I: someone who 
looks at that would def. 
remember this resume more 
than just another paper 
he read over
Student W: because he had 
skillz
Student M: thats true
Student H: well most com-
panies weed out using 
resumes and then there 
are practical tests that 
the potentials must go 
against
Student M: you stand out
Student E: Hey group
Student K: here now
Student X: that was a 
stupid video huh
Student E: i think that 
it was all over the place
Student X: but how is it 
a job application
Student X: it seemed more 
to me like it was selling 
you the desire to work 
for AOL
Student K: i hope he 
didn't get 
the job
Student E: 
lol
Student E: he 
was in graphic design and 
stuff so he made his ap-
plication work for him
Student X: oh i get it 
now. (Session 1, Group 
Chat)
In all likelihood, a traditional lecture 
would have left Students X and K in the dark 
about the importance of exigency in resumes 
(whether interactive or not). In this case, 
Student E was able to follow the thread and 
move the others onto the right track. In tradi-
tional group discussions, the student with the 
most knowledge and experience often mo-
nopolizes the discussion. In chat-based discus-
sion groups the students most in need of help 
are able to get a word in edge-wise.
Students also noted their tendency to be 
more honest in their participation with Breeze:
Student S: i am usually 
more apt to say what i am 
thinking in this situa-
tion than in actual group 
conversation]
Student R: That is a nice 
feature, but the same 
could be done with a tape 
recorder.
Student Q: yeah, removing 
us from actual personal 
interaction does defi-
nitely make people more 
honest
Student Y: true. (Session 
2, Group Chat)
Their increased honesty was certainly a result 
of the feeling of "being watched" that elec-
143tronic discourse encourages. Too much “drive 
by Foucault” research has already been writ-
ten on panoptical nature of digital media. The 
class was small enough that at this point in the 
discussion, any anonymity had mostly dissipat-
ed. A future version of this experiment might 
try to engage theories of control societies as 
articulated by Deleuze and Hardt and Negri.
As students continued to reflect on their 
own participation, the themes of boredom 
and entertainment arose again and again:
Jason Helms: would it 
have been easier/bet-
ter/more efficient if we 
just did this all the old 
fashioned way?
…
Student L: i don't think 
it would have been bet-
ter b/c i would have been 
bored, honestly
Student L: this at least 
adds entertainment value 
to the afternoon b/c i 
have a 2 hour break be-
fore this class so most 
of the time i have no de-
sire to come to it
Student C: Yea I would 
have been really bored 
too. (Session 1, Group 
Chat)
Student V: if we were 
sitting in groups talking 
we wouldnt have been this 
productive the little 
amount of productive we 
were
Student U: that would 
probably make me cranky. 
(Session 2, 
Group Chat)
Student G: 
lol, i re-
member not liking it all 
that much when we did 
this the first time
Student W: this class has 
changed my life forever
Student H: true but it 
also makes me more ADD.  
Student G: I prefer this 
type of group work now
Student E: yea, it will 
change the way i act 
during the rest of the 
day...i will bust out 
laughing for no apparent 
reason, but the truth is 
i am remembering some-
thing [Student K] said 
lol
Student D: this class is 
my Anti-Drug. (Session 1, 
Group Chat)
Some instructors might be reticent about the 
benefits of an "entertaining" classroom expe-
rience, but I would assert that the goals of 
teaching are, like poetry, two-fold: to delight 
and instruct. Only through instruction will it be 
delightful. Only through delight will the stu-
dents be instructed.
 One of the major critiques students 
had was that this level of participation was 
too demanding:
Student S: it takes me a 
little longer to keep up 
though...my brain isn't 
quite awake enough to 
keep track of everything 
144that's being said
Student S: but i 
don'tknow if that would 
be any different if we 
were actually talking...
Student Q: I think being 
forced to talk in chat 
rooms before 10 am may be 
constitutionally defined 
as torture
Student Y: but we still 
know who is talking/typ-
ing. 
Jason Helms: it doesn't 
let u fake it, does it?
…
Student S: no no at all. 
(Session 2, Group Chat)
Student N: i am really 
ADD, and when I read I 
jump around (ex. I can't 
read a list of five 
things in order) so typ-
ing and writing somewhat 
screws with my head, esp. 
if someone near me starts 
talking
Student P: Sorry
Student O: my bad yo
Student N: 
thats okay
Student N: 
you say what 
you type, it 
helps actually
Student P: I think it is 
easier to think "digi-
tally"
Student O: Well, for one 
thing, if we'd had a more 
typical lecture class, 
I'd have finished my 
[homework] by now. (Ses-
sion 2, Group Chat)
The second selection in particular raises the 
dual issues in participation. Sometimes I worry 
that I may be requiring too much of students, 
especially when they claim Attention Deficit 
Disorder as a reason for the difficulty of the 
assignment. However, when they complain 
that they are less able to do other work in 
class because of the required participation, I 
am less sympathetic. 
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Reflections
The end goal of the experiment was that 
students would become more aware of and 
reflective on their own relationship with 
technology, not only within the experiment 
(an awareness implied by many of the above 
quotes), but also within their career and ev-
eryday life. This goal built upon Dickie Selfe’s 
demand for a technological awareness that 
allowed students to both work with technol-
ogy and analyze it simultaneously. During the 
course of the experiment students were able 
to reflect upon technology as more than just 
computers and turn their analysis on their 
careers and everyday lives.
 I had emphasized early on that 
technology is much more than just electronic, 
but that even writing is technological. As the 
semester continued on, however, I became 
increasingly worried that students had forgot-
ten this reality and were thinking of technology 
strictly in terms of computers etc. However a 
single conversation restored my faith:
Jason Helms: k, so how do 
u apply into your career? 
just add tech to any-
thing?
Student U: nope, only add 
tech when needed
Student T: well if you 
dont then you will surely 
fall behind 
Student U: it's like when 
ppl make ppt's when only 
a handout is needed
Student U: it's annoying
Student U: or like me-
chanical en-
gineers, they 
make things so complicat-
ed, an industrial engi-
neer has to make it sale-
able and userfriendly
Student T: even a career 
such as agriculture that 
people think or view to 
be very premative a lot 
technology is actually 
envolved
Student V: true, but i 
think technology in the 
workplace is a good idea. 
as a chem major im going 
to use it to run tests 
ect. tech isnt just com-
puters
Student U: true, bc u 
would use the technology 
u understand
Student V: and comp ap-
plicatiosn
Student U: yep yep
Student T: with farmers 
the work place is a la-
ger field full of corn or 
cattle and there is still 
a ldecient amount of tech 
stuff envolved
Student V: so reflection 
is that technology helps 
careers well when used 
wisely and correctly?
Student U: yep, but in 
farming i'm guessing 
that over technology can 
bring harm or make things 
toxic, etc. (Session 2, 
Group Chat)
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an excellent one, and fairly organic within this 
discussion. I was also quite glad to see that 
they connected it to their careers with little 
prodding on my part. 
Other groups made the same connec-
tions, this time when reflecting on Lanham's 
distinctions between at and through:
Student L: well if you 
look at something, you 
just see it for what it 
is
Student E: i think it is 
more marketable to look 
through something and see 
the bigger picture
Student L: when you see 
through something, you're 
seeing behind the face 
value, you're taking away 
the bigger meaning of it 
…
Student D: at means what 
you see on the surface, 
through means analyzing 
it
Student H: at makes it 
seem as if the person 
were shallow
Student G: or maybe 
rushed?
Student G: at would be 
for memos
Student D: I think "at" 
os referring to seeing 
an advertisement, whereas 
"through" means seeing 
the meaning behind the 
advertisement
Student W: So it would 
good to be able to see 
both the surface and 
meaning
Student G: 
ok, so in 
that case, do 
we ever know 
what an ad-
virtisement is saying if 
we only look at it and 
not through it?
Student G: or do we have 
to do both? (Session 1, 
Group Chat)
Although they seem to invert the dichotomy 
(Lanham's discussion shows that at reveals 
the rhetoric inherent in any discourse, while 
through aims at ignoring it), they were able to 
grasp the need to do both well. 
Another group (who did seem to un-
derstand at and through correctly) made the 
same connection:
Student R: [Student Q] 
says, "The at and through 
merge to give purpose."
Student Q: Weren't we 
supposed to be talking 
more specifically about 
marketability
Student Q: like how does 
knowing the difference 
between at and through 
and how they complement 
one another help in what 
you're going to do?
Student Q: hell, what are 
you going to do?
Student R: I don't know 
anymore.
…
Student R: Employers what 
a person to be both an at 
and through person, but 
at times this is lacking. 
(Session 2, Group Chat)
That the students used examples from their 
147careers and everyday lives to bolster their 
arguments showed a particularly nuanced 
understanding of the issues. 
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Conclusions
This experiment in augmented pedagogy 
reveals the medium’s strengths and weakness. 
It certainly brings kairos to a privileged posi-
tion with the three other pillars of rhetoric. It 
rewards tangential thought and, as this experi-
ment has hopefully shown, is rewarded in turn 
by those acts of abnormality. It encourages 
participation and allows instructors oversight 
on student participation. It enables digital 
literacy while simultaneously making a space 
for reflection on technology and our relation-
ship with it.
 The process of engaging simultane-
ously in the actual and the virtual can be 
quite taxing for instructors and students alike. It 
extends our attention’s capacities to the near 
breaking point. The very strengths mentioned 
above can turn quickly to weaknesses. Many 
instructors would see little benefit in tangential 
conversations and fear that teaching kairos 
through experience can only further the alien-
ation of our tech savvy students from all things 
academic. Whatever the case, more work is 
certainly needed. While this study was con-
ducted in a writing course, there is no reason 
other disciplines would not discover the same 
advantages. Also, a more quantitative analysis 
comparing augmented and traditional peda-
gogies would likely reveal other trends. Yet the 
most immediate concern is for other instructors 
to begin to dabble in this on their own. As they 
do, I’m sure we will begin to form a picture of 
what augmented pedagogy can and cannot 
do. 
 The students in this course were taught 
the importance of delivery in the form and 
content of the class. They composed multi-
modal assignments relying on discourse and 
figure, learned the promises and perils inher-
ent in various media, and reflected on their 
own relationship with rhetoric and technology. 
This is one way of applying the theories I’ve 
articulated throughout this dissertation, but 
there are of course infinite other possibilities 
for application. The classroom is a blank space 
waiting to be given form.





ComposeConclusion:
Yourself!
155
Who am I 
composing
The ques-
tion is ambiguous and perhaps 
grammatically incorrect. Did I mean whom? 
Should there be a comma? By asking what “I” mean, 
the reader (one of whom I am) falls 
prey to the rep- resentationalist 
paradigm I have so assidu-
ously attacked throughout this 
book. Compo- sitionists love to 
ask these ques- tions, though, 
often uncriti- cally. We/they 
can use terms 
like agency 
to cover their 
tracks, but 
we/they really 
mean someone 
who can “really 
mean.” Perhaps 
there once was 
someONE who 
could mean 
transparently. I 
have argued 
that such a 
person no 
longer exists, 
and such nos-
talgic attempts 
are doomed to 
failure and shot 
through with dis-
honest assertions 
of continuity.
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I am not sure who I am. 
I do not mean this in any 
Sartrean, high-school 
angst search for mean-
ing (do I?). I mean, who 
is this first person pro-
noun used throughout 
this work? With all I have 
said of the complex rela-
tionship between figure 
and discourse, why would 
I still rely upon a singular 
marker, knowing full well 
that the body typing 
these words is not even 
singular. Moreover, when 
the massively recursive 
modes of writing THIS dis-
sertation – modes which 
include pencil, pen, eras-
er, a variety of papers, 
books, scans, half of Ado-
be’s creative suite, and 
the full force of the col-
lective intelligence of the 
internet – are brought into 
account, notions of singu-
larity, continuity, agency, 
intention become virtually 
meaningless. Should I then 
bracket [I]? Eliminate I? 
Could each sentence be 
uttered passively? One 
could (many would) follow 
Raul Sanchez in eliminat-
ing the subject from the 
composition classroom:
Can tell you something?
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all of our avail-
able terms – 
agency, subject, 
consciousness – 
are so deeply impli-
cated in the represen-
tationalist paradigm that it 
is all but impossible to imagine 
a writer or even an appropriately 
postmodernized “writing subject” that is 
not fundamentally prediscursive, that solves 
or identifies problems through the medium or tools of 
language and writing. (Sanchez 97)
Here we (Raul and I, though the I of the last 
paragraph, not this one) are falling prey to the 
correspondence theory of truth I compli-
cated in chapter three. However, 
the opposing concept of 
truth I proposed, Heide-
gger’s infinite, generative 
play of (un)concealement, 
relies not just upon re-
flexivity. It is not enough, 
in other words, to ask 
whether I should use the 
first person pronoun. That 
is merely to interrogate an 
always already Cartesian 
subject. Truth as aletheia, 
which is to say composi-
tion as apophasis, is in 
constant struggle with 
itself. It depends upon a 
multiplicity (Deleuze and 
Guattari’s useful evasion 
of the word subject) who 
never arrives.
Žižek’s metaphor 
of the parallax view (the 
metaphor with which I be-
gan this text) is careful not 
to presuppose a transcen-
must compose.
At the end 
of the day,
some
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dental 
I with two eyes. Instead, 
the parallax view creates the transcen-
dental I:
“What, then, is this new dimension that emerges 
in the gap itself? It is that of the transcendental I itself, of its 
“spontaneity”: the ultimate parallax, the third space between phe-
nomena and the noumenon itself, is the subject’s freedom / spontaneity, 
which — although, of course, it is not the property of a phenomenal entity, 
so that it cannot be dismissed as a false appearance which 
conceals the noumenal fact that we are totally 
caught in an inacces- sible necessity — is 
also not simply noumenal” (22).
E v e n in our contingency, when we are at 
our most “thrown,” our spontaneity reveals us to our-
s e l v e s . The transcendental I reappears as medium, 
which is also, of course, message.
“The philosophical consequences of 
this Kantian parallax are fully explored in 
their notion of ontological difference, the fo-
cus of Heidegger’s entire thought, which can 
be properly grasped only against the back-
ground of the theme of finitude. There is a 
double doxa on Heidegger’s ontological dif- f e r -
e n ce : it is a difference between the Whatness, the es-
sence of beings, and the mere That-ness of their being – it 
li bera tes beings from subordination to any groung / 
arche / goal; furthermore, it is a difference not merely 
between (dif- ferent levels of) beings, of reality, but be-
tween the All of re- ality and some- thing else which, 
with regard to reality, cannot but appear as 
“Nothing.” . . . This doxa is deeply misleading” (23).
Žižek’s declaration of our freedom, however, may leave us looking a bit like 
the emoticon that introduces his quote — not entirely happy. Our sponta-
neity is always already in the face of our contingency. We are free 
only insofar as we are bound to act. 
We are composed by others at least as much as we 
compose ourselves. Heidegger is able to bridge the 
gap between phenomena and the noumenon, 
but at a cost: I am not the master 
of my own fate, 
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t h o u g h 
I may instead become 
its lover. And still, his assertion that 
existence preceeds essence is taken as a 
grand proclamation of the freedom of the will. The 
composer is bound by a variety of conventions, some 
grammatical, some material, all rhetorical.
The composer is always already a gap bridger. I have 
made much of the etymology of composition, literally to put 
together. Multimodality lies at the heart of composition (for how 
can one put together one ingredient?). 
At the core of this multimodality is the gap between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal, discourse and figure. It is here 
that the multiplicity composes itself with (un)conscious (un)
intentionality. 
And we are left with a single dot. It can signify 
circularity. A pupil (eye or student?). It signifies, 
and bears witness to the supplement which 
I was unable to include. It also sig-
nifies an end. Period.
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